本文選題：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)分層 + 代理沖突　； 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2008年碩士論文

【摘要】： 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)作為公司治理系統(tǒng)中的重要組成部分,不但影響到公司治理機(jī)制運作,也關(guān)系到證券市場投資者的切身利益。在我國尚未成熟的市場環(huán)境下,股權(quán)代理問題的產(chǎn)生使得外部審計成為內(nèi)部機(jī)制的一項重要補充。因此從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)角度來研究上市公司高質(zhì)量審計的需求,對引導(dǎo)其形成合理的股權(quán)模式具有重要的意義。 本文分別從單個股東層面、大股東層面、全體股東層面以及市場層面上理論分析了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對公司外部審計需求的影響。在實證研究部分,針對股權(quán)的四個層面提出五個相關(guān)假設(shè),以456個股改已完成樣本和932個股改未完成樣本為研究對象,選擇國有股比例、法人股比例、股權(quán)制衡度、股權(quán)集中度作為自變量構(gòu)建了回歸模型,又選取456對配對樣本的差量數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,對股權(quán)流通性改善與高質(zhì)量審計需求變動構(gòu)建回歸模型。回歸結(jié)果表明,法人股比例、管理層持股、股權(quán)制衡度對高質(zhì)量審計需求存在顯著的正向影響,而股權(quán)集中度則與高質(zhì)量審計需求呈倒U型關(guān)系,并得出了最佳集中度值和變化區(qū)間。同時,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),國有股比例與高質(zhì)量審計需求間的負(fù)向關(guān)系并不顯著,這也表明隨著國有股的減持和全流通的推進(jìn),國有股獨大引發(fā)的代理沖突正逐步得到緩解,國有股對外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制的抑制作用有所降低。此外,股權(quán)分置改革對股權(quán)流通性的改善使得上市公司股改前后的高質(zhì)量審計需求得到顯著提高,這也從側(cè)面反應(yīng)出股改在降低代理沖突、提高公司治理效率方面發(fā)揮了一定作用。 依據(jù)上述理論和實證研究的結(jié)論,結(jié)合我國上市公司實際狀況,本文在最后提出了引導(dǎo)上市公司形成合理股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:As an important part of corporate governance system, equity structure not only affects the operation of corporate governance mechanism, but also relates to the vital interests of investors in the securities market. In the immature market environment of our country, the emergence of equity agency problem makes external audit an important supplement to the internal mechanism. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the demand for high quality audit of listed companies from the perspective of equity structure, which is of great significance to guide them to form a reasonable equity model. This paper theoretically analyzes the influence of ownership structure on the external audit demand of the company from the single shareholder level, the large shareholder level, the whole shareholder level and the market level. In the part of empirical research, we put forward five relevant hypotheses in view of the four levels of equity, taking 456 completed stock reform samples and 932 uncompleted stock reform samples as the research objects, choosing the proportion of state-owned shares, the proportion of legal person shares, and the degree of equity balance. The regression model of equity concentration is constructed as an independent variable, and 456 pairs of matched sample difference data are selected as samples to build a regression model for the improvement of equity liquidity and the change of high quality audit demand. The regression results show that there are significant positive effects on the demand for high quality audit by the proportion of corporate shares, managerial shareholding, equity checks and balances, and the relationship between equity concentration and high quality audit demand is inversely U-shaped. The best concentration value and variation range are obtained. At the same time, we find that the negative relationship between the proportion of state-owned shares and the demand for high-quality audit is not significant. This also shows that with the reduction of state-owned shares and the promotion of full circulation, the agency conflicts caused by the dominance of state-owned shares are gradually being alleviated. The inhibitory effect of state-owned shares on external supervision mechanism has been reduced. In addition, the improvement of equity circulation by the reform of split share structure has significantly increased the demand for high-quality audit of listed companies before and after the stock reform, which also reflects that stock reform is reducing agency conflicts. Improve the efficiency of corporate governance has played a certain role. Based on the conclusions of the above theoretical and empirical studies and the actual situation of the listed companies in China, this paper puts forward some policy recommendations to guide the listed companies to form a reasonable ownership structure at the end of this paper.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：F271;F239.4;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 康璐;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對審計意見購買的影響研究[D];貴州財經(jīng)學(xué)院;2011年

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本文編號：1839706