本文選題：審計(jì)意見 + 審計(jì)質(zhì)量　； 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文

【摘要】： 作為衡量上市公司財(cái)務(wù)信息質(zhì)量的標(biāo)尺之一,審計(jì)質(zhì)量歷來都受到國內(nèi)外學(xué)術(shù)界的極大關(guān)注,并形成了卓有成效的大量成果。但隨著安然、世通等欺詐丑聞的曝光及薩班斯——奧克斯萊法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)的頒布實(shí)施所產(chǎn)生的新特征,使我們開始關(guān)注審計(jì)質(zhì)量的縱深課題,即上市公司聘請來自現(xiàn)任會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的高管會(huì)對審計(jì)質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響? 基于以上的原因,本文運(yùn)用規(guī)范分析及實(shí)證研究的方法對上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)聘用的行為動(dòng)機(jī)和關(guān)聯(lián)雇傭行為對審計(jì)意見的影響進(jìn)行了分析。意在彌補(bǔ)國內(nèi)相關(guān)研究不足的基礎(chǔ)上,為監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)加強(qiáng)監(jiān)督以及完善我國審計(jì)市場提供一定的依據(jù)。本文的研究主要分為三部分,相應(yīng)的研究內(nèi)容及結(jié)論如下: 第一部分為理論分析部分,主要為第3章。本部分通過對企業(yè)委托代理理論、博弈理論和保險(xiǎn)理論以及審計(jì)意見相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行分析,對審計(jì)產(chǎn)生的動(dòng)因、審計(jì)的委托代理機(jī)制以及不同類型審計(jì)意見的成因、市場反應(yīng)進(jìn)行了規(guī)范性研究,并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了“清潔”和“不清潔”審計(jì)意見的劃分方法,為實(shí)證研究部分提供了理論支持。 第二部分為實(shí)證研究部分,包括第4章、第5章和第6章。第4章通過規(guī)范性分析,介紹了“不清潔”審計(jì)意見對上市公司的影響,并分析了關(guān)聯(lián)高管對審計(jì)師審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響途徑,從而指出上市公司有運(yùn)用聘任關(guān)聯(lián)高管的手段來影響審計(jì)師決策,改善審計(jì)質(zhì)量的動(dòng)機(jī)。第5章及第6章為實(shí)證的核心部分,本文采用修正的Lennox(2000)審計(jì)意見估計(jì)模型研究了上市公司雇傭關(guān)聯(lián)高管的動(dòng)機(jī);然后運(yùn)用logistic回歸模型檢驗(yàn)這種行為是否能改善審計(jì)意見從而損害了審計(jì)質(zhì)量。研究結(jié)果表明:上市公司聘用來自會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的高管的動(dòng)機(jī)在于預(yù)計(jì)的關(guān)聯(lián)雇傭行為將給審計(jì)意見帶來的改善作用。同時(shí),與國外研究一致,本文的結(jié)論也表明在我國的審計(jì)市場上雇傭關(guān)聯(lián)高管的公司更易收到“清潔”的審計(jì)意見,也就是說這種關(guān)聯(lián)雇傭關(guān)系很可能損害了審計(jì)質(zhì)量,影響了審計(jì)獨(dú)立性。 第三部分為政策建議部分,主要為第7章。本部分在前述實(shí)證研究結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了兩方面的對策建議,一方面是對上市公司聘請來自會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的高管的監(jiān)管建議,另一方面提出了完善我國審計(jì)市場的思路。
[Abstract]:As one of the yardsticks to measure the quality of financial information of listed companies, audit quality has always been paid great attention to by the academic circles at home and abroad, and has formed a great deal of fruitful results.However, with the exposure of fraud scandals such as Enron, WorldCom and the promulgation of Sarbanes-Oxley Actand Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we began to pay attention to the in-depth issue of audit quality.That is, how does hiring executives from current accounting firms affect the audit quality of listed companies?Based on the above reasons, this paper uses normative analysis and empirical research to analyze the impact of the behavior motivation and related employment behavior of listed companies on audit opinions.The purpose is to make up for the lack of domestic research, and to provide some basis for the supervision of the supervision and the improvement of the audit market in China.The research of this paper is divided into three parts, the corresponding research contents and conclusions are as follows:The first part is the theoretical analysis part, mainly the third chapter.Through the analysis of the principal-agent theory, game theory, insurance theory and audit opinion theory, this part analyzes the causes of audit, the principal-agent mechanism of audit and the causes of different types of audit opinions.On the basis of the normative research on market reaction, this paper puts forward the method of dividing "clean" and "unclean" audit opinions, which provides theoretical support for the empirical research.The second part is the empirical research, including chapter 4, chapter 5 and chapter 6.Chapter 4, through normative analysis, introduces the influence of "unclean" audit opinion on listed companies, and analyzes the influence of related executives on auditor audit quality.It is pointed out that listed companies have the motivation of employing associated executives to influence auditors' decisions and improve audit quality.Chapter 5 and chapter 6 are the core parts of the empirical study. This paper uses the modified Lennox2000) audit opinion estimation model to study the motivation of the listed companies to hire associated executives;Then the logistic regression model is used to test whether this behavior can improve the audit opinion and thus impair the audit quality.The results show that the motivation of hiring executives from accounting firms in listed companies lies in the improved effect of the expected related employment behavior on audit opinions.At the same time, consistent with foreign studies, the conclusion of this paper also shows that companies employing associated executives in the audit market in China are more likely to receive "clean" audit opinions, that is to say, this kind of related employment relationship may damage the audit quality.The audit independence is affected.The third part is the policy suggestion part, mainly is the 7th chapter.On the basis of the above empirical research conclusions, this part puts forward two countermeasures and suggestions. On the one hand, it proposes to supervise the listed companies' hiring of executives from accounting firms; on the other hand, it puts forward the idea of perfecting the audit market in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號】：F233;F239.4

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