本文選題：審計(jì)契約 + 獨(dú)立性�。� 參考：《暨南大學(xué)》2008年博士論文

【摘要】： 本研究主要從審計(jì)契約的本質(zhì)和結(jié)構(gòu)、非正式契約的執(zhí)行機(jī)制、市場(chǎng)力量以及政府角色四個(gè)層次提出核心觀點(diǎn):獨(dú)立性反映了審計(jì)者在不同力量制衡下的利益傾向性,審計(jì)的契約安排為獨(dú)立性提供了制度保障,聲譽(yù)機(jī)制和獨(dú)立性的互動(dòng)效應(yīng)蘊(yùn)含著審計(jì)制度的生機(jī)。以此為基礎(chǔ),構(gòu)建了一個(gè)以審計(jì)者為中心、基于審計(jì)契約安排的獨(dú)立性互動(dòng)分析框架。 從本質(zhì)上看,契約的不完備性引發(fā)了對(duì)審計(jì)的需求,而利益主體在人格化上的分化則使得外部審計(jì)契約采用了正式契約和非正式契約兩種形式。正式契約影響著審計(jì)者的即時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)收益,決定了審計(jì)者不可能超然獨(dú)立于特定的相對(duì)人;非正式契約影響著審計(jì)者的未來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)收益,它為審計(jì)者的獨(dú)立性在制度安排上提供了一種救濟(jì)。審計(jì)契約的本質(zhì)就是不同利益主體對(duì)利益協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制進(jìn)行集體選擇的結(jié)果,利益主體的力量對(duì)比必然會(huì)通過(guò)審計(jì)契約規(guī)定的秩序影響到審計(jì)結(jié)果,審計(jì)者的獨(dú)立性就反映了他在各方利益主體力量制衡下的利益傾向性。 聲譽(yù)是非正式契約的自履行機(jī)制,也是審計(jì)者獨(dú)立性的重要保障。從表面上看,審計(jì)者的即時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益來(lái)源于他與特定相對(duì)人的正式契約規(guī)定,實(shí)際上則是來(lái)源于他所承諾的獨(dú)立性;同樣,審計(jì)者的未來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益表面上來(lái)源于他與不特定相對(duì)人之間的非正式契約安排,實(shí)際上則是來(lái)源于他實(shí)質(zhì)上的獨(dú)立性。獨(dú)立性帶來(lái)的聲譽(yù)能為審計(jì)者帶來(lái)即時(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)回報(bào);良好聲譽(yù)帶來(lái)的持續(xù)收益,也促使審計(jì)者不僅有對(duì)他的獨(dú)立性作出承諾的激勵(lì),而且還有保持實(shí)質(zhì)上獨(dú)立性的激勵(lì)。由此形成了審計(jì)者聲譽(yù)與獨(dú)立性相互作用的互動(dòng)機(jī)制。市場(chǎng)力量在這種互動(dòng)機(jī)制中的作用方式就是通過(guò)聲譽(yù)機(jī)制來(lái)約束審計(jì)者的行為、提高獨(dú)立性,幫助利益主體通過(guò)契約安排來(lái)選擇審計(jì)者、提高交易效率;一個(gè)良好的聲譽(yù)機(jī)制包括信譽(yù)體系和司法救濟(jì)兩個(gè)方面,政府的作用就是推動(dòng)信譽(yù)體系的建設(shè)和提供完善的司法救濟(jì),使得個(gè)人從中獲取的收益大于他們付出的成本,從而建立起一個(gè)穩(wěn)定的秩序構(gòu)架。 根據(jù)理論分析的結(jié)論,本研究構(gòu)建了獨(dú)立性和聲譽(yù)互動(dòng)的遞歸分析模型和審計(jì)者聲譽(yù)的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)模型,利用非線性混合方程法和混合線性方程法,從不同的方面得到了以下相似的結(jié)論: (1)審計(jì)者的獨(dú)立性受到來(lái)自包括上市公司、中小股東和市場(chǎng)力量等外界各方壓力的系統(tǒng)性影響,只要契約各方的力量對(duì)比發(fā)生了變化,獨(dú)立性就會(huì)改變。這就是審計(jì)者與上市公司之間的關(guān)系表現(xiàn)出強(qiáng)勢(shì)、弱勢(shì)和勢(shì)均力敵三種形態(tài),并且時(shí)時(shí)變化的原因。由此證明:獨(dú)立性就是審計(jì)者利益傾向的狀態(tài)。 (2)聲譽(yù)機(jī)制對(duì)獨(dú)立性的促進(jìn)作用在實(shí)證結(jié)果中得到了證實(shí),優(yōu)質(zhì)客戶有優(yōu)質(zhì)審計(jì)的需求。不僅是審計(jì)者在選擇客戶,客戶也在選擇審計(jì)者,這就形成了審計(jì)者保持高質(zhì)量和高獨(dú)立性的一種動(dòng)力。但是這種需求在不同的客戶中表現(xiàn)出差異。雖然獨(dú)立性對(duì)聲譽(yù)的作用被證明是積極性的,但是在當(dāng)前的制度背景下,它沒(méi)有能夠發(fā)揮顯著的影響。原因是聲譽(yù)的傳遞渠道是不暢通的,投資者沒(méi)有接收到關(guān)于審計(jì)者聲譽(yù)變化的確切信息,這些信息也就不足以改變他們的投資預(yù)期。統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果顯示出投資者更認(rèn)同國(guó)際四大的品牌,信賴(lài)它們的審計(jì)質(zhì)量。投資者更直接感觸到的不是審計(jì)者聲譽(yù)的改變,而是審計(jì)者長(zhǎng)期累積的聲譽(yù)——品牌。 (3)本研究也證實(shí)了非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)的信息含量,這至少說(shuō)明了投資市場(chǎng)仍然對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量存在期望。優(yōu)質(zhì)客戶需要優(yōu)質(zhì)審計(jì)的部分原因就是因?yàn)榉菢?biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)會(huì)帶來(lái)異�；貓�(bào)的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果,而且優(yōu)質(zhì)客戶優(yōu)質(zhì)審計(jì)的組合在市場(chǎng)上確實(shí)被觀察到獲得了更高的市場(chǎng)回報(bào)。但是,有關(guān)證據(jù)并不支持將這一結(jié)論推廣到所有的審計(jì)意見(jiàn)類(lèi)型。 (4)市場(chǎng)力量的作用表現(xiàn)為信息披露的程度。市場(chǎng)發(fā)育程度越高,越有利于審計(jì)者聲譽(yù)的累積;政府的干預(yù)程度越小、與市場(chǎng)的協(xié)調(diào)性越好,它的監(jiān)管作用就越能取得良好的效果;法制的約束力加大了審計(jì)者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)意識(shí),使他們不僅要挑選客戶,同時(shí)也要被客戶挑選。中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)的意見(jiàn)在投資者心目中是非常有威信的,處罰公告除了引起投資者的強(qiáng)烈反應(yīng)之外,還使得被處罰公司的個(gè)股回報(bào)顯著地低于市場(chǎng)平均水平。但是由于監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)上市公司和審計(jì)者的指責(zé)存在不及時(shí)和披露不充分的現(xiàn)象,因此沒(méi)有能夠?qū)徲?jì)者的聲譽(yù)造成顯著影響,再次說(shuō)明了聲譽(yù)形成的信息傳遞渠道不暢通。
[Abstract]:This study is mainly from the essence and structure of audit contract, the implementation mechanism of informal contract, market force and the four levels of government role. Independence reflects the interest tendency of the auditor under the balance of different forces. The audit contract arrangement provides the system guarantee for independence, the interaction of reputation mechanism and independence. The effect implies the vitality of audit system. On this basis, an independent interaction analysis framework based on auditors and based on audit contract arrangement is constructed.
In essence, the incompleteness of the contract causes the demand for the audit, and the differentiation of the personalization of the stakeholders makes the external audit contract adopt two forms of formal contract and informal contract. The formal contract affects the immediate economic income of the auditor, and determines that the auditor can not be detached from the specific relative person; The formal contract affects the future economic income of the auditor. It provides a relief for the auditor's independence in the system arrangement. The essence of the audit contract is the result of the collective choice of the interests coordination mechanism by the different stakeholders. The strength contrast of the stakeholders will inevitably affect the audit through the order stipulated in the audit contract. As a result, auditor independence reflects his interest tendency under the balance of interests of all parties.
Reputation is the self performance mechanism of informal contract and an important guarantee for the independence of auditors. On the surface, the immediate economic benefit of the auditor derives from the formal contract between him and the specific person. In fact, the independence of the auditor is derived from his commitment; also, the future economic interests of the auditor originate from him and not on the surface. The informal contract arrangement between the relative persons, in fact, is derived from his substantive independence. The reputation of independence brings immediate economic returns to the auditor; the continuing benefits of a good reputation also encourage the auditor not only to make a commitment to his independence, but also to maintain its substantive independence. Incentive. Thus, the interaction mechanism of auditor reputation and independence is formed. The role of market forces in this interactive mechanism is to restrict auditors' behavior through reputation mechanism, improve independence, help the stakeholders to choose auditors through contractual arrangements, and improve transaction efficiency; a good reputation mechanism. Including two aspects of credit system and judicial relief, the role of the government is to promote the construction of the credit system and provide perfect judicial relief, which makes the individual gain more than the cost they pay, thus establishing a stable framework of order.
According to the conclusion of the theoretical analysis, this study constructs the recursive analysis model of independence and reputation interaction and the market reaction model of the auditor's reputation. By using the nonlinear mixed equation method and the mixed linear equation method, the following conclusions are obtained from different aspects.
(1) the independence of the auditor is influenced by the pressure of the outside parties, including the listed companies, the small shareholders and the market forces. As long as the strength of the parties in the contract changes, the independence will change. This is the strong, weak and equal three forms of the relations between the auditors and the listed companies. The reasons for this change are: independence is the state of interest tendency of auditors.
(2) the promotion of reputation mechanism to independence has been confirmed in the empirical results. High quality customers have the demand of high quality audit. Not only is the auditor choosing the customer, but also the customer is choosing the auditor. This has formed a driving force for the auditor to maintain high quality and high independence. However, this demand shows differences among different customers. Although the role of independence on reputation is proved to be positive, it has not been able to play a significant role in the current institutional context. The reason is that the channels of reputation transfer are unimpeded, and investors have not received the exact information about the changes in the reputation of the auditors, and this information is not enough to change their investment expectations. The results show that investors are more likely to identify with the four largest brands in the world and rely on their audit quality. Investors are more directly affected than the changes in the auditor's reputation, but the reputation of the auditors for a long time - the brand.
(3) this study also confirms the information content of non standard audit opinion, which at least indicates that the investment market still has the expectation of audit quality. The reason for high quality audit is partly because of the economic consequences of abnormal returns, and the combination of high quality audit of high quality customers is true in the market. A higher market return was observed. However, the evidence does not support this conclusion to all audit opinion types.
(4) the role of market force is shown as the degree of information disclosure. The higher the market development, the more beneficial to the buildup of auditors' reputation; the smaller the level of the government's intervention, the better the coordination with the market, the better the effect of its regulatory role; the binding force of the legal system increases the risk awareness of the auditors and makes them not only selected. The comments of the CSRC are very prestigious in the minds of the investors, and the penalty announcement, in addition to the strong reaction of the investors, also makes the shares of the penalized company significantly lower than the market average. But because the regulators' accusations to the listed companies and auditors are not. The lack of timely and inadequate disclosure has not significantly affected auditors' reputation, which once again shows that the information transmission channel of reputation formation is not smooth.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：暨南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F239.4;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 何敬;審計(jì)期望差距研究[D];東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2010年

2 李俊梅;注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師會(huì)計(jì)舞弊識(shí)別能力研究[D];石河子大學(xué);2011年

3 蔣基路;特定應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)的盈余管理研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2009年

4 張薇;我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)購(gòu)買(mǎi)行為研究[D];中南大學(xué);2010年

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本文編號(hào)：1894449