本文選題：產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論 + SCP分析框架��； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2008年博士論文

【摘要】：根據(jù)產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論,市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)、市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效三者之間是相互聯(lián)系和相互作用的。傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論認(rèn)為,市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)在三者之間起著決定性作用,而新產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論認(rèn)為,市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效起著主要和決定性作用,這兩種代表性觀點(diǎn)最終發(fā)展為產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論中著名的結(jié)構(gòu)假說和效率假說。圍繞著這兩大假說產(chǎn)生了大量的實(shí)證研究文獻(xiàn)。 由于中國(guó)創(chuàng)建資本市場(chǎng)和審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的歷史不長(zhǎng),各項(xiàng)相關(guān)制度還很不完善,市場(chǎng)機(jī)制也未能發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有作用,而“有形之手”的作用其實(shí)也并不明顯。究其實(shí)質(zhì),乃是中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)所存在的先天缺陷所致,即在社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)處于初級(jí)階段的現(xiàn)實(shí)情況下,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)是一個(gè)集中度低、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度大和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效低的過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)�，F(xiàn)代產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論分別從市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)、市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效等方面指出了過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的基本特征,聯(lián)系到審計(jì)市場(chǎng),這為我們判斷審計(jì)市場(chǎng)是否陷入過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)提供了更多的維度。我們從中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)、市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效這三個(gè)維度對(duì)中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行了分析。 過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論是現(xiàn)代產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論中興起的一個(gè)新的研究領(lǐng)域。近年來,在中國(guó)受到經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)界和產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論研究者的關(guān)注,并產(chǎn)生了較為豐富的研究成果。現(xiàn)代產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論主要從市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)主體的市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效等方面來研究過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象,這為我們能夠運(yùn)用產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論多維度多視角審視和考察中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)可能存在的過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象提供了理論基礎(chǔ)和研究方法。根據(jù)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的發(fā)展歷程和產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論,在市場(chǎng)發(fā)展的初期,往往市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)起著基礎(chǔ)性和決定性作用。因此,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)上,在市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)、市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效三者相互聯(lián)系、相互作用的關(guān)系中,市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)該起著重要的基礎(chǔ)性和決定性作用。為此,我們根據(jù)產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論和SCP研究框架對(duì)中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)、市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效進(jìn)行了分析,結(jié)論證明了我們的觀點(diǎn),即由于中國(guó)存在不合理的分散型市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)(集中度低、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度大等),從而產(chǎn)生了不合理的過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為(低價(jià)攬業(yè)和審計(jì)意見購(gòu)買等),導(dǎo)致審計(jì)市場(chǎng)績(jī)效低下(缺乏規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)效率和審計(jì)質(zhì)量較低等)。因此,無(wú)論從市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)或市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效來看,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)都是一個(gè)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)。 為了克服中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象,我們認(rèn)為,寡頭壟斷型市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)越性能夠解決過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題,由此提出了建立寡頭壟斷型市場(chǎng)所應(yīng)采取的措施。 本論文包括以下幾個(gè)方面內(nèi)容: 首先是導(dǎo)論。導(dǎo)論主要是對(duì)研究問題的緣起、研究路徑和整體構(gòu)思做一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單和概括性陳述。 第1章對(duì)中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)研究的理論基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行了論述。主要是對(duì)產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論中與本論文最為相關(guān)、也是產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論中最為核心的部分,即對(duì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)劃分、SCP分析框架、產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論研究方法等做一介紹和分析,在此基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的定義和特征進(jìn)行了分析與論述,并對(duì)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象的表現(xiàn)形式進(jìn)行了歸納,以期為后面的研究奠定堅(jiān)實(shí)的理論和方法論基礎(chǔ)。 第2章主要是從市場(chǎng)集中度指標(biāo)的角度對(duì)中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行了深入分析。統(tǒng)計(jì)分析的結(jié)果表明,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)是一個(gè)集中度很低的分散競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu),這種市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)也是過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)典型的結(jié)構(gòu)性特征。我們認(rèn)為,這種分散競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)生過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)行為和較低的市場(chǎng)績(jī)效。為此,接下來各章將探討在目前這種市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)形態(tài)下,分析中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效方面所存在的過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象。 第3章對(duì)中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為之一低價(jià)攬業(yè)行為進(jìn)行了分析。低價(jià)攬客行為是過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為的典型表現(xiàn)形式之一。在過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的情況下,各會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所為了生存與發(fā)展,將會(huì)采取各種不正當(dāng)?shù)氖侄位蛐袨閬碚袛埧蛻�。由于中�?guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)集中度低,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度大,可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)生低價(jià)攬業(yè)行為。統(tǒng)計(jì)分析的結(jié)果證明了我們所提出的判斷,同時(shí)也從市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為的角度揭示了中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象。 第4章對(duì)中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)上另外一種過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為,即審計(jì)意見購(gòu)買進(jìn)行了分析。為了更深入地分析中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)行為方面所存在的過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象,在本章,我們繼續(xù)就中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為進(jìn)行分析,即對(duì)審計(jì)意見購(gòu)買行為進(jìn)行了分析。由于中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)是一個(gè)分散競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu),具體表現(xiàn)為事務(wù)所眾多,規(guī)模小,業(yè)務(wù)品種單一,市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度大,供需結(jié)構(gòu)失衡。在此情形下,審計(jì)客戶完全可以通過操縱審計(jì)收費(fèi)或變更審計(jì)師施加壓力,來達(dá)到改善審計(jì)意見的目的。本章的統(tǒng)計(jì)分析結(jié)果表明,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)存在審計(jì)意見購(gòu)買這一過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為。 第5章通過對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所規(guī)模報(bào)酬和效率的分析來考察中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)績(jī)效。過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的嚴(yán)重后果,首先是喪失規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)效率,導(dǎo)致資源配置效率下降。根據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論,在低集中度的分散競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型市場(chǎng)上,審計(jì)師可能會(huì)缺乏規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和范圍經(jīng)濟(jì)。此外,在過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的情況下,將可能存在低價(jià)攬業(yè)和審計(jì)意見購(gòu)買行為。這樣的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)和市場(chǎng)行為,將會(huì)導(dǎo)致規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)效率的喪失。由于中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)存在過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)和相應(yīng)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為,因此,會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的規(guī)模報(bào)酬和規(guī)模效率是不明顯的,甚至是邊際遞減的。統(tǒng)計(jì)分析的結(jié)果說明我們的判斷是正確的。 第6章主要從審計(jì)質(zhì)量視角來分析中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)績(jī)效。由于過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)(即分散競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu))和市場(chǎng)行為,必然會(huì)損害審計(jì)獨(dú)立性和審計(jì)質(zhì)量,從而導(dǎo)致審計(jì)質(zhì)量低下。在過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下,事務(wù)所眾多,規(guī)模小,業(yè)務(wù)品種單一,市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度大,供需結(jié)構(gòu)失衡等,導(dǎo)致委托契約主體缺乏真實(shí)審計(jì)信息的需求。而審計(jì)師追求高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)報(bào)告,會(huì)增加審計(jì)成本、降低利潤(rùn)。為此,在目前這種過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)形態(tài)和過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)行為下,會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所缺乏追求高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的動(dòng)機(jī)。而低質(zhì)量審計(jì)將導(dǎo)致喪失引導(dǎo)資源合理配置的能力。在過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的審計(jì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)形態(tài)和市場(chǎng)行為下,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的情況不容樂觀。統(tǒng)計(jì)分析的結(jié)果表明,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)審計(jì)質(zhì)量沒有達(dá)到應(yīng)有的水平。 第7章針對(duì)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題提出了相應(yīng)的產(chǎn)業(yè)組織政策建議。由于寡頭壟斷市場(chǎng)能夠提高審計(jì)市場(chǎng)效率、避免過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng),因此,建立寡頭壟斷審計(jì)市場(chǎng)是解決目前中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)上存在的過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題的根本途徑。為此,本文提出了建立寡頭壟斷審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的一系列政策建議。 結(jié)束語(yǔ)部分主要包括結(jié)論、創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)及后續(xù)研究方向。 論文分別從審計(jì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)、市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效三個(gè)維度對(duì)中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行了深入分析,并得出了以下結(jié)論: 首先,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)無(wú)論是從市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)、還是從市場(chǎng)行為或市場(chǎng)績(jī)效來看,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)都是一個(gè)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)。具體表現(xiàn)在: 第一,審計(jì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)方面:市場(chǎng)集中度低;市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入壁壘低;會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所眾多;規(guī)模小,品種單一;競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度大。 第二,審計(jì)市場(chǎng)行為方面:在過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)形態(tài)下,價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)成為審計(jì)市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的最主要手段,事務(wù)所普遍存在不顧職業(yè)團(tuán)結(jié)、在不能保證審計(jì)質(zhì)量的前提下降低審計(jì)收費(fèi)的行為,即存在低價(jià)攬業(yè)行為;同時(shí),由于市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)不合理與市場(chǎng)供需失衡而導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)生了審計(jì)意見購(gòu)買行為。 第三,審計(jì)市場(chǎng)績(jī)效方面:過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)和市場(chǎng)行為,其最直接的后果就是喪失規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和降低審計(jì)質(zhì)量。由于市場(chǎng)集中度低,事務(wù)所眾多,規(guī)模小,品種單一,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度大,會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所難以獲得規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和范圍經(jīng)濟(jì)。同時(shí),由于過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng),事務(wù)所只能處于微利或獲得低于正常利潤(rùn)水平的利潤(rùn);過低的審計(jì)收費(fèi)和不規(guī)范的市場(chǎng)行為損害了審計(jì)獨(dú)立性,不能保證審計(jì)質(zhì)量,使得審計(jì)質(zhì)量未達(dá)到應(yīng)有水平。 其次,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)諸多問題的產(chǎn)生,根源于中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)是一個(gè)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)。而過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題的根源,則在于中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)的不合理,中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)是一個(gè)分散競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型市場(chǎng)。這種分散競(jìng)爭(zhēng)型市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)效率產(chǎn)生了嚴(yán)重不利影響。 最后,為了從根源上解決中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題,我們認(rèn)為,建立寡頭壟斷型市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)是優(yōu)化市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)、克服過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的根本途徑。本文提出了建立寡頭壟斷型市場(chǎng)的基本舉措和克服過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的建議。 我們運(yùn)用產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論,通過規(guī)范分析和實(shí)證研究,終于透過中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)林林總總的現(xiàn)象,看到了其內(nèi)在的本質(zhì)性問題。即中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)是一個(gè)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng),其主要表現(xiàn)形式就是中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)集中度低,會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所眾多,規(guī)模小,缺乏規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)和范圍經(jīng)濟(jì),供需結(jié)構(gòu)失衡,行業(yè)利潤(rùn)率低,審計(jì)質(zhì)量不高,所有這些都需要相應(yīng)的行業(yè)政策措施來加以解決,以促進(jìn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效率的提高,實(shí)現(xiàn)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)向有效競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的轉(zhuǎn)變。而目前最為緊迫和最為重要的措施就是要提高審計(jì)市場(chǎng)集中度,建立寡頭壟斷型審計(jì)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu),做大做強(qiáng)中國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所,從而避免過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng),提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量和市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效率,實(shí)現(xiàn)資源優(yōu)化配置,從根源上全面有效地解決中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)所存在的深層次結(jié)構(gòu)性問題。 總體上,本論文的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新點(diǎn)有:其一,本文運(yùn)用產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論及其SCP分析框架,系統(tǒng)深入地分析了中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題。其二,從實(shí)證研究看,論文從市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)、市場(chǎng)行為和市場(chǎng)績(jī)效三個(gè)維度對(duì)中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題進(jìn)行了系列嚴(yán)密的實(shí)證分析,為本文主要論點(diǎn)和研究結(jié)論提供了強(qiáng)有力的支撐。其三,在傳統(tǒng)審計(jì)定價(jià)模型和相關(guān)研究的基礎(chǔ)上,建立了超常審計(jì)收費(fèi)模型來研究有關(guān)問題,在模型方法上有一定創(chuàng)新。其四,提出了解決過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題的基本產(chǎn)業(yè)組織政策是要建立寡頭壟斷型市場(chǎng)及其須采取的相應(yīng)的系列政策建議。論文對(duì)中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)本質(zhì)性問題的透徹分析和建立寡頭壟斷市場(chǎng)這一觀點(diǎn)的提出,將為解決過度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題、健全中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)機(jī)制、完善審計(jì)市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管提供一個(gè)有益和全新的思路。
[Abstract]:According to the theory of industrial organization, the market structure, market behavior and market performance are interconnected and interacted between the three. The traditional industrial organization theory holds that the market structure plays a decisive role between the three, and the new industrial organization theory holds that the market behavior and market performance play a major and decisive role, which are the two representativeness. The viewpoint eventually developed into the famous structural hypothesis and efficiency hypothesis in the theory of industrial organization. Around these two hypotheses, a large number of empirical research literatures were produced.
Because the history of China's capital market and the audit market is not long, the relevant systems are not perfect, the market mechanism has not played its role, but the role of "tangible hand" is not obvious. The essence is the congenital defects in the Chinese audit market, that is, the socialist market economy is at the beginning. Under the actual situation of the stage, China's audit market is an overly competitive market with low concentration, high competition intensity and low market performance. The modern industrial organization theory points out the basic characteristics of excessive competition from the market structure, market behavior and market performance, which is linked to the audit market, which is to judge the audit market. The over competition provides more dimensions. We analyze the phenomenon of excessive competition in China's audit market from the three dimensions of China's audit market structure, market behavior and market performance.
The theory of excessive competition is a new field of research in the theory of modern industrial organization. In recent years, in China, the researchers of the economic and industrial organizations have paid more attention to it, and have produced more abundant research results. The theory of modern industrial organization is mainly from market structure, market behavior and market performance of competition subjects. The study of excessive competition has provided a theoretical basis and research method for us to examine and examine the possible excessive competition in China's audit market by using the multi dimensional perspective of industrial organization theory. Therefore, in China's audit market, market structure should play an important basic and decisive role in the relationship and interaction of market structure, market behavior and market performance between the three parties. To this end, according to the industrial organization theory and the SCP research framework, the market structure, market behavior and the market behavior of the Chinese audit market are based on the industrial organization theory and the research framework. The market performance is analyzed. The conclusion is that the irrational and decentralized market structure (low concentration, high competition intensity, etc.) in China has resulted in unreasonable excessive competition behavior (low price industry and audit opinion purchase), which leads to low audit market performance (lack of scale economic efficiency and audit quality). Therefore, from the perspective of market structure or market behavior and market performance, China's audit market is an overcompetitive market.
In order to overcome the excessive competition in China's audit market, we believe that the superiority of the oligopoly market structure can solve the problem of excessive competition, thus the measures should be taken to establish the oligopoly market.
This paper includes the following aspects:
The first part is introduction. The introduction is mainly about the origin, the research path and the overall idea of the research.
The first chapter discusses the theoretical basis of the research on the excessive competition in China's audit market. It is mainly related to the theory of industrial organization and the most core part of the theory of industrial organization, namely, the introduction and analysis of the division of the market structure, the SCP analysis framework, the theoretical research method of the industrial organization, and so on. The definition and characteristics of excessive competition are analyzed and discussed, and the manifestations of the phenomenon of excessive competition in the audit market are summarized in order to lay a solid theoretical and methodological foundation for the later research.
The second chapter mainly analyzes the structure of China's audit market from the perspective of market concentration index. The results of statistical analysis show that the Chinese audit market is a decentralized and competitive market structure with low concentration, and this market structure is also a typical structural feature of the over competitive market. The market structure may lead to overly competitive market behavior and lower market performance. For this reason, the following chapters will discuss the phenomenon of excessive competition in China's audit market behavior and market performance in the current market structure.
In the third chapter, one of the behavior of low price competition in China's audit market is one of the behavior of low price competition. Low price package behavior is one of the typical forms of excessive competitive behavior. In the case of excessive competition, the accounting firms will take various improper means or actions to attract customers for the survival and development of the audit firms. The low concentration of the audit market structure and the high intensity of competition may lead to the production of low price. The result of statistical analysis proves the judgment we put forward, and also reveals the phenomenon of excessive competition in China's audit market from the perspective of market competition behavior.
In the fourth chapter, another kind of excessive competition behavior in China's audit market, namely audit opinion purchase, is analyzed. In order to further analyze the phenomenon of excessive competition in the behavior of China's audit market, in this chapter, we continue to analyze the excessive competition behavior in China's audit market, that is, the behavior of audit opinion purchase is carried out. The audit market in China is a decentralized and competitive market structure, which is characterized by a large number of firms, small scale, single business variety, high market competition intensity and unbalance supply and demand structure. In this case, the audit customers can completely improve the audit opinion by manipulating the audit fees or changing the auditor's pressure. The results of statistical analysis in this chapter show that there is an excessive competition in audit market in China.
The fifth chapter examines the performance of China's audit market through the analysis of the scale reward and efficiency of the accounting firms. The serious consequences of excessive competition, first of all, are the loss of economies of scale, leading to a decline in the efficiency of the allocation of resources. According to the theory of economics and industrial organization, auditors may lack the rules in a decentralized competitive market with low concentration. In addition, in the case of excessive competition, there may be low price and audit opinion buying behavior. Such market structure and market behavior will lead to the loss of economies of scale. Because of the overly competitive market structure and the corresponding excessive competition behavior in China's audit market, the accountants' Affairs The scale reward and scale efficiency are not obvious or even marginal decreasing. The result of statistical analysis shows that our judgement is correct.
The sixth chapter mainly analyzes the performance of China's audit market from the perspective of audit quality. Due to the overly competitive market structure (that is, the decentralized competitive market structure) and market behavior, the audit independence and audit quality will inevitably be damaged and the audit quality is low. Under the overly competitive market structure, the firms are numerous, small, and business varieties. Single, high market competition intensity and unbalanced supply and demand structure lead to the lack of real audit information, and auditors' pursuit of high quality audit reports will increase audit costs and reduce profits. Therefore, under the present overly competitive market structure and excessive competitive market behavior, the accounting firms are missing. Low quality audit will lead to the motivation of high quality audit, and low quality audit will lead to the loss of rational allocation of resources. Under the overly competitive audit market structure and market behavior, the audit quality of audit market in China is not optimistic. The results of statistical analysis show that the audit quality of China's trial market has not reached its level.
The seventh chapter puts forward the corresponding industrial organization policy suggestions on the problem of excessive competition. Because the oligopoly market can improve the efficiency of audit market and avoid excessive competition, it is the fundamental way to solve the problem of excessive competition in the current audit market in China. Therefore, the oligopoly is set up to establish oligopoly. A series of policy proposals to monopolize the audit market.
The concluding remarks include the conclusion, the innovation and the future research direction.
From the three dimensions of audit market structure, market behavior and market performance, this paper analyzes the phenomenon of excessive competition in China's audit market, and draws the following conclusions.
First of all, China audit market is an overly competitive market in terms of market structure, market behavior or market performance.
First, the structure of audit market: low market concentration, low barriers to entry, large number of accounting firms, small scale, single varieties, and strong competition.
Second, audit market behavior: in the form of excessive competitive market structure, price competition is the most important means of competition in the audit market. The firm generally has the behavior of reducing the audit fees under the premise that the audit quality can not be guaranteed, that is, the behavior of low price employment in the condition that the audit quality is not guaranteed; and, at the same time, the market structure is unreasonable and the market structure is unreasonable. The imbalance between market supply and demand leads to audit opinion shopping.
Third, audit market performance: over competitive market structure and market behavior, the most direct consequence is the loss of economies of scale and audit quality. Because of low market concentration, large number of firms, small scale, single variety, high competition intensity, accounting affairs are difficult to obtain economies of scale and scope. Competition, the firm can only be in a small profit or gain lower profit than the normal profit level; low audit fees and irregular market behavior damage audit independence, can not guarantee the quality of audit, and make the audit quality not reached the level of due.
Secondly, the origin of many problems in China's audit market is that China's audit market is an overly competitive market. The root of the problem of excessive competition lies in the irrational structure of China's audit market, and the Chinese audit market is a decentralized and competitive market. This decentralized competitive market structure has produced strict audit market efficiency. Adverse effects.
Finally, in order to solve the problem of excessive competition in China's audit market, we believe that the establishment of oligopoly market structure is the fundamental way to optimize the market structure and overcome the excessive competition. This paper puts forward the basic measures to establish oligopoly market and the suggestions to overcome the excessive competition.
By using the theory of industrial organization, through normative analysis and empirical research, we have finally seen the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon through the general phenomenon of China's audit market. That is, the Chinese audit market is an overly competitive market. The main manifestation is the low concentration of China's audit market, the large number of accounting firms and small scale. The lack of economies of scale and scope, the imbalance of supply and demand structure, low profit rate of industry and low quality of audit, all of which need corresponding industry policy measures to improve the efficiency of competition and realize the transition from excessive competition to effective competition. At present, the most urgent and most important measure is to improve the audit market. The field concentration degree, establish the oligopoly monopoly audit market structure, make big and strong Chinese accounting firm, thus avoid excessive competition, improve the audit quality and market competition efficiency, realize the optimal allocation of resources, and solve the deep structural problems existing in the Chinese audit market from the root.
On the whole, the main innovations of this paper are as follows: firstly, this paper systematically analyzes the excessive competition in China's audit market by using the theory of industrial organization and its SCP analysis framework.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F239.4

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條

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相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 郝文娟;我國(guó)上市公司審計(jì)市場(chǎng)集中度研究[D];北京化工大學(xué);2011年

2 王立嬌;上市公司違規(guī)處罰對(duì)審計(jì)師行為影響的實(shí)證研究[D];東北石油大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號(hào)：1817017