我國(guó)上市公司審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-04-05 04:32
本文選題:上市公司 切入點(diǎn):審計(jì)委員會(huì) 出處:《湖南大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文
【摘要】: 近年來(lái),我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)上,上市公司的監(jiān)管和治理并不盡如人意。上市公司信息失真,惡意損害中小股東利益的案件屢有發(fā)生。這些案件嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了廣大投資者的利益,嚴(yán)重影響了我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)行秩序,也影響了其健康發(fā)展。這些使人們對(duì)公司治理,特別是審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度產(chǎn)生了懷疑。但是我們應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到制度本身并沒有錯(cuò)誤,關(guān)鍵是審計(jì)委員會(huì)是否獨(dú)立。審計(jì)委員會(huì)不獨(dú)立,審計(jì)委員會(huì)的職能就無(wú)庸置疑不可能得到有效發(fā)揮。 本文以2003-2005年在深圳交易所A股上市的設(shè)有審計(jì)委員會(huì)202家上市公司為樣本,從獨(dú)立于管理層的角度分析界定了審計(jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立性的概念,并在對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立性對(duì)上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量的影響關(guān)系的實(shí)證分析時(shí),創(chuàng)新運(yùn)用了:審計(jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立董事的比例、審計(jì)委員會(huì)成員本年度在本公司或關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)任職的人數(shù)比例、審計(jì)委員會(huì)成員只在本公司領(lǐng)取津貼的人數(shù)比例和審計(jì)委員會(huì)成員的年度平均津貼等影響審計(jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立性的變量進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)審計(jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立性的四個(gè)變量中,只有審計(jì)委員會(huì)中領(lǐng)取津貼的人員比例與信息披露質(zhì)量之間顯著正相關(guān),其他三個(gè)變量即審計(jì)委員會(huì)獨(dú)立董事的比例、審計(jì)委員會(huì)委員領(lǐng)取的平均津貼數(shù)額和審計(jì)委員會(huì)中在本公司及關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)任職的人員比例都與上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量沒有顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系,或相關(guān)性很弱的結(jié)論。 針對(duì)上述結(jié)果,本文歸納、分析了其主要原因,有針對(duì)性的提出了提高審計(jì)委員會(huì)中獨(dú)立董事比例、改革審計(jì)委員會(huì)中獨(dú)立董事的薪酬制度、明確審計(jì)委員會(huì)委員獨(dú)立性的規(guī)定、建立健全審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度的披露機(jī)制等相關(guān)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the supervision and governance of listed companies in China's securities market is not satisfactory.Listed companies information distortion, malicious damage to the interests of minority shareholders have occurred repeatedly.These cases have seriously damaged the interests of investors, seriously affected the operation order of China's securities market, and also affected its healthy development.This raises doubts about corporate governance, particularly the audit committee system.But we should realize that the system itself is not wrong, the key is whether the audit committee is independent.If the audit committee is not independent, there is no doubt that the function of the audit committee cannot be carried out effectively.Based on 202 listed companies listed in A shares of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2005, this paper analyzes and defines the concept of audit committee independence from the perspective of independence from management.And in the empirical analysis of the impact of audit committee independence on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, innovative use of: the proportion of independent directors of audit committee,The proportion of members of the audit committee serving in their own company or associated enterprise this year,The audit committee members conducted an empirical test only in the proportion of the number of people receiving the allowance and the annual average allowance of the members of the audit committee, which affected the independence of the audit committee. The results showed that the audit committee was independent of four variables,Only there is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of those who receive allowances and the quality of information disclosure in the audit committee. The other three variables are the proportion of independent directors of the audit committee.There is no significant correlation between the average amount of allowance received by the members of the audit committee and the proportion of employees in the audit committee and the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, or the conclusion that the correlation is very weak.In view of the above results, this paper sums up and analyzes the main reasons, and proposes to raise the proportion of independent directors in the audit committee and to reform the compensation system of independent directors in the audit committee.To clarify the independence of audit committee members, to establish and improve the audit committee system disclosure mechanism and other relevant policy recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2007
【分類號(hào)】:F276.6;F239.4
【引證文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 郭嘉;我國(guó)上市公司審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度研究[D];東北師范大學(xué);2009年
,本文編號(hào):1713234
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