本文選題：機(jī)會(huì)主義型關(guān)聯(lián)交易 + 決策有用型關(guān)聯(lián)交易��； 參考：《延邊大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著我國市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,關(guān)聯(lián)交易已經(jīng)成為我國上市公司普遍存在的現(xiàn)象。為了防止上市公司利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易的隱蔽性,操縱利潤進(jìn)行盈余管理,從而侵害中小股東及債權(quán)人的利益。2006年財(cái)政部頒發(fā)了《企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則第36號(hào)——關(guān)聯(lián)方披露》,以此使上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易透明化,同時(shí)也對(duì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)指出了方向。在《企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則》給出規(guī)定后,學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)于關(guān)聯(lián)方交易和盈余管理以及審計(jì)意見的相關(guān)性投入了大量研究。但許多學(xué)者對(duì)于關(guān)聯(lián)交易類型沒有進(jìn)行區(qū)分,只是對(duì)其中的發(fā)生較頻繁和發(fā)生金額較大的關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行了研究,沒有充分考慮到關(guān)聯(lián)交易的動(dòng)機(jī)是公允性的還是非公允性的。只有非公允性的關(guān)聯(lián)交易才會(huì)產(chǎn)生不良影響,對(duì)于兩者不加區(qū)分勢(shì)必會(huì)影響研究結(jié)果的準(zhǔn)確性。因此,本文在明確關(guān)聯(lián)交易類型的前提下將關(guān)聯(lián)交易的動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行區(qū)分,從而對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易與審計(jì)意見的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行分析。由于關(guān)聯(lián)方交易信息的披露具有模糊性和隱蔽性,使得我國的證券監(jiān)管部門很難對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)方交易的性質(zhì)作出準(zhǔn)確判斷,更無法判斷交易行為是否公允。此時(shí),為了保護(hù)利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)益,限制企業(yè)通過非公允性的關(guān)聯(lián)方交易謀取私利。就需要一種具有獨(dú)立性的機(jī)制來輔助監(jiān)管,揭示企業(yè)所進(jìn)行的關(guān)聯(lián)方交易的性質(zhì),從而達(dá)到保護(hù)利益相關(guān)者權(quán)益并且提高經(jīng)濟(jì)效率的目的。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師往往在資本市場(chǎng)中擔(dān)任這一角色,他們有著較強(qiáng)的勝任能力,并且能夠保持自身的獨(dú)立性。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師可以通過出具不同類型的審計(jì)意見,幫助投資者減少與上市公司間信息不對(duì)稱的問題。但是,目前上市公司間的關(guān)聯(lián)方交易行為有著越來越復(fù)雜化和多樣化的趨勢(shì),使得注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的難度也隨之增加。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的審計(jì)意見是否能夠揭示企業(yè)的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為,越來越被人們所重視。為了使研究有代表性,本文選取了2012—2014年,在滬深兩市披露關(guān)聯(lián)方交易情況的上市公司作為研究樣本,通過建立研究模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,檢驗(yàn)了關(guān)聯(lián)方交易與審計(jì)意見之間的關(guān)系。首先驗(yàn)證了機(jī)會(huì)主義型關(guān)聯(lián)交易的金額越大,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師出具非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見的概率越大,二者之間是正相關(guān)的關(guān)系；其次,驗(yàn)證了決策有用型關(guān)聯(lián)交易金額的大小對(duì)審計(jì)意見的結(jié)果并無顯著影響；最后,驗(yàn)證了擔(dān)保類關(guān)聯(lián)方交易的金額越大,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師出具非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見的概率越大,二者之間也是正相關(guān)的關(guān)系。并根據(jù)這些結(jié)論為企業(yè)提出了幾類建議：即完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、強(qiáng)化監(jiān)管措施以及審計(jì)人員和經(jīng)理人員職業(yè)道德等方面,對(duì)抑制關(guān)聯(lián)方交易的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為和關(guān)聯(lián)方交易的規(guī)范和合理運(yùn)用能夠提供一些可行的參考。
[Abstract]:With the development of China's market economy, affiliated transactions have become a common phenomenon of listed companies in China. In order to prevent listed companies from exploiting the concealment of related party transactions and manipulating profits for earnings management, In 2006, the Ministry of Finance issued "Enterprise Accounting Standard No. 36-related party disclosure" in order to make the related transactions of listed companies transparent, and at the same time pointed out the direction of CPA audit. After the stipulation of Accounting Standards for Enterprises, the academic circles have invested a lot of research on the relevance of related party transactions and earnings management as well as audit opinions. However, many scholars do not distinguish the types of related party transactions, and only study the frequently occurring and large amount of related party transactions, without fully considering whether the motives of related party transactions are fair or unfair. Only unfair related party transactions will have a negative impact, and no distinction between the two will inevitably affect the accuracy of the research results. Therefore, under the premise of defining the type of related party transaction, this paper distinguishes the motivation of related party transaction, and then analyzes the correlation between related party transaction and audit opinion. Due to the ambiguity and concealment of the disclosure of related party transaction information, it is difficult for the securities regulatory department of our country to make an accurate judgment on the nature of the related party transaction, let alone to judge whether the transaction is fair or not. At this time, in order to protect the rights and interests of stakeholders, enterprises are restricted to obtain private benefits through unfair related party transactions. A kind of independent mechanism is needed to assist the supervision to reveal the nature of related party transactions carried out by enterprises so as to protect the rights and interests of stakeholders and improve economic efficiency. CPA often play this role in the capital market, they have strong competence and can maintain their own independence. CPA can help investors reduce the problem of information asymmetry between listed companies by issuing different kinds of audit opinions. However, the related party transaction behavior among listed companies is becoming more and more complicated and diversified, which makes CPA audit more difficult. Whether the audit opinion of CPA can reveal the opportunistic behavior of enterprises has been paid more and more attention to. In order to make the research representative, this paper selects listed companies that disclose related party transactions in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as the research samples, and establishes a research model to carry out empirical analysis. The relationship between related party transaction and audit opinion is tested. Firstly, it is verified that the larger the amount of opportunistic related party transactions is, the greater the probability of CPA issuing non-standard audit opinions is, and the positive correlation exists between the two. It is verified that the size of decision useful related party transactions has no significant influence on the results of audit opinions. Finally, it is verified that the larger the amount of related party transactions of guarantee type, the greater the probability of CPA issuing non-standard audit opinions. There is also a positive correlation between the two. According to these conclusions, some suggestions are put forward for the enterprise: perfecting the corporate governance structure, strengthening the supervision measures and the professional ethics of auditors and managers, etc. It can provide some feasible reference to restrain the opportunistic behavior of related party transaction and the regulation and reasonable application of related party transaction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：延邊大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F239.4
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本文編號(hào)：1810478