本文選題：審計(jì)定價(jià) + 成本　； 參考：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2007年博士論文

【摘要】： 獨(dú)立審計(jì)對(duì)于降低企業(yè)代理成本，緩解代理沖突，優(yōu)化資本市場(chǎng)資源配置，維護(hù)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序發(fā)揮著不可替代的重要作用。然而，在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)高速發(fā)展、資本市場(chǎng)日漸完善的過(guò)程中，獨(dú)立審計(jì)產(chǎn)業(yè)卻面臨著種種困境。這些困境主要源自獨(dú)立審計(jì)產(chǎn)業(yè)承擔(dān)的雙重責(zé)任及其定價(jià)機(jī)制：一方面履行著維護(hù)社會(huì)公眾利益，降低企業(yè)代理成本以及提高資本市場(chǎng)配置效率的職責(zé)，，另一方面必須獲取行業(yè)收益，維持自身生存，支持產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展。審計(jì)產(chǎn)品的定價(jià)機(jī)制較普通產(chǎn)品更為復(fù)雜，可以這么說(shuō)，沒(méi)有一個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)如同獨(dú)立審計(jì)一樣，一方面從被審計(jì)人處獲取經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，另一方面卻要維護(hù)那些并不付費(fèi)的人員和組織的利益。證券市場(chǎng)吸納了最廣泛的公眾資金，將公眾利益置于最高地位，利益雙軌制所引發(fā)的矛盾、沖突往往被放大、擴(kuò)展。證券市場(chǎng)的審計(jì)定價(jià)問(wèn)題，不僅牽涉到公眾利益和行業(yè)利益的矛盾、沖突及其平衡、協(xié)調(diào)，更是聚集了審計(jì)產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益與職業(yè)道德之間紛繁復(fù)雜的關(guān)系，引發(fā)各國(guó)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)高度關(guān)注，成為學(xué)術(shù)界“百家爭(zhēng)鳴”的主題之一。 在我國(guó)上市公司年報(bào)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)中，會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的審計(jì)定價(jià)行為表現(xiàn)為兩個(gè)極端。一方面，證券審計(jì)市場(chǎng)集中度較低，審計(jì)產(chǎn)品缺乏差異，價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈，審計(jì)回扣盛行；另一方面，“四大”合作所享有超國(guó)民待遇，源源不斷地獲取高額“審計(jì)溢價(jià)”，國(guó)內(nèi)事務(wù)所缺乏良性的生存發(fā)展環(huán)境。我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的收費(fèi)情況為何存在中外兩重天的情況?“四大”的溢價(jià)究竟來(lái)自何處?審計(jì)回扣是否就是低價(jià)攬客?針對(duì)這些問(wèn)題，現(xiàn)有的研究文獻(xiàn)往往僅限于財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)、事務(wù)所特征等角度，缺乏系統(tǒng)性的整體分析框架。另外，我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的形成和發(fā)展一直都是由政府直接推動(dòng)的，政府行為對(duì)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的規(guī)模結(jié)構(gòu)和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)狀況存在深刻的影響，審計(jì)產(chǎn)品定價(jià)的政府監(jiān)管也由來(lái)已久。但是，政府的這些監(jiān)管政策是否有效?政府是否能夠直接管制定價(jià)?審計(jì)定價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)到底是由政府管制還是由市場(chǎng)決定?這些問(wèn)題尚且缺乏明確的答案，值得深入探討。 證券審計(jì)市場(chǎng)定價(jià)的影響因素紛繁復(fù)雜，事務(wù)所定價(jià)行為的表現(xiàn)形式千差萬(wàn)別。只有透過(guò)表面現(xiàn)象，才能成功地捕捉到審計(jì)定價(jià)問(wèn)題的本質(zhì)。國(guó)際“四大”囊括我國(guó)A股證券審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的高端客戶，坐擁高額溢價(jià)的事實(shí)，反映了國(guó)際大型事務(wù)所在法律風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較低的新興市場(chǎng)的盈利模式，從一個(gè)側(cè)面顯露了國(guó)際大型事務(wù)所的全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略。當(dāng)前，如何以合理的定價(jià)機(jī)制和定價(jià)水平提升審計(jì)師的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)意識(shí)，維護(hù)應(yīng)有的審計(jì)質(zhì)量，確保合理的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)格局，對(duì)于我國(guó)本土審計(jì)產(chǎn)業(yè)的健康發(fā)展有著重要意義，這也是正是本文的要旨所在。本文立足我國(guó)A股市場(chǎng)，以上市公司年報(bào)審計(jì)定價(jià)為研究對(duì)象，對(duì)上述問(wèn)題進(jìn)行歸納、整理和回答，以期探求問(wèn)題背后的原因，為監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)制定政策提供相關(guān)依據(jù)，為學(xué)術(shù)界的后續(xù)工作提供研究基礎(chǔ)。 本文的核心內(nèi)容包括三大部分。一是構(gòu)建一個(gè)系統(tǒng)完整的審計(jì)定價(jià)分析框架，據(jù)此考察我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)審計(jì)定價(jià)的實(shí)際情況。本文根據(jù)審計(jì)定價(jià)區(qū)間模型，結(jié)合審計(jì)定價(jià)的影響因素，抽象出審計(jì)定價(jià)的四項(xiàng)主要約束條件，即成本、需求、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和監(jiān)管。這四個(gè)方面分別是審計(jì)產(chǎn)品的供給方、需求方、市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)以及監(jiān)管方的替代變量，由此構(gòu)建中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)審計(jì)定價(jià)的分析模型。根據(jù)這一分析模型，全文從兩個(gè)層面分析問(wèn)題：第一個(gè)層面是理論分析，本文分別闡述了成本、需求、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和管制的理論基礎(chǔ)：第二個(gè)層面是針對(duì)我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的實(shí)際情況進(jìn)行經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析。二是考察“四大”在中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的審計(jì)定價(jià)行為。在逐項(xiàng)闡述成本、需求、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和監(jiān)管理論的同時(shí)，本文著重分析了“四大”的成本結(jié)構(gòu)、需求特征、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為，旨在探究“四大”究竟是否獲取了溢價(jià)以及如何獲取溢價(jià)的。三是考察某些審計(jì)定價(jià)現(xiàn)象。在我國(guó)證券審計(jì)市場(chǎng)中，審計(jì)回扣、非審計(jì)服務(wù)、定價(jià)聯(lián)盟等都對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量和市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)產(chǎn)生重要影響。本文針對(duì)這些問(wèn)題進(jìn)行專題分析。 從整體上看，本文在以下幾個(gè)方面作出了積極探索： 第一，本文將影響審計(jì)定價(jià)的眾多因素概括為四項(xiàng)內(nèi)容，構(gòu)建了一個(gè)系統(tǒng)的分析框架。根據(jù)這一框架，本文逐項(xiàng)展開(kāi)充分論證。這一工作使得審計(jì)定價(jià)的研究具有系統(tǒng)性，由此能夠彌補(bǔ)一些局部研究成果的不足。 第二，本文吸收、借鑒近期的研究成果和研究方法，在構(gòu)建一個(gè)比較系統(tǒng)和完整的理論框架之上，密切聯(lián)系國(guó)內(nèi)實(shí)際情況，注重規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合，使得提出的政策建議更具有針對(duì)性和說(shuō)服力。 第三，本文的主要研究結(jié)論具有一定的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。首先，本文提出了審計(jì)定價(jià)悖論。審計(jì)產(chǎn)品的準(zhǔn)公共產(chǎn)品特質(zhì)與私人定價(jià)機(jī)制之間的矛盾構(gòu)成了審計(jì)定價(jià)悖論，這一悖論是引發(fā)審計(jì)付費(fèi)人和委托人合一的前提，也是研究相關(guān)審計(jì)問(wèn)題的出發(fā)點(diǎn)。其次，通過(guò)深入細(xì)致地考察“四大”溢價(jià)來(lái)源，本文認(rèn)為，由于缺乏顯著證據(jù)證明“四大”溢價(jià)來(lái)源于市場(chǎng)勢(shì)力和產(chǎn)品差異，因而“四大”在中國(guó)市場(chǎng)取得的溢價(jià)更有可能來(lái)自優(yōu)質(zhì)國(guó)企的主動(dòng)提供以及政府偏好的影響。第三，由于審計(jì)產(chǎn)品的特殊性，主流的政府價(jià)格管制模型無(wú)法為審計(jì)定價(jià)管制提供理論支持。在實(shí)踐中，直接價(jià)格管制政策(以最低限價(jià)為例)的實(shí)施效果并不理想。因此，從整體上看，審計(jì)產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格難以由政府規(guī)定或者管制。 由于審計(jì)定價(jià)問(wèn)題紛繁復(fù)雜，影響因素眾多。盡管本文從上述四個(gè)方面進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)分析，但是，上述四個(gè)方面往往是交叉作用，因而不可避免地存在一定程度的變量?jī)?nèi)生問(wèn)題。盡管本文已經(jīng)力圖控制這種內(nèi)生影響，但更為徹底的控制方法是通過(guò)設(shè)計(jì)計(jì)算機(jī)程序，模擬系統(tǒng)內(nèi)因素的影響。因此，控制變量?jī)?nèi)生和運(yùn)用新的研究方法，例如系統(tǒng)動(dòng)力學(xué)，應(yīng)當(dāng)是未來(lái)可行的研究方向。另外，審計(jì)定價(jià)問(wèn)題與職業(yè)道德、獨(dú)立性問(wèn)題密切相關(guān)，因此，從社會(huì)學(xué)、倫理學(xué)以及心理學(xué)等領(lǐng)域深入研究審計(jì)定價(jià)問(wèn)題是必要的。
[Abstract]:Independent audit plays an irreplaceable role in reducing agency cost, alleviating agency conflict, optimizing capital market resource allocation and maintaining market economy order. However, in the process of rapid development of the market economy and the improvement of capital market, the independent audit industry is faced with various difficulties. These difficulties are mainly derived from independence. The dual responsibility and pricing mechanism undertaken by the audit industry: on the one hand, it performs the responsibility of maintaining social public interests, reducing the agency cost and improving the efficiency of the capital market allocation. On the other hand, it is necessary to obtain industry income, maintain its own survival and support industrial development. The pricing mechanism of the trial product is more complex than the common product. It can be said that there is no industry, like an independent audit, on the one hand to obtain economic benefits from the auditor, on the other hand, to maintain the interests of those who do not pay. The securities market absorbs the most extensive public funds, puts the public interest in the highest position, the contradiction caused by the double track system of interest, and the conflict. The problem of audit pricing in the securities market is not only involved in the contradiction between the public interests and the interests of the industry, and the conflict and its balance and coordination, but also the complicated and complicated relationship between the economic interests of the audit industry and the professional ethics, which has aroused the high attention of the regulatory agencies of various countries and has become one of the themes of the "contention of a hundred schools of a hundred schools of thought" in the academic circles.
In the annual report audit market of the listed companies in China, the audit pricing behavior of the accounting firms is two extremes. On the one hand, the market concentration of the audit market is low, the audit products are not different, the price competition is fierce, the audit rebate is prevalent; on the other hand, the "four big" cooperation enjoys the super national treatment, and has a constant source of high "amount". "Audit premium", domestic firms lack of a benign environment for survival and development. Why does the charge situation of China's audit market exist between China and foreign countries? Where do the "four big" premium come from? Is the audit rebate a low price package? The existing research literature is often limited to financial indicators and firm characteristics. In addition, the formation and development of the securities market in China have been driven directly by the government. The government behavior has a profound influence on the scale structure and competition situation of the audit market. The government supervision of the audit product pricing has also been long. But are the government's regulatory policies effective? Can the government control the pricing directly? Is the audit pricing standard controlled by the government or by the market? These questions still lack a clear answer, which should be discussed in depth.
There are numerous and complicated factors affecting the pricing of the securities audit market, and the forms of pricing behavior of the firm are different. Only through the surface phenomenon can we capture the essence of the audit pricing successfully. The international "four big" covers the high end customers of our country's A stock audit market, and the fact that the high premium is sitting in the market reflects the large international events. The profit model of the emerging market with lower legal risk has revealed the global competition strategy of large international firms from one side. At present, how to improve the auditor's risk awareness with reasonable pricing mechanism and pricing level, maintain the due audit quality, ensure the reasonable competition pattern and the local audit industry in our country This paper, based on the A share market of our country, takes the annual report audit pricing of listed companies as the research object, and summarizes the above questions, collate and answer the problems, in order to find out the reasons behind the problems, provide the relevant basis for the policy setting policy and the follow-up work for the academic community. Provide the basis for research.
The core content of this paper consists of three parts. One is to construct a systematic and integrated framework of audit pricing analysis, and to investigate the actual situation of audit pricing in China's securities market. According to the audit pricing interval model and the influencing factors of audit pricing, this paper abstracts the four main constraints of audit pricing, namely, cost, demand, and competition. The four aspects are the suppliers of the audit products, the demand side, the market competition and the replacement variables of the regulators, thus the analysis model of the audit pricing of China's securities market is constructed. According to this analysis model, the full text analyses the problems from two levels: the first level is the theoretical analysis, and the cost and the demand are expounded in this paper. The theoretical basis of competition and control: the second level is the empirical analysis of the actual situation in China's securities market. Two is to examine the audit pricing behavior of the "four major" in the Chinese securities market. At the same time, the cost, demand, competition and supervision theory are expounded, the cost structure of the "four big" and the demand characteristics are emphatically analyzed. Competitive behavior is designed to explore whether the "four major" has got a premium and how to get a premium. Three is to examine some of the audit pricing phenomena. In China's securities audit market, audit rebates, non audit services, and pricing alliances all have a heavy impact on audit quality and market competition. This paper makes a special analysis of these problems.
On the whole, this article has made active explorations in the following aspects:
First, in this paper, we generalize the factors that affect the audit pricing as four items, and build a systematic analysis framework. According to this framework, this paper makes full demonstration of the audit pricing. This work makes the research of audit pricing systematic and can make up some deficiencies of the local research results.
Second, this article absorbs and draws on the recent research results and methods, and on the basis of a relatively systematic and complete theoretical framework, closely links the actual situation in China, and pays more attention to the combination of normative and empirical research, making the proposed policy recommendations more pertinent and persuasive.
Third, the main conclusions of this paper have some theoretical and practical significance. First, this paper puts forward the paradox of audit pricing. The contradiction between the quality of the quasi public products and the private pricing mechanism of the audit products constitutes the paradox of audit pricing. This paradox is the prerequisite for the combination of the auditors and the clients and the research phase. Secondly, through a thorough and careful investigation of the "four big" premium sources, this article believes that, due to the lack of significant evidence that the "four" premium comes from market forces and product differences, the premium of "the four" in the Chinese market is more likely to come from the initiative of the high quality state-owned enterprises and the government's preference. Third, due to the particularity of audit products, the mainstream government price control model can not provide theoretical support for audit pricing control. In practice, the effect of direct price control policy (with the minimum price as an example) is not ideal. Therefore, the price of audit products is difficult to be regulated or regulated by the government on the whole.
Although the audit pricing problem is complicated and many factors are affected, the above four aspects are systematically analyzed, but the above four aspects are often intersecting and inevitably exist in a certain degree of variable endogenous problems. Although this article has tried to control the endogenous influence, the more thorough control method It is by designing computer programs to simulate the influence of factors within the system. Therefore, the control variable endogenous and application of new research methods, such as system dynamics, should be the future research direction. In addition, the audit pricing problem is closely related to the professional ethics and independence, so it is deep in the fields of sociology, ethics and psychology. It is necessary to study the issue of audit pricing.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

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