本文選題：配股政策 + 盈余管理　； 參考：《江蘇大學》2007年碩士論文

【摘要】： 中國資本市場監(jiān)管(如配股政策、ST、PT政策等)的剛性政策,誘發(fā)了上市公司盈余管理的動機,而這種政策剛性通過壓力傳導機制影響到提供外部監(jiān)督和鑒證的注冊會計師(CPA)的審計行為。脫離這一背景而孤立地研究中國CPA的審計行為以及其審計獨立性問題,這樣的研究結(jié)論容易誤導我們的審計理論和實踐。遵循現(xiàn)代審計理論與實務(風險導向?qū)徲?中一個重要概念——審計重要性水平,公司經(jīng)營風險、審計重要性水平與審計意見類型三者之間存在下列因果關(guān)系:公司經(jīng)營風險提高,審計師傾向于降低審計重要性水平,給定同樣的盈余管理水平,較之于低風險的公司,高經(jīng)營風險的公司被出具非標準審計意見的概率增大。遵循上述思路,本文將審計重要性水平納入上述研究框架中來考察配股政策誘發(fā)的盈余管理行為與審計獨立性問題。 本文第一章為導論,第二章為文獻回顧,第三章從配股政策對凈資產(chǎn)收益率計算方法的變化出發(fā),在總結(jié)以往盈余管理研究所使用的財務指標的缺陷基礎(chǔ)上,構(gòu)建了文中使用的新財務指標,并對2001-2005年配股公司的盈余管理行為進行了實證檢驗,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)配股公司的盈余質(zhì)量在提高,盈余管理行為在逐步減弱。第四章對配股區(qū)間公司的審計獨立性缺失提出疑問,本部分主要為理論分析,為后一章的實證研究作鋪墊。第五章選用2001-2005年上市公司作為樣本,采用總應計利潤替代法、帶長期投資項的截面Jones模型和帶長期投資項的調(diào)整的KS模型三種方法計算操控性應計利潤。通過同等經(jīng)營風險水平下標準審計意見組的操控性應計利潤與非標意見組的對比,估計審計師設(shè)置的重要性水平,并通過對配股公司操控性應計利潤的統(tǒng)計,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)配股公司的確存在盈余管理行為,但由于其操控性應計利潤并未達到審計師設(shè)置“重要性水平”的界限,所以研究結(jié)論并不支持審計師對配股企業(yè)的獨立性缺失的觀點。第六章為研究結(jié)果和研究局限。
[Abstract]:The rigid policy of China's capital market supervision (such as stock rights issue policy and STPT-policy, etc.) induces the motive of earnings management of listed companies. This policy rigidity influences the audit behavior of CPA (CPA) which provides external supervision and authentication through the pressure conduction mechanism. It is easy to mislead our audit theory and practice to study the audit behavior and audit independence of CPA in China in isolation from this background. Following an important concept in modern audit theory and practice (risk-based auditing), which is the level of audit materiality, the management risk of a company, There is a causal relationship between the audit materiality level and the type of audit opinion: the operating risk of the company is increased, the auditor tends to reduce the audit importance level, and given the same earnings management level, compared with the low-risk company, High risk companies are more likely to issue non-standard audit opinions. Following the above thinking, this paper brings the audit importance level into the above research framework to investigate the earnings management behavior and audit independence induced by the rights issue policy. The first chapter of this paper is the introduction, the second chapter is the literature review, the third chapter starts from the change of equity policy to the net assets return calculation method, on the basis of summing up the defect of the financial index used in the earnings management research in the past, the third chapter is the literature review. This paper constructs the new financial index used in this paper and makes an empirical test on earnings management behavior of rights issue companies from 2001 to 2005. It is found that earnings quality of rights issue companies is improving and earnings management behavior is gradually weakening. The fourth chapter questions the lack of audit independence of the interval companies, this part is mainly theoretical analysis, for the latter chapter of the empirical research to pave the way. In the fifth chapter, the listed companies from 2001 to 2005 are selected as samples, the total accrual profit substitution method, the cross-section Jones model with long-term investment term and the adjusted KS model with long-term investment term are used to calculate the operating accrual profits. By comparing the operating accrual profit of the standard audit opinion group with that of the non-standard opinion group under the same operating risk level, the importance level of auditor setting is estimated, and the statistics of the operating accrual profit of the rights issue company are also given. It is found that the earnings management behavior does exist in the rights issue companies, but the operating accrual profits do not reach the threshold of the "materiality level" set by the auditor. Therefore, the findings do not support the auditor's lack of independence. The sixth chapter is the research results and limitations.
【學位授予單位】：江蘇大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2007
【分類號】：F832.51;F239.6;F224

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