本文選題：審計(jì)師規(guī)模　切入點(diǎn)：審計(jì)任期　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自上世紀(jì)初,獨(dú)立審計(jì)就倍受債權(quán)債務(wù)人的注重,理論界給予了高度重視。另外,盡管公司融資已有資本市場(chǎng)這個(gè)直接融資渠道,但銀行貸款這種間接融資方式仍占主導(dǎo)地位,企業(yè)外部融資仍然主要依賴于銀行貸款。因此,科學(xué)地認(rèn)識(shí)獨(dú)立審計(jì)在借款契約中的作用機(jī)制和實(shí)際效用以及有效提升這種效用就成為關(guān)系到龐大債務(wù)市場(chǎng)有序運(yùn)行、審計(jì)行業(yè)健康發(fā)展的重大問題,具有重要的意義。目前,我們已經(jīng)知道獨(dú)立審計(jì)在銀行借款契約中具有一定的信息傳遞作用,那么這種信息傳遞作用在企業(yè)自身的信息環(huán)境發(fā)生變遷時(shí)是否會(huì)發(fā)生變化?提高企業(yè)的信息透明度能否降低企業(yè)的借款資本成本?事實(shí)上,目前關(guān)于審計(jì)師規(guī)模的研究不少,但對(duì)于審計(jì)師規(guī)模與銀行貸款政策的專題性研究還較少。此外,對(duì)于審計(jì)任期與銀行借款成本的研究也比較少,部分研究都集中在審計(jì)任期與債券發(fā)行成本的關(guān)系上。關(guān)于信息透明度與債務(wù)成本的研究也相當(dāng)少,大部分研究都集中在信息透明度與股權(quán)融資成本的研究上,關(guān)于不同信息環(huán)境背景下審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征對(duì)銀行借款利率的作用的研究基本更是非常缺乏。所以,本文的研究在彌補(bǔ)這幾方面的理論上是具有重要的意義的。 因此,本文以2006至2011年間深圳證券交易所上市公司為樣本,在契約理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論的基礎(chǔ)上,分析了審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征、企業(yè)信息透明度與企業(yè)銀行借款利率的關(guān)系,并檢驗(yàn)了不同信息環(huán)境下審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征對(duì)借款利率的作用。 本文的研究結(jié)果證實(shí),審計(jì)師規(guī)模與企業(yè)銀行借款利率存在負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。在在控制了審計(jì)意見、公司規(guī)模、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率、總資產(chǎn)周轉(zhuǎn)率、凈資產(chǎn)收益率和企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)性的因素之后,審計(jì)師規(guī)模與借款利率負(fù)相關(guān),也就是說如果審計(jì)師的規(guī)模為“十大”,則有助于企業(yè)爭(zhēng)取更優(yōu)惠的借款利率。而目前我國的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所市場(chǎng)集中度很低,事務(wù)所規(guī)模普遍較小,因此實(shí)現(xiàn)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所規(guī)�；哂兄匾囊饬x。 通過對(duì)審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征的進(jìn)一步的分析發(fā)現(xiàn),審計(jì)任期對(duì)借款利率的作用會(huì)受審計(jì)師規(guī)模的影響。當(dāng)審計(jì)師規(guī)模為“十大”時(shí),審計(jì)任期對(duì)借款利率具有一個(gè)相對(duì)較弱的正影響,審計(jì)任期越長(zhǎng),企業(yè)借款利率越大；而當(dāng)審計(jì)師規(guī)模為“非十大”時(shí),審計(jì)任期的作用要更突出一些,并且是負(fù)相關(guān),即審計(jì)任期越長(zhǎng),企業(yè)借款利率越小。這是因?yàn)椤笆蟆迸c“非十大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的專業(yè)勝任能力存在差異,所以學(xué)習(xí)效用對(duì)該勝任能力有不同的影響。由于“十大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的審計(jì)人員自身的專業(yè)勝任能力較強(qiáng),當(dāng)審計(jì)任期越來越長(zhǎng)時(shí)學(xué)習(xí)效果可能不明顯,甚至可能由于缺乏挑戰(zhàn),審計(jì)人員會(huì)產(chǎn)生過度自信心理,從而無法保持合理的職業(yè)謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度,導(dǎo)致審計(jì)質(zhì)量降低。而對(duì)于“非十大”事務(wù)所來講,學(xué)習(xí)效應(yīng)可能相對(duì)顯著,隨著審計(jì)任期越來越長(zhǎng),審計(jì)師的專業(yè)勝任能力也不斷增強(qiáng),審計(jì)結(jié)果的質(zhì)量更佳。因此,當(dāng)審計(jì)師規(guī)模為“十大”時(shí),審計(jì)任期越長(zhǎng)企業(yè)借款利率越大,當(dāng)審計(jì)師規(guī)模為“非十大”時(shí),審計(jì)任期越長(zhǎng)企業(yè)借款利率越低。 為了進(jìn)一步考察不同信息透明度下審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征(審計(jì)師規(guī)模和審計(jì)任期)與公司借款利率的關(guān)系,即審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征對(duì)借款利率的作用是否會(huì)因?yàn)樯鲜泄拘畔⑼该鞫鹊母叩投煌�。本文根�?jù)樣本公司的信息透明度把總樣本劃分為高信息透明度和低信息透明度的兩個(gè)子樣本,分別對(duì)總樣本和兩個(gè)子樣本進(jìn)行回歸。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),當(dāng)企業(yè)自身信息透明度高時(shí),審計(jì)師規(guī)模和審計(jì)任期對(duì)借款利率有顯著的負(fù)影響,而在在信息透明度低時(shí),這種反向關(guān)系不顯著。這說明,審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征只有在一定的透明度下才會(huì)起作用,信息透明度低時(shí)審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征的作用不大。 另外,本文還發(fā)現(xiàn),企業(yè)信息透明度對(duì)審計(jì)意見與借款利率的相關(guān)性影響較大。在較高的信息透明度下,審計(jì)意見與借款利率的相關(guān)性不顯著,而在較低的信息透明度下,審計(jì)意見與借款利率顯著正相關(guān),且在5%水平上顯著。這說明,當(dāng)企業(yè)信息透明度高的時(shí)候,審計(jì)對(duì)借款利率的作用主要集中在審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征方面。當(dāng)企業(yè)信息透明度較低時(shí),由于企業(yè)與銀行間信息不對(duì)稱程度較高,銀行需要通過其他途徑獲得更多有效的信息以減少信息不對(duì)稱所帶來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),此時(shí)審計(jì)意見對(duì)借款利率的作用會(huì)比較突出。 綜上所述,企業(yè)信息透明度對(duì)借款利率的直接影響不大,但是他可以通過影響審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征及審計(jì)意見等對(duì)企業(yè)借款利率的作用對(duì)借款利率產(chǎn)生間接的影響。當(dāng)企業(yè)本身信息透明度低時(shí),審計(jì)意見在借款利率中的作用會(huì)更突出；而在信息透明度高時(shí),審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征對(duì)借款利率的作用更明顯。 本文的研究貢獻(xiàn)主要有以下幾點(diǎn)：第一,同時(shí)研究了審計(jì)師規(guī)模和審計(jì)任期與借款利率的關(guān)系,豐富了獨(dú)立審計(jì)與企業(yè)借款利率關(guān)系的研究文獻(xiàn)；第二,本文基于企業(yè)信息環(huán)境變遷的視角考察審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征在債務(wù)契約中的作用,豐富了信息透明度與銀行借款利率的理論體系,特別是信息透明度變動(dòng)的情況下審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)特征對(duì)銀行借款利率的影響；第三,本文的研究結(jié)果對(duì)于有針對(duì)性的提高審計(jì)在債務(wù)契約中的效用、降低企業(yè)借款契約的交易成本、強(qiáng)化債務(wù)市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)管以及審計(jì)行業(yè)的健康發(fā)展等均具有重要意義。 另外,本文還存在以下幾方面的不足,這也是未來研究需要注意的方面。 首先,在控制變量方面,本文選取了審計(jì)意見、公司規(guī)模、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率、資產(chǎn)周轉(zhuǎn)率、公司的盈利水平、公司的成長(zhǎng)性和企業(yè)破產(chǎn)指數(shù)來降低其他因素對(duì)企業(yè)借款利率的影響。但事實(shí)上這些因素不足以囊括所有的影響因素,目前已被證實(shí)能夠影響企業(yè)借款利率的因素就有很多,包括大股東占款程度、其他外部融資、公司上市年限、金融市場(chǎng)水平、法制環(huán)境等。因此,本文在控制變量的選取方面不夠全面,如果能控制更多的影響因素,本文的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果可能會(huì)更具有意義。 其次,在審計(jì)任期變量的選取上,本文采用了事務(wù)所的任期作為審計(jì)任期,而有些學(xué)者以審計(jì)師的任期年限為基礎(chǔ)對(duì)審計(jì)任期進(jìn)行研究,如果能夠?qū)煞N任期分別進(jìn)行研究和對(duì)比,實(shí)證結(jié)果可能會(huì)更全面。 此外,在樣本選擇與數(shù)據(jù)來源方面,本文的樣本來自于2006至2011年間的深交所A股非金融類上市公司,而非所有上市公司。另外,這些樣本公司必須同時(shí)具備以下條件：披露審計(jì)事務(wù)所聘任信息；披露當(dāng)年年度財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告；借款利率為正；具有深交所信息披露評(píng)級(jí)信息。因此,經(jīng)過篩選處理后的樣本量偏小,尤其是信息透明度較低的樣本量只有604個(gè),因此實(shí)證結(jié)果尤其是信息透明度分類分析的結(jié)果可能不夠精確。如果能夠有更豐富的樣本數(shù)據(jù),在兩種信息環(huán)境下的樣本量差異較小的情況下進(jìn)行分析的話,研究結(jié)果可能更為準(zhǔn)確。
[Abstract]:Since the beginning of the century, independent audit has the creditor and the debtor to pay attention to, the theory circle has given high attention. In addition, although the company has been the capital market financing channels for direct financing, bank loans but this indirect financing mode is still dominant, enterprise external financing still mainly rely on bank loans. Therefore, the scientific understanding of the role of independent audit the mechanism in the loan contract and the actual utility and improve the utility has become related to the orderly debt market operation, major issues of the healthy development of the audit industry, has important significance. At present, we already know that the independent audit has a certain role in the transmission of information in the bank loan contract, so the role of information transfer in the enterprise the information environment changes will change? Improve the transparency of information can reduce the loan capital In fact, the current cost? Many studies on auditor size, but for the special research on the auditor size and bank loan policy is still less. In addition, for the study of audit tenure and bank borrowing costs are relatively small, some studies have focused the relationship in the cost of issuing bonds on audit tenure and quite a few studies on. Transparency of information and the cost of debt, most studies have focused on the study of information transparency and the cost of equity financing, on the audit characteristics of different information environment under the background of the bank loan interest rate of basic research is very lack. So, this study has important significance in making up several aspects of this theory is.
Therefore, this paper takes 2006 to 2011 years, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies as samples, in contract theory, based on the theory of information asymmetry, analyzes the characteristics of audit institutions, the relationship between enterprise information transparency and corporate borrowing rates for banks, and examines the characteristics of different audit institutions under the environment of information on loan interest.
The results of this study confirmed that there is a negative correlation between auditor size and corporate bank loan interest rate. In the control of the audit opinion, the company size, asset liability ratio, total assets turnover, the rate of return on net assets and factors of enterprise growth, auditor size is negatively correlated with the loan interest rate, that is to say if the auditor the size of the "big ten", will help enterprises to strive for more favorable borrowing rates. The market concentration and the current accounting firms in China is very low, firm size is generally small, so the implementation of the accounting firm scale has important significance.
Through the further analysis of the characteristics of audit institutions, audit tenure will be affected by the auditor size to the borrowing rate. When the size of the "big ten" auditors, audit tenure has a relatively weak positive effect on the borrowing rate, long auditor tenure, corporate borrowing rates increased; and when the auditor the size of "big ten", the audit tenure effect is more prominent, and is negatively related to audit tenure is longer, corporate borrowing rate is smaller. This is because the "big ten" and "non big ten CPA professional competency are different, so the study effect is different the influence on the competence. Because of the" big ten "accounting firms audit staff's professional competence is strong, when learning more and more long term audit effect may not be obvious, even because of the lack of challenge, audit People will have overconfidence, thus unable to maintain a reasonable occupation cautious, lead to lower audit quality. As for the "non big ten firms, learning effect may be relatively significant, with more and more long term audit, the auditor's professional competence is constantly enhanced, better quality of audit results. Therefore, when the auditor the size of the" big ten ", long auditor tenure corporate borrowing rate is larger, when the size of the" non big ten auditors ", long auditor tenure corporate borrowing rates are low.
In order to further investigate the characteristics of audit information transparency (auditor size and audit term) and relationship between corporate borrowing rates, namely audit characteristics effect on loan interest will because the information transparency of listed company and Sample Firms. According to the different information transparency of the total samples are divided into two sub samples of high and low information transparency the information transparency, respectively for the total sample and two sub sample regression. The results showed that when the enterprise information transparency is high, auditor size and audit term has a significant negative impact on borrowing rate, while in low information transparency, this inverse relationship is not significant. This shows that the audit agency features only in a certain transparency will take effect, not characteristics of audit agency information transparency low.
In addition, this paper also found that the effect of the enterprise information transparency correlation on the audit opinion and the loan interest rate greatly. The higher information transparency, no significant correlation between the audit opinion and the loan interest rate, while low information transparency, the audit opinion and the borrowing rate significantly positive correlation, and significant at the 5% level. That, when the enterprise information transparency, the role of the audit of loan interest mainly concentrated in the characteristics of audit institutions. When the enterprise information transparency is low, because of the degree of information asymmetry between enterprises and banks is higher, the bank through other ways to get more effective information to reduce the risk caused by the information asymmetry, the audit comments on the loan interest rate effect will be more prominent.
To sum up, the enterprise information transparency has little direct impact on the loan interest, but he can have an indirect effect on loan interest rate by affecting the audit agency audit opinion on the characteristics and the role of corporate borrowing rate. When the enterprise itself low information transparency, audit opinion in the loan interest rate in effect will be more prominent in the information transparency; when the audit characteristics effect on the loan interest rate is more obvious.
The main contributions of this article are as follows: first, the relationship between auditor size and audit tenure and loan interest, enrich the research literatures on the relationship between independent audit and corporate borrowing rates; second, the information environment changes of enterprises from the perspective based on the audit characteristics of institutions in the debt contract, enriches the theory of the system of information transparency and bank loan interest rates, especially the impact of audit institutions characteristics of information transparency changes on bank lending rates; third, the results of this study provided high utility for audit in the debt contract of the enterprise, reduce transaction costs of loan contracts, are of great significance to strengthen the debt market supervision and audit of the healthy development of the industry.
In addition, this article also has the following problems, this is the future research aspects need to pay attention to.
First of all, in the aspect of control variables, this paper selects the audit opinion, the company size, asset liability ratio, asset turnover, the company's profitability, corporate growth and corporate bankruptcy index to reduce the influence of other factors on corporate borrowing rates. But these factors do not include all factors, has been that can influence factors of enterprise loan interest there are many, including big shareholders, other external financing, the age of the listed companies, financial market, legal environment. Therefore, the selection of control variables is not comprehensive enough, if we can control more factors, the empirical test results may be more meaningful.
Secondly, in the selection of audit tenure variables, the firm's tenure as auditor tenure, and some scholars in the auditor's tenure as the foundation to study the audit term, if the term of two were studied and compared, the empirical results may be more comprehensive.
In addition, in the aspect of sample selection and data sources, the samples from 2006 to 2011 between the Shenzhen A shares of non-financial listed companies, but not all of the listed companies. In addition, the Sample Firms must also meet the following conditions: the disclosure of audit appointment information; disclosure of annual financial report; borrowing rate has positive; the Shenzhen stock exchange information disclosure rating information. Therefore, after screening after the treatment of small sample, especially the sample information transparency low of only 604, so the empirical results especially on the transparency of information classification results may not be accurate. If we can have more abundant sample data, analyze it in two the smaller sample size differences under the information environment under the condition that the results may be more accurate.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F239.2

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