本文選題：審計(jì)合謀 + 審計(jì)任期　； 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文

【摘要】： 2001年的安然事件震驚了全世界,在隨后的調(diào)查中發(fā)現(xiàn)存在于安然公司和安達(dá)信會(huì)計(jì)公司之間嚴(yán)重的合謀行為是導(dǎo)致這一事件的直接原因。其中尤其是安然與安達(dá)信之間長(zhǎng)達(dá)16年的合作關(guān)系更是引發(fā)了人們關(guān)于審計(jì)任期是否影響審計(jì)合謀的深刻思考。近年來(lái)的相關(guān)研究也隨之增多,但大多數(shù)都是理論分析,并沒(méi)有進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。 基于上述原因,論文將在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,運(yùn)用實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)方法來(lái)研究審計(jì)合謀與審計(jì)任期的相關(guān)關(guān)系,進(jìn)而為我國(guó)的證券市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管提供證據(jù)支持和政策建議。 論文的研究工作從層次上分為三個(gè)部分,相應(yīng)的研究?jī)?nèi)容和結(jié)論如下:論文第一部分包括第1章和第2章。其中,第1章在對(duì)研究問(wèn)題進(jìn)行闡述和相關(guān)研究進(jìn)行回顧的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了論文的研究思路和研究框架。第2章以委托代理理論與公共選擇理論為依據(jù),分析了審計(jì)合謀的產(chǎn)生機(jī)理和審計(jì)合謀與審計(jì)意見(jiàn)類(lèi)型的關(guān)系,為下文的實(shí)證研究奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)。 論文第二部分包括第3章和第4章,該部分是整個(gè)論文的核心部分。其中,第3章運(yùn)用改進(jìn)的Lennox審計(jì)意見(jiàn)預(yù)測(cè)模型來(lái)預(yù)測(cè)A股上市公司2003-2005年度的審計(jì)意見(jiàn),尋找到了審計(jì)合謀的66個(gè)研究樣本。第4章利用CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)為每一個(gè)研究樣本配對(duì)了一個(gè)控制樣本,主要運(yùn)用配對(duì)樣本的T檢驗(yàn)、Logistic回歸方法來(lái)考察審計(jì)合謀與審計(jì)任期的相關(guān)關(guān)系,發(fā)現(xiàn)長(zhǎng)(短)的審計(jì)任期相對(duì)于中等長(zhǎng)度的審計(jì)任期更容易發(fā)生審計(jì)合謀。為了檢驗(yàn)審計(jì)任期劃分的合理性,論文對(duì)審計(jì)任期的劃分進(jìn)行了敏感性分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)審計(jì)任期的劃分基本不影響結(jié)論的正確性。 論文第三部分包括第5章,其研究?jī)?nèi)容主要是總結(jié)第二部分實(shí)證研究的結(jié)論,并在結(jié)合前面理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,提出相關(guān)的監(jiān)管建議。這些政策建議包括:①實(shí)行事務(wù)所強(qiáng)制輪換,并設(shè)置審計(jì)任期的上下限;②加強(qiáng)違規(guī)的處罰力度和執(zhí)行力度。
[Abstract]:The Enron incident in 2001 shocked the whole world, and the serious collusion between Enron and Andersen Accounting Company was found to be the direct cause of the incident. Especially the 16-year cooperative relationship between Enron and Andersen has caused people to think deeply about whether the audit term affects audit collusion. In recent years, the related studies have increased, but most of them are theoretical analysis, and no empirical test has been carried out. Based on the above reasons, the paper will use the empirical test method to study the relationship between audit collusion and audit tenure on the basis of theoretical analysis, and then provide evidence support and policy recommendations for China's securities market supervision. The research work is divided into three parts. The corresponding research contents and conclusions are as follows: the first part includes chapter 1 and chapter 2. In the first chapter, based on the review of the research and related research, the author puts forward the research ideas and research framework. Based on the principal-agent theory and public choice theory, chapter 2 analyzes the mechanism of audit collusion and the relationship between audit collusion and audit opinion type, which lays a theoretical foundation for the empirical research below. The second part of the thesis includes chapters 3 and 4, which is the core of the whole thesis. In chapter 3, the improved Lennox audit opinion prediction model is used to predict the audit opinions of A-share listed companies in 2003-2005, and 66 research samples of audit collusion are found. Chapter 4 uses the CSMAR database to match a control sample for each study sample, mainly using the T test logistic regression method to investigate the relationship between audit collusion and audit tenure. It is found that long (short) audit term is more prone to collusion than medium length audit term. In order to test the rationality of the division of audit tenure, this paper makes a sensitivity analysis on the division of audit tenure, and finds that the division of audit tenure basically does not affect the correctness of the conclusion. The third part of the paper includes chapter 5, the main research content is to summarize the conclusions of the second part of empirical research, and on the basis of previous theoretical analysis, put forward relevant regulatory recommendations. These policy recommendations include the mandatory rotation of the firm at: 1 and the setting of the upper and lower limits of the audit term to strengthen the penalties and enforcement of violations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F239.0

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