本文選題：真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理 + 審計(jì)費(fèi)用��； 參考：《新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著我國新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的實(shí)施，上市公司進(jìn)行應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和成本加大。越來越多的實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，公司管理層傾向于選擇通過扭曲正常的商業(yè)活動(dòng)或構(gòu)建真實(shí)交易來操控會(huì)計(jì)盈余，稱為真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理（REM）。與應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理不同的是，這種盈余管理方式能夠直接影響企業(yè)當(dāng)期和未來經(jīng)營現(xiàn)金流量。對(duì)于一般投資者而言，這種方式不易被發(fā)現(xiàn)，也不易被外部審計(jì)師、政策監(jiān)管者和其他外部利益相關(guān)者所察覺。它會(huì)造成企業(yè)經(jīng)營活動(dòng)偏離最優(yōu)目標(biāo)，從而嚴(yán)重抑制了企業(yè)遠(yuǎn)期生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營現(xiàn)金流的能力。 文章研究了審計(jì)師在審計(jì)定價(jià)決策中，是否會(huì)考慮客戶公司進(jìn)行真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理所帶來的潛在訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，進(jìn)而提高審計(jì)服務(wù)定價(jià)。真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理與較高的審計(jì)費(fèi)用相關(guān)。因?yàn)樵谝欢ǔ潭壬纤从沉斯芾韺拥臋C(jī)會(huì)主義行為，在未來期間不易被識(shí)別并且與審計(jì)師承擔(dān)的訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相關(guān)（Gul et al，2003）。因此，管理層盈余管理手段的轉(zhuǎn)變對(duì)審計(jì)師關(guān)于訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的評(píng)估和審計(jì)定價(jià)決策產(chǎn)生了很大影響。假定審計(jì)師會(huì)對(duì)公司真實(shí)盈余管理方式保持相應(yīng)的敏感性并且有更大的動(dòng)力去理解和發(fā)現(xiàn)公司真實(shí)盈余管理跡象，鑒于真實(shí)盈余管理是一種更為嚴(yán)重的破壞企業(yè)價(jià)值的盈余管理方式，一旦審計(jì)師理解和發(fā)現(xiàn)，他們會(huì)對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理程度高的上市公司收取較高的審計(jì)服務(wù)費(fèi)用。 文章預(yù)期真實(shí)盈余管理與審計(jì)費(fèi)用的正相關(guān)關(guān)系存在的話，審計(jì)師通常會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)客戶公司真實(shí)盈余管理跡象，，并且對(duì)其財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告出具“非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”審計(jì)意見。鑒于真實(shí)盈余管理對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值的危害性和會(huì)計(jì)盈余質(zhì)量對(duì)的投資決策重要性，識(shí)別并報(bào)告上市公司真實(shí)盈余管理行為是審計(jì)師保持審計(jì)獨(dú)立性和保證審計(jì)質(zhì)量的重要表現(xiàn)，對(duì)于規(guī)范審計(jì)市場(chǎng)和證券市場(chǎng)具有重要意義。
[Abstract]:With the implementation of new accounting standards in China, the risks and costs of accrual earnings management for listed companies are increased. More and more empirical studies show that managers tend to manipulate accounting earnings by distorting normal business activities or constructing real transactions, which is called real earnings management. Different from accrual earnings management, this earnings management mode can directly affect the current and future operating cash flow. For retail investors, this approach is not easy to detect by external auditors, policy regulators and other external stakeholders. It will cause the business activities deviate from the optimal target, thus seriously constraining the cash flow ability of the long-term production and operation of the enterprise. This paper studies the auditor's ability in the audit pricing decision. Whether to consider the potential litigation risk caused by the real earnings management of client companies, and then improve the pricing of audit services. Real activity earnings management is associated with higher audit costs. Because to some extent it reflects management opportunism, it is not easy to identify in the future and is related to the litigation risks borne by auditors. Therefore, the change of management earnings management means has a great impact on auditor's assessment of litigation risk and audit pricing decision. It is assumed that auditors will be sensitive to the actual earnings management methods and have a greater incentive to understand and discover signs of real earnings management. In view of the fact that real earnings management is a more serious form of earnings management that undermines the value of an enterprise, once the auditor understands and discovers, They charge higher audit service fees for listed companies with high level of real earnings management. If there is a positive correlation between real earnings management and audit fees, auditors usually find evidence of real earnings management in client companies. And to its financial report issued a "non-standard" audit opinion. In view of the harmfulness of real earnings management to enterprise value and the importance of accounting earnings quality in investment decision-making, identifying and reporting real earnings management behavior of listed companies is an important performance for auditors to maintain audit independence and ensure audit quality. It is of great significance to standardize the audit market and the securities market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F239.4

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 張志花;金蓮花;;公司治理與真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2010年12期

2 劉啟亮;劉晶瑩;談麗華;張雅曼;;IFRS的強(qiáng)制趨同、盈余動(dòng)機(jī)與應(yīng)計(jì)及真實(shí)盈余操縱[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2011年15期

3 李增福;董志強(qiáng);連玉君;;應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理還是真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理?——基于我國2007年所得稅改革的研究[J];管理世界;2011年01期

4 李彬;張俊瑞;;真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果研究——以費(fèi)用操控為例[J];華東經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2009年02期

5 李增福;曾慶意;魏下海;;債務(wù)契約、控制人性質(zhì)與盈余管理[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)評(píng)論;2011年06期

6 李彬;張俊瑞;;銷售操控與未來經(jīng)營業(yè)績關(guān)系研究:來自中國證券市場(chǎng)的證據(jù)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)問題探索;2009年03期

7 吳聯(lián)生;薄仙慧;王亞平;;現(xiàn)金流量在多大程度上被管理了——來自我國上市公司的證據(jù)[J];金融研究;2007年03期

8 陸建橋;中國虧損上市公司盈余管理實(shí)證研究[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;1999年09期

9 魏明海;盈余管理基本理論及其研究述評(píng)[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2000年09期

10 伍利娜;盈余管理對(duì)審計(jì)費(fèi)用影響分析——來自中國上市公司首次審計(jì)費(fèi)用披露的證據(jù)[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2003年12期

本文編號(hào)：2002880