本文選題：財務(wù)舞弊　切入點：審計合謀　出處：《中國政法大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2002年至2011年十年間，我國平均每年約有100家上市公司因為違規(guī)購買股票、虛構(gòu)利潤、虛列資產(chǎn)、擅自改變資金用途、推遲披露、虛假陳述、重大遺漏、違規(guī)出資、操縱股價、欺詐上市、違規(guī)擔(dān)保等違法違規(guī)事項被監(jiān)管機構(gòu)處罰。為什么經(jīng)過審計的上市公司報表還會出現(xiàn)如此重大的紕漏？審計師們在這些案件中扮演了怎樣的角色？一系列讓人震驚的數(shù)據(jù)和曝光的財務(wù)造假丑聞無不警示我們：舞弊并未遠離，合謀仍在繼續(xù)。審計合謀不僅關(guān)系到眾多投資者的經(jīng)濟利益、注冊會計師的職業(yè)形象，更影響到證券市場的健康運行和社會誠信機制的構(gòu)建。認(rèn)清合謀的實質(zhì)從而找出解決之道勢在必行。 由于審計合謀問題的隱蔽性，無法用經(jīng)驗數(shù)據(jù)進行直接研究，因此本文采用構(gòu)建博弈模型結(jié)合描述性統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)的方式進行分析論證。 本文按照發(fā)現(xiàn)問題、分析問題和解決問題的思路分為五個部分。引言部分主要介紹了選題背景和意義、國內(nèi)外研究狀況、研究對象和研究方法等。第一章探討審計合謀形成的原因。借鑒“舞弊三角”理論將原因梳理為動機理論、現(xiàn)實壓力和機會誘導(dǎo)三方面。第二章是審計合謀的博弈分析過程。首先根據(jù)中國審計市場的情況構(gòu)建一個初步博弈模型，，目的是理順博弈雙方的利益訴求和整個博弈過程，并尋找一個管理層更傾向于真實披露且注冊會計師更愿意保持獨立的利益均衡狀態(tài)。其次增加中國審計市場缺乏的或者是尚不完善的變量，如聲譽回報、民事訴訟機制等，對此擴展博弈進行分析，以說明這些因素對博弈雙方策略選擇的影響。第三章針對學(xué)術(shù)界提出的四種防治審計合謀的措施進行有效性探討，這些措施包括審計收費最低限價管制、審計委托模式重構(gòu)、引入第二個審計師和加大行政處罰力度。第四章是在前三章的基礎(chǔ)上提出審計合謀的治理建議。這些措施有：完善上市公司和會計師事務(wù)所的組織管理體制，建立有效的經(jīng)理人和事務(wù)所競爭市場，明確注冊會計師的法律責(zé)任，積極接受媒體和公眾監(jiān)督，以及明確政府部門的審計監(jiān)督職責(zé)。
[Abstract]:During the 10 years from 2002 to 2011, on average, about 100 listed companies in China bought shares illegally, made up profits, listed assets, changed the use of funds without authorization, delayed disclosure, misrepresented statements, significant omissions, illegally financed and manipulated stock prices. Fraudulent listing, illegal guarantee and other illegal matters were punished by the regulatory authorities. Why can the audited listed companies' statements still have such significant flaws? What role do auditors play in these cases? A series of shocking data and financial fraud scandals have warned us that fraud is not far away and collusion is continuing. Auditing collusion is not only about the economic interests of many investors, but also about the professional image of certified public accountants. It also affects the healthy operation of the securities market and the construction of social credit mechanism. It is imperative to recognize the essence of collusion and find out the solution. Because of the concealment of audit collusion problem, the empirical data can not be directly studied, so this paper adopts the way of constructing game model combined with descriptive statistical data to analyze and prove it. This paper is divided into five parts according to the ideas of problem finding, problem analysis and problem solving. The introduction mainly introduces the background and significance of the topic, the research situation at home and abroad. The first chapter discusses the causes of audit collusion. The second chapter is the game analysis process of audit collusion. Firstly, according to the situation of China's audit market, a preliminary game model is constructed, the purpose of which is to straighten out the interests of both sides of the game and the whole process of the game. And looking for a management more inclined to true disclosure and CPA is more willing to maintain an independent balance of interests. Secondly, increase the lack of audit market in China or is not yet perfect variables, such as reputation returns, civil litigation mechanisms, etc. In order to explain the influence of these factors on the strategy choice of both sides of the game, the third chapter discusses the effectiveness of four kinds of measures to prevent and cure audit collusion put forward by academic circles. These measures include the control of the minimum price of audit fees, the reconfiguration of the audit entrustment model, The second auditor is introduced and the administrative penalty is increased. Chapter 4th puts forward the governance suggestions of audit collusion on the basis of the first three chapters. These measures include: perfecting the organization and management system of listed companies and accounting firms, To establish an effective competitive market for managers and firms, clarify the legal responsibilities of CPA, actively accept media and public supervision, and clarify the audit supervision responsibilities of government departments.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F239.2;F224.32

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