本文選題：審計(jì)合謀治理 + 審計(jì)師激勵(lì)��； 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2008年碩士論文

【摘要】： 審計(jì)合謀的存在,使審計(jì)失敗隨之而至,同時(shí)伴隨著會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量低下與審計(jì)市場(chǎng)失效,極大傷害了投資者權(quán)益,更是破壞了注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)的良性發(fā)展。盡管目前我國(guó)采取了有關(guān)的審計(jì)合謀整治措施,但是,由于對(duì)審計(jì)師的激勵(lì)不恰當(dāng)、不科學(xué)、不到位,使審計(jì)合謀的治理效果不顯著。因此,通過(guò)分析如何激勵(lì)審計(jì)師的方式來(lái)研究審計(jì)合謀的治理,割斷審計(jì)師與審計(jì)業(yè)務(wù)的緊密經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系,加強(qiáng)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)監(jiān)管的懲罰手段,是本文提出治理審計(jì)合謀的主要思路。而這一問(wèn)題的討論是在經(jīng)濟(jì)人假設(shè)下,以博弈理論、委托代理理論和激勵(lì)機(jī)制為理論基礎(chǔ)展開(kāi)的。首先闡述了審計(jì)合謀產(chǎn)生的機(jī)理,利用事務(wù)所與審計(jì)師之間的博弈分析,得出結(jié)論:對(duì)審計(jì)師的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)不但不能從正面有效抑制審計(jì)合謀反而滋生合謀,而對(duì)審計(jì)師的懲罰可以有效的抑制審計(jì)合謀,于是提出了強(qiáng)化對(duì)審計(jì)師的懲罰以及割斷審計(jì)師利益與審計(jì)收入掛鉤的有效建議;其次,利用上述結(jié)果進(jìn)一步構(gòu)建了在行業(yè)監(jiān)管基礎(chǔ)上的一個(gè)雙方博弈,以探討對(duì)審計(jì)師的懲罰區(qū)間,通過(guò)對(duì)監(jiān)管部門(mén)與審計(jì)師的收益進(jìn)行博弈分析,根據(jù)委托代理理論建立符合分析要求的模型,并運(yùn)用此模型獲得了使審計(jì)師拒絕合謀時(shí)的懲罰區(qū)間,提出了審計(jì)師的懲罰應(yīng)以經(jīng)濟(jì)懲罰為主且在一定的區(qū)間時(shí),可以有效抑制審計(jì)合謀的出現(xiàn),并建議以提高行業(yè)監(jiān)管概率與懲罰力度、制定履約財(cái)產(chǎn)公證與承諾制、建立履約財(cái)產(chǎn)的保障機(jī)制等措施來(lái)治理審計(jì)合謀。
[Abstract]:The existence of audit collusion makes audit failure come along with the low quality of accounting information and the invalidation of audit market, which greatly damages the rights and interests of investors and destroys the benign development of CPA industry. Although our country has adopted the relevant audit collusion rectification measures at present, but because of the inappropriate, unscientific and unsuitable incentive to the auditor, the governance effect of the audit collusion is not remarkable. Therefore, through the analysis of how to motivate auditors to study the governance of audit collusion, cut off the close economic relationship between auditors and audit business, and strengthen the punishment means of CPA industry supervision. It is the main idea of managing audit collusion. The discussion of this problem is based on the theory of game theory, principal-agent theory and incentive mechanism under the hypothesis of economic man. Firstly, this paper expounds the mechanism of audit collusion, and draws a conclusion by using the game analysis between firm and auditor: the reward for auditor not only can not restrain audit collusion effectively, but breed collusion. The punishment of auditors can effectively suppress audit collusion, so it puts forward the effective suggestions of strengthening the punishment of auditors and cutting off the link between auditor interests and audit income. Using the above results, a game based on industry supervision is further constructed to discuss the punishment interval of auditors, and through the game analysis of the income of regulators and auditors, According to the principal-agent theory, this paper establishes a model that meets the requirements of analysis, and obtains the punishment interval of auditors when they refuse to conspire with each other by using this model, and points out that auditors' punishment should be mainly economic and in a certain range. It can effectively restrain the appearance of audit collusion, and suggest that the audit collusion should be governed by improving the supervision probability and punishment, establishing the system of notarization and commitment of performance property, establishing the guarantee mechanism of performance property, and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F239.0;F224.32

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 劉武;;上市公司審計(jì)合謀的原因及防范對(duì)策[J];學(xué)術(shù)論壇;2012年06期

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本文編號(hào)：1856946