本文選題：上市公司 + 更換審計(jì)師��； 參考：《東北林業(yè)大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文

【摘要】： 近年來(lái)，我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)中上市公司更換審計(jì)師的案例日益增多。更換審計(jì)師作為市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)中上市公司一種特殊經(jīng)濟(jì)行為，毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)具有一定的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果。具體而言，審計(jì)報(bào)告的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果是通過(guò)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)類型的表達(dá)差異來(lái)體現(xiàn)的，審計(jì)師變更對(duì)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)類型產(chǎn)生影響，從而產(chǎn)生經(jīng)濟(jì)后果。人們對(duì)公司通過(guò)審計(jì)師變更來(lái)獲取更有利審計(jì)報(bào)告的關(guān)注，迫使管制機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)此做出回應(yīng)，并采取了種種管制措施。然而，這些措施是否必要，是否反應(yīng)過(guò)度，對(duì)相關(guān)利益方有什么影響，，對(duì)投資者的投資決策有什么意義，市場(chǎng)對(duì)審計(jì)師變更的反應(yīng)程度如何，都需要經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)的證實(shí)。 本文首先對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)梳理，對(duì)相關(guān)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)及經(jīng)濟(jì)后果理論進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)總結(jié)，并對(duì)我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的特點(diǎn)予以概括。在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文選取了2003、2004、2005年我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)中上市公司發(fā)起的審計(jì)師變更的A股上市公司為樣本，研究變更審計(jì)師后上市公司如何選擇后任審計(jì)師以及這種選擇如何影響審計(jì)意見(jiàn)，從而找出上市公司是否實(shí)現(xiàn)了以及在多大程度上實(shí)現(xiàn)上述動(dòng)機(jī)。另外，作為公開(kāi)披露的重大事件之一，更換審計(jì)師可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)，本文試圖對(duì)我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)中的若干審計(jì)師變更樣本進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)，以發(fā)現(xiàn)審計(jì)師變更事件是否存在市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)及其潛在含義。 通過(guò)實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，上市公司更換審計(jì)師存在明顯的購(gòu)買(mǎi)審計(jì)意見(jiàn)的目的，而且他們成功地達(dá)成了此目的。更換審計(jì)師事件在董事會(huì)決議公告日前后時(shí)窗存在市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)，在股東大會(huì)決議公告日前后時(shí)窗則不存在市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)。這說(shuō)明在我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)中，相關(guān)的信息披露制度逐漸完善，市場(chǎng)對(duì)上市公司更換審計(jì)師做出了反應(yīng)。但由于上市公司在實(shí)際操作時(shí)并未完全按規(guī)定執(zhí)行，存在著信息披露嚴(yán)重滯后、虛假披露等問(wèn)題，因而需要加強(qiáng)對(duì)上市公司信息披露的及時(shí)性和規(guī)范性的監(jiān)管。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the number of listed companies changing auditors in China's securities market is increasing. As a special economic behavior of listed companies in the market economy, the replacement of auditors undoubtedly has certain economic consequences. Specifically, the economic consequences of the audit report are reflected by the differences in the expression of the type of audit opinion, and the change of auditors has an impact on the type of audit opinion, thus producing economic consequences. The concern that companies obtain more favourable audit reports by changing auditors forces regulators to respond and take various controls. However, whether these measures are necessary, overreacted, have any impact on the relevant stakeholders, what is the significance to investors' investment decisions, and how far the market responds to the change of auditors needs to be verified by empirical evidence. Firstly, this paper systematically reviews the relevant research at home and abroad, summarizes the relevant audit market and the theory of economic consequences, and summarizes the characteristics of the audit market in our country. On this basis, this paper selects the A-share listed companies initiated by the listed companies in China's stock market in 20032004 and 2005 as the samples. This paper studies how the listed company chooses the subsequent auditor after the change of auditor and how this choice affects the audit opinion, so as to find out whether and to what extent the listed company has realized the above motivation. In addition, as one of the important events of public disclosure, the change of auditor may produce market reaction. This paper attempts to test several samples of auditor change in China's securities market. To find out whether there is a market reaction to the auditor change event and its potential implications. Through empirical research, it is found that there is a clear purpose of purchasing audit opinions in the exchange of auditors of listed companies, and they have successfully achieved this purpose. There is a market reaction in the time window of the auditor change before and after the announcement day of the board resolution, but there is no market reaction in the time window before and after the announcement date of the resolution of the shareholders' general meeting. This shows that in China's securities market, the relevant information disclosure system is gradually improved, and the market has reacted to the change of auditors of listed companies. However, due to the fact that the listed company is not carried out in accordance with the regulations in practice, there are some problems such as serious lag of information disclosure and false disclosure, so it is necessary to strengthen the supervision of the timeliness and standardization of information disclosure of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北林業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：F276.6;F239.4

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