本文選題：審計(jì)委員會(huì) + 本原性質(zhì)　； 參考：《天津商業(yè)大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文

【摘要】： 審計(jì)委員會(huì)是一個(gè)重要治理機(jī)制,近兩年來(lái)學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)展開(kāi)廣泛的研究。而對(duì)于審計(jì)委員會(huì)的本原性質(zhì)和作用機(jī)理的研究較少且意見(jiàn)不一,正確認(rèn)識(shí)審計(jì)委員會(huì)的性質(zhì)和作用機(jī)理,理順審計(jì)委員會(huì)的治理關(guān)系,為審計(jì)委員會(huì)的實(shí)際效率提供制度層面的注解,才能完善審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度,提高其治理效率。 本文采用規(guī)范研究的方法,以委托代理理論、受托責(zé)任理論、信號(hào)傳遞理論、企業(yè)理論為研究基礎(chǔ),以控制權(quán)分享和公司治理機(jī)制為研究主線,通過(guò)對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)賴以存在的董事會(huì)制度和獨(dú)立董事制度的研究,尤其是對(duì)董事會(huì)和獨(dú)立董事的性質(zhì)的研究,本文認(rèn)為企業(yè)是人力資本和非人力資本投資者投入的要素使用權(quán)交易合約的動(dòng)態(tài)履行過(guò)程,要素所有者分享企業(yè)終極所有權(quán),即剩余索取權(quán)和剩余控制權(quán)。在企業(yè)內(nèi),基于委托代理關(guān)系形成了一個(gè)受托責(zé)任的鏈條,進(jìn)而形成一系列授權(quán)與控制機(jī)制。作為受托人的經(jīng)理人具有雙重身份:作為人力資本的投資者,經(jīng)理人員享有作為所有者的剩余索取權(quán)和剩余控制權(quán),作為基于企業(yè)內(nèi)部受托責(zé)任的責(zé)任人,經(jīng)理人員享有董事會(huì)授予的特定經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)。在公司治理中人力資本所有者利用控制權(quán)優(yōu)勢(shì)虐待非人力資本所有者,產(chǎn)生第一類代理問(wèn)題,在公司治理中引入董事會(huì)制度,董事會(huì)的性質(zhì)就是股東投入資產(chǎn)的“監(jiān)護(hù)人”,經(jīng)理人參與董事會(huì)是監(jiān)護(hù)自身投入資產(chǎn)的需要。 企業(yè)控制權(quán)的分享機(jī)制只是一個(gè)模糊的權(quán)力邊界。圍繞受托責(zé)任鏈形成相應(yīng)的控制權(quán)分享機(jī)制,同時(shí)還形成一套有效地分權(quán)與制衡機(jī)制,即公司治理機(jī)制。實(shí)現(xiàn)良好治理的核心是充分的信息披露。審計(jì)機(jī)制是為了實(shí)現(xiàn)信息質(zhì)量的制度安排。大股東形成的內(nèi)部人控制產(chǎn)生第二類代理問(wèn)題,由獨(dú)立董事代表企業(yè)弱勢(shì)參與者行使剩余控制權(quán)而成為董事會(huì)的成員成為理性的制度安排。獨(dú)立懂事的本質(zhì)是代替企業(yè)弱勢(shì)參與者行使其剩余控制權(quán)的代理人。但現(xiàn)有的審計(jì)機(jī)制卻不能控制在第二種委托代理關(guān)系下由所有者操縱審計(jì)意見(jiàn)所導(dǎo)致的審計(jì)委托與受托關(guān)系異化,于是引入了審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度。 本文的研究認(rèn)為審計(jì)委員會(huì)的本原性質(zhì)是為了實(shí)現(xiàn)審計(jì)機(jī)制良性運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)、保證外部審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的公司治理裝置,審計(jì)委員會(huì)是代表股東行使審計(jì)委托權(quán)、負(fù)責(zé)管理外部審計(jì)事務(wù)的專門(mén)機(jī)構(gòu),審計(jì)委員會(huì)成員必須具備超然的獨(dú)立性和專業(yè)勝任能力,獨(dú)立于企業(yè)的經(jīng)理人,對(duì)股東負(fù)責(zé)。同時(shí),本文通過(guò)對(duì)公司信息控制權(quán)的分析,設(shè)計(jì)出一套審計(jì)委員會(huì)的運(yùn)作機(jī)理,并提出相應(yīng)問(wèn)題。
[Abstract]:Audit Committee is an important governance mechanism. In recent two years, the academic circles have carried out extensive research on Audit Committee.However, there are few researches on the original nature and mechanism of the audit committee, and different opinions, so we should correctly understand the nature and mechanism of the audit committee, and straighten out the governance relationship of the audit committee.In order to perfect the audit committee system and improve its governance efficiency, the system of audit committee can be improved by providing the annotations of system level for the actual efficiency of audit committee.Based on the principal-agent theory, fiduciary responsibility theory, signaling theory and firm theory, this paper takes the sharing of control rights and the mechanism of corporate governance as the main line.Through the study of the board of directors system and the independent director system on which the audit committee depends, especially the study of the nature of the board of directors and independent directors,This paper holds that the enterprise is the dynamic performance process of the transaction contract of the use right of the elements invested by the investors of human capital and non-human capital, and the owner of the factor shares the ultimate ownership of the enterprise, that is, the residual claim and the residual right of control.In an enterprise, a chain of fiduciary responsibility is formed based on principal-agent relationship, and then a series of authorization and control mechanisms are formed.As a trustee, the manager has a dual identity: as an investor in human capital, the manager has the residual claim and residual control right as the owner, and as the responsible person based on the fiduciary responsibility within the enterprise.The manager shall have a specific right of operation granted by the board of directors.In corporate governance, the owners of human capital abuse the non-human capital owners by the advantage of control rights, which leads to the first kind of agency problem. The board of directors is introduced into the corporate governance. The nature of the board of directors is the "guardian" who the shareholders put into the assets.Managers' participation in the board of directors is the need to monitor their invested assets.The sharing mechanism of corporate control is only a vague boundary of power.Around the chain of fiduciary responsibility to form the corresponding control sharing mechanism, but also to form an effective separation of powers and checks and balances, that is, corporate governance mechanism.The core of good governance is adequate information disclosure.Audit mechanism is to realize the system arrangement of information quality.The second kind of agency problem arises from the insider control formed by the large shareholders. The independent director exercises the residual control right on behalf of the weak participants of the enterprise and becomes the member of the board of directors as a rational institutional arrangement.The essence of independent and sensible is to replace the weak participants in the enterprise to exercise their residual control.However, the existing audit mechanism can not control the alienation of audit entrustment and fiduciary relationship caused by the owner manipulating audit opinions under the second principal-agent relationship, so the audit committee system is introduced.In this paper, the author thinks that the original nature of audit committee is to realize the sound operation of audit mechanism and guarantee the independence of external audit. The audit committee is to exercise audit entrustment power on behalf of shareholders.The members of the audit committee who are responsible for the management of external audit affairs must have detached independence and professional competence, independent of the managers of the enterprise, and accountable to the shareholders.At the same time, through the analysis of the control right of company information, this paper designs a set of operating mechanism of audit committee, and puts forward the corresponding problems.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

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