發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-23 15:41

  本文選題：真實(shí)盈余管理 + 審計(jì)收費(fèi)��； 參考：《集美大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：盈余管理問題始終是財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)領(lǐng)域的一個(gè)重要話題。盈余管理包括應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理。真實(shí)盈余管理是對(duì)企業(yè)真實(shí)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的盈余操控行為。由于其操作手段的隱蔽性,在監(jiān)管環(huán)境趨嚴(yán)的現(xiàn)實(shí)條件下,相較于應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理,真實(shí)盈余管理越來越受到上市公司管理層的青睞。而真實(shí)盈余管理會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的增加。那么,作為第三方機(jī)構(gòu),審計(jì)師能否識(shí)別該風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素并在審計(jì)收費(fèi)決策時(shí)加以考慮?此外,在我國(guó)特殊制度背景下,我國(guó)上市公司中最終控制人為政府的占多數(shù),國(guó)有企業(yè)與非國(guó)有企業(yè)由于受到監(jiān)管的程度不同因而面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大小也有差異,審計(jì)師是否區(qū)別對(duì)待不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的上市公司中真實(shí)盈余管理所包含的信息?鑒于此,本文研究了上市公司真實(shí)盈余管理對(duì)審計(jì)收費(fèi)的影響,并進(jìn)一步區(qū)分產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì),研究了不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下這種影響的差異性。本文首先在對(duì)以往文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行回顧的基礎(chǔ)上,進(jìn)行了文獻(xiàn)評(píng)述。其次,分析了真實(shí)盈余管理對(duì)審計(jì)收費(fèi)影響的作用機(jī)理以及產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對(duì)兩者相關(guān)性影響的機(jī)理,在此基礎(chǔ)上提出相應(yīng)假設(shè)。再次,通過構(gòu)建計(jì)量指標(biāo)與模型,并選取2011-2015年我國(guó)滬深A(yù)股上市公司年度數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了我國(guó)上市公司真實(shí)盈余管理對(duì)審計(jì)收費(fèi)產(chǎn)生的影響,進(jìn)一步按照產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)不同,將樣本劃分為國(guó)有企業(yè)組和非國(guó)有企業(yè)組,分別進(jìn)行多元線性回歸,對(duì)比檢驗(yàn)了不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的上市公司真實(shí)盈余管理對(duì)審計(jì)收費(fèi)影響的差異。最后,本文得出以下結(jié)論:第一,真實(shí)盈余管理對(duì)審計(jì)收費(fèi)具有顯著的正向影響,即上市公司通過實(shí)施真實(shí)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)進(jìn)行盈余操控的程度越大,審計(jì)收費(fèi)越高。第二,審計(jì)師區(qū)別對(duì)待了不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)上市公司中真實(shí)盈余管理所包含的信息,即與非國(guó)有企業(yè)相比,國(guó)有企業(yè)真實(shí)盈余管理程度對(duì)審計(jì)收費(fèi)的影響更為顯著。
[Abstract]:Earnings management is always an important topic in the field of financial accounting. Earnings management includes accrual earnings management and real earnings management. Real earnings management is the manipulation of real business activities. Because of the concealment of its means of operation, under the realistic condition of strict supervision environment, compared with accrual earnings management, real earnings management is more and more favored by the management of listed companies. The real earnings management will lead to the increase of business risks. Can the auditor, as a third party, identify the risk factor and take it into account in the audit of the fee decision? In addition, under the background of the special system of our country, the final control of the listed companies in our country is dominated by the government, and the risks faced by the state-owned enterprises and the non-state-owned enterprises are also different because of the different degree of supervision. Do auditors discriminate between the information contained in real earnings management in listed companies with different property rights? In view of this, this paper studies the impact of real earnings management on audit fees of listed companies, and further distinguishes the nature of property rights, and studies the differences of the effects under different property rights. Based on the review of the previous literatures, this paper reviews the literature. Secondly, this paper analyzes the mechanism of the effect of real earnings management on audit fees and the mechanism of property right's influence on the relationship between the two, and puts forward the corresponding assumptions on this basis. Thirdly, by constructing the measurement index and model, and selecting the annual data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011-2015 as the research sample, this paper empirically tests the impact of real earnings management on audit fees of listed companies in China. Further according to the nature of property rights, the sample is divided into state-owned enterprise group and non-state-owned enterprise group, and multivariate linear regression is carried out respectively, and the differences of real earnings management on audit fees of listed companies with different property rights are compared and tested. Finally, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the real earnings management has a significant positive impact on audit fees, that is, the greater the degree of earnings manipulation through the implementation of real business activities, the higher the audit fees. Second, auditors discriminate the information contained in the real earnings management of listed companies with different property rights, that is, the degree of real earnings management of state-owned enterprises has a more significant impact on audit fees than that of non-state-owned enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：集美大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F239.4

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本文編號(hào)：1792593