本文選題：管理舞弊 + 管理舞弊控制　； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2007年博士論文

【摘要】： 眾所周知,會(huì)計(jì)信息是決策的重要依據(jù),會(huì)計(jì)信息失真帶來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果可能是十分嚴(yán)重的,更何況是管理舞弊產(chǎn)生的惡劣影響。然而,自18世紀(jì)英國(guó)南海公司舞弊案催生獨(dú)立審計(jì)以來(lái),因?yàn)楣芾砦璞椎膹V泛存在,審計(jì)師與公司管理層之間一直上演著貓捉老鼠的游戲。所以,管理舞弊控制與審計(jì)質(zhì)量,也就不可避免地成為了具有歷史性和長(zhǎng)久性的研究課題。 財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表是由管理層負(fù)責(zé)編制的,即使由注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師依據(jù)一般公認(rèn)審計(jì)準(zhǔn)則進(jìn)行了審計(jì),財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表所揭露的信息終究是財(cái)務(wù)性、歷史性的,公開時(shí)點(diǎn)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落在企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)行為之后。盡管如此,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)仍然被視為公司管理舞弊控制的重要防線。在管理舞弊控制方面,審計(jì)師有自己的職業(yè)優(yōu)勢(shì),也存在著職業(yè)劣勢(shì)。審計(jì)師管理舞弊控制的理論基礎(chǔ)是什么?從理論上講,高質(zhì)量審計(jì)應(yīng)該能夠在管理舞弊控制方面有著良好表現(xiàn),控制管理舞弊應(yīng)該能夠提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量,能否以實(shí)證研究的方式為理論提供數(shù)據(jù)支持呢? 本文共分七章。 第一章,緒論。主要對(duì)本文的研究背景、研究問題和研究方法進(jìn)行說(shuō)明。 第二章,管理舞弊控制與審計(jì)質(zhì)量概述。首先,本章回顧了舞弊訴訟對(duì)審計(jì)準(zhǔn)則、審計(jì)程序、審計(jì)信息披露、舞弊審計(jì)責(zé)任等產(chǎn)生的重大影響。舞弊訴訟判例反映出一種日漸明顯的趨勢(shì),即加大了審計(jì)師揭示管理舞弊的法律責(zé)任。審計(jì)職業(yè)界為了適應(yīng)法律環(huán)境的變化,為了更好地提高服務(wù)水準(zhǔn),不得不修改既有的審計(jì)規(guī)范或更新過(guò)時(shí)的審計(jì)理念,從而提高了揭示管理舞弊的審計(jì)能力,也縮小了與社會(huì)公眾的審計(jì)期望差距,提高了審計(jì)執(zhí)業(yè)質(zhì)量。其次,本章結(jié)合所要研究的問題進(jìn)行了相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)回顧,文獻(xiàn)回顧對(duì)管理舞弊的界定、研究樣本的選擇和研究?jī)?nèi)容的安排帶來(lái)了啟示。 第三章,管理舞弊控制與審計(jì)質(zhì)量研究的理論基礎(chǔ)。蔡春教授(1991,2002)提出的受托經(jīng)濟(jì)責(zé)任觀和審計(jì)控制觀指出,審計(jì)是一種以確保受托經(jīng)濟(jì)責(zé)任之全面有效履行為目標(biāo)的特殊的經(jīng)濟(jì)控制行為。以此為理論基礎(chǔ),本章論述了受托經(jīng)濟(jì)責(zé)任是聯(lián)系管理舞弊控制與審計(jì)質(zhì)量的紐帶,控制管理舞弊是社會(huì)公眾對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的期望,也是提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量的前提。美國(guó)著名的特雷德韋委員會(huì)(Treadway Commission)將注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)作為公司舞弊控制的四道防線之一。管理舞弊控制方面,審計(jì)師有自己的職業(yè)優(yōu)勢(shì),也存在著職業(yè)劣勢(shì)。本章指出,盡管審計(jì)師的“追求個(gè)人私利的理性經(jīng)濟(jì)人”身份為其超然獨(dú)立帶來(lái)了先天性阻力,但正當(dāng)懷疑理念、應(yīng)有關(guān)注理念、舞弊推定原則,以及審計(jì)判斷和審計(jì)分析技術(shù)等審計(jì)學(xué)基本理念與技術(shù),仍然可以為審計(jì)師偵查舞弊發(fā)揮指導(dǎo)作用。 第四章,研究設(shè)計(jì)。本章奠定了本文后續(xù)實(shí)證研究的樣本基礎(chǔ)。首先,政府監(jiān)管與管理舞弊樣本的選擇。以國(guó)泰安“CSMAR違規(guī)處理數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)”中被公告違規(guī)的公司作為研究管理舞弊的樣本來(lái)源,通過(guò)逐步篩選得到了198個(gè)管理舞弊樣本:(1)因?yàn)閷?shí)證研究中運(yùn)用到了現(xiàn)金流量數(shù)據(jù),違規(guī)樣本的選擇時(shí)間始于1998年;(2)因?yàn)檠芯恐羞\(yùn)用到的審計(jì)意見數(shù)據(jù)是針對(duì)上市公司年度會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表的,所以選擇涉及年報(bào)的違規(guī)樣本,而將涉及中報(bào)、季報(bào)、臨時(shí)公告、招股說(shuō)明書、上市公告、配股增發(fā)說(shuō)明書的違規(guī)樣本剔除。其次,會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表舞弊識(shí)別與管理舞弊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)樣本的選擇。會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表舞弊識(shí)別指標(biāo)的選擇按如下順序進(jìn)行:(1)為管理舞弊樣本查找配對(duì)樣本,配對(duì)樣本從同一行業(yè)、同一年度、資產(chǎn)最接近、而且沒有被報(bào)道過(guò)舞弊事件的非丑聞公司中查找;(2)通過(guò)管理舞弊樣本組與配對(duì)樣本組財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)的非參數(shù)檢驗(yàn),得到兩組之間存在顯著性差異的三個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo);(3)以這三個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)作為解釋變量進(jìn)行回歸分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)其中的“關(guān)聯(lián)交易度”是影響管理舞弊(被解釋變量)的最顯著的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)。以關(guān)聯(lián)交易度為會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表舞弊識(shí)別指標(biāo),得到198個(gè)因關(guān)聯(lián)交易過(guò)度而可能存在管理舞弊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的樣本。最后,以修正的瓊斯模型(Modified Jones Model)計(jì)量盈余管理程度,得到198個(gè)因盈余管理過(guò)度而可能存在管理舞弊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的樣本。由此,得到本文后續(xù)實(shí)證研究的594個(gè)管理舞弊(風(fēng)險(xiǎn))樣本。 第五章,高質(zhì)量審計(jì)與管理舞弊控制關(guān)系的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。首先,審計(jì)意見與管理舞弊相關(guān)性的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)表明,盡管中外媒體披露了大量的審計(jì)師針對(duì)舞弊報(bào)表的審計(jì)失敗案例,使得社會(huì)公眾對(duì)審計(jì)師在經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)中應(yīng)有的作用產(chǎn)生了懷疑,并對(duì)審計(jì)師揭露管理舞弊的能力產(chǎn)生了疑問,但從總體上來(lái)講,審計(jì)師能夠?qū)ξ璞讏?bào)表謹(jǐn)慎選擇審計(jì)意見,能夠以出具非標(biāo)審計(jì)意見的方式對(duì)管理舞弊說(shuō)“不”。其次,以中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)上的“九大”和國(guó)際五大作為高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的替代變量,檢驗(yàn)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)在管理舞弊控制方面的表現(xiàn),實(shí)證結(jié)果表明,2001-2003中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)上的“九大”在管理舞弊控制方面有著良好表現(xiàn),但在管理舞弊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制方面沒有良好的表現(xiàn)。2001-2005中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)上的國(guó)際五大則在管理舞弊控制和管理舞弊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制方面均沒有良好表現(xiàn)。本章的實(shí)證結(jié)論與相關(guān)學(xué)者的研究結(jié)論都表明,如果不改善中國(guó)內(nèi)地獨(dú)立審計(jì)制度安排,理論上的“高質(zhì)量審計(jì)”在中國(guó)內(nèi)地是難以發(fā)揮其高質(zhì)量審計(jì)功能的。 第六章,管理舞弊控制與審計(jì)質(zhì)量相關(guān)性的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。本章以審計(jì)師對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性(conservatism)的審計(jì)意見反應(yīng)和操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)(Discretionary Accruals, DA)作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量的替代變量,分別進(jìn)行了管理舞弊控制與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)和管理舞弊控制與操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。管理舞弊控制與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)論說(shuō)明,從整體上講審計(jì)師識(shí)別了存在管理舞弊的上市公司之間的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性差異。這為會(huì)計(jì)信息使用者推測(cè)上市公司的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性提供了一個(gè)新的視角。管理舞弊控制與操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)論表明,審計(jì)師控制管理舞弊和管理舞弊風(fēng)險(xiǎn),降低了客戶公司報(bào)告盈余中的“操控”成份,控制管理舞弊和管理舞弊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提高了客戶公司的盈余質(zhì)量。 第七章,結(jié)論、局限性與后續(xù)研究建議。本章主要?dú)w納了本文的主要結(jié)論,并指出了研究的局限性,同時(shí)提出了進(jìn)行后續(xù)研究的建議。筆者在既有研究的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行了一定的嘗試和努力,論文可能的改進(jìn)與創(chuàng)新如下: 第一,本文不但遵照研究慣例從政府監(jiān)管角度選擇違規(guī)公司作為管理舞弊樣本,還通過(guò)會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表舞弊識(shí)別與盈余管理計(jì)量選擇了可能存在管理舞弊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的樣本,擴(kuò)大了管理舞弊研究的范圍。 第二,本文引入管理舞弊(風(fēng)險(xiǎn))控制變量修正了Ball and Shivakumar(2005)的分段線性回歸模型(piecewise-linear regression model),并對(duì)其進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)論說(shuō)明,從整體上講,審計(jì)師具備識(shí)別存在管理舞弊上市公司之間的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性差異的能力。這為會(huì)計(jì)信息使用者推測(cè)上市公司的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性提供了一個(gè)新的視角。 第三,本文以操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)(DA)作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量的替代變量進(jìn)行了非參數(shù)檢驗(yàn)。結(jié)果表明,控制了管理舞弊(風(fēng)險(xiǎn))樣本組的操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)低于沒有控制管理舞弊(風(fēng)險(xiǎn))樣本組的操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn),說(shuō)明上市公司的報(bào)告盈余是管理當(dāng)局與審計(jì)師共同作用的結(jié)果;審計(jì)師控制管理舞弊(風(fēng)險(xiǎn)),有助于降低客戶公司報(bào)告盈余中的“操控”成份,為控制管理舞弊(風(fēng)險(xiǎn))有助于提高盈余質(zhì)量,進(jìn)而提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量,提供了有力的數(shù)據(jù)支持。
[Abstract]:It is well - known that accounting information is an important basis for decision - making , and the economic consequences of accounting information distortion may be very serious , and worse , it is the bad influence of management fraud . However , since the fraud of the South China Sea Corporation in the 18th century has prompted the independent audit , since the management of fraud is widespread , the auditors and the management of the company have been playing cat - and - mouse games . Therefore , management of fraud control and audit quality inevitably becomes a historic and long - term research topic .









The financial statements are prepared by management , even when audited by certified public accountants on the basis of generally accepted auditing standards , the information disclosed in the financial statements is financial , historical and public , and falls far behind the economic behavior of the enterprise . However , the CPA audit is still regarded as an important defensive line of the company ' s management fraud control . In the management of fraud control , the auditor has its own professional advantage and has a professional disadvantage .









This article is divided into seven chapters .









Chapter One , Introduction . The research background , research problems and research methods are mainly described in this paper .









Chapter 2 , management fraud control and audit quality overview . First , this chapter reviews the major influence of fraud litigation on auditing standards , audit procedures , audit information disclosure , fraud auditing responsibilities , etc . The case of fraud litigation reflects a growing trend , that is , increases auditors ' legal liability for managing fraud . In order to improve the auditing ability of management fraud , the audit profession has to modify the existing auditing standards or to update outdated auditing concepts , thus improving auditing practice quality . Secondly , this chapter reviews the definition of management fraud , and studies the choice of sample and the arrangement of research contents .









In chapter 3 , the theory basis of management fraud control and audit quality research is discussed . It is pointed out that auditing is a kind of special economic control behavior to ensure the comprehensive and effective performance of entrusted economic responsibility .









In chapter four , the paper establishes a sample basis for the follow - up empirical research in this chapter . First of all , there are 198 sample sources of fraud in government supervision and management .









Chapter five , the empirical test of the relationship between audit opinion and management fraud control shows that , although the Chinese and foreign media have disclosed a large number of auditors ' audit failure cases for fraud report , the auditor can choose the audit opinion in the way of management fraud control , but it has no good performance in management of fraud control .









Chapter 6 : An empirical test of the correlation between fraud control and auditing quality . An empirical test of management fraud control and accounting robustness is provided .









Chapter 7 , conclusions , limitations and follow - up suggestions . This chapter summarizes the main conclusions of this paper and points out the limitations of the research , and puts forward some suggestions for the follow - up study . The author has made some attempts and efforts on the basis of the existing research , and the possible improvement and innovation of the paper are as follows :









Firstly , according to the research practice , the paper selects the non - compliance company from the perspective of government supervision as the management fraud sample , and also selects the sample which can manage the fraud risk through the accounting statement fraud identification and earnings management measurement , and expands the scope of the management fraud research .









Secondly , the author introduces the piecewise linear regression model of Ball and Shivour mar ( 2005 ) by introducing the control variable of management fraud ( risk ) , and makes an empirical study on it . The result shows that the auditor has the ability to identify the accounting robustness difference between listed companies . This provides a new perspective for the users of accounting information to speculate the accounting robustness of listed companies .









Third , this paper makes a non - parametric test on the basis of the profit ( DA ) as an alternative to the quality of audit . The results show that the profit of the control of the sample set is lower than that of the sample group without control management fraud ( risk ) . It is shown that the report earnings of the listed company are the result of the common action between the management authority and the auditor ; the auditor controls the management of fraud ( risk ) , helps to reduce the " manipulation " component of the report surplus of the client company , helps to improve the earnings quality for the control management fraud ( risk ) , and further improves the quality of the audit and provides strong data support .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：F239.2;F233

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 李秀枝;我國(guó)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊特征及識(shí)別研究[D];中國(guó)礦業(yè)大學(xué);2010年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前8條

1 孫淑珍;管理舞弊控制與盈余質(zhì)量[D];中國(guó)海洋大學(xué);2010年

2 賀仕華;差量審計(jì)定價(jià)與審計(jì)合謀研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2011年

3 劉傳會(huì);管理層舞弊的法務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)調(diào)查與預(yù)防研究[D];重慶理工大學(xué);2011年

4 王曉敏;上市公司會(huì)計(jì)舞弊與審計(jì)失敗研究[D];沈陽(yáng)工業(yè)大學(xué);2011年

5 周云;我國(guó)高新技術(shù)企業(yè)管理層舞弊審計(jì)方法研究[D];天津財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2008年

6 李光;基于舞弊揭露目標(biāo)的審計(jì)策略研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2010年

7 王仲祥;上市公司獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量研究[D];天津師范大學(xué);2012年

8 李曉燕;管理層凌駕內(nèi)部控制問題研究[D];山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號(hào)：1867840