本文選題：會計師事務(wù)所　切入點：被披露違規(guī)信息　出處：《首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：審計報告作為證券交易市場的重要信息載體,對政府監(jiān)管、投資者投資、上市公司發(fā)展具有重要意義。會計師事務(wù)所在審計報告的出具過程中扮演著“鑒證者”的角色。所以,分析會計師事務(wù)所被披露違規(guī)信息與審計質(zhì)量的相關(guān)性關(guān)系,對審計市場的有序發(fā)展、金融行業(yè)的平穩(wěn)運行具有重要意義。本文以2007-2014年中國證券監(jiān)督委員會(以下簡稱“證監(jiān)會”)公布的會計師事務(wù)所的行政處罰公告為研究對象,以操縱性應(yīng)計作為替代變量,研究會計師事務(wù)所被披露違規(guī)信息與審計質(zhì)量的相關(guān)性關(guān)系。本文以2007年至2014年被披露違規(guī)信息的會計師事務(wù)所為研究對象,回顧梳理了行政監(jiān)管、審計行為影響因素、違規(guī)信息披露對審計質(zhì)量影響的相關(guān)文獻,綜合委托代理理論、公共產(chǎn)品理論、聲譽傳導(dǎo)機制、法律機制等基礎(chǔ)理論,分析違規(guī)信息披露與審計質(zhì)量之間的相關(guān)性關(guān)系;并運用描述性分析、對照樣本法、最小二乘法回歸等方法進行檢驗。第一,根據(jù)中國證監(jiān)會的行政公告,手工搜集2007-2014年間被披露違規(guī)信息的會計師事務(wù)所信息,通過配對法選取未被披露違規(guī)的會計師事務(wù)所作為對照樣本;第二,以未被證監(jiān)會披露違規(guī)信息的事務(wù)所為對照樣本,研究被證監(jiān)會披露違規(guī)信息的會計師事務(wù)所審計質(zhì)量在違規(guī)信息披露前后的變化情況;第三,研究證監(jiān)會出具的處罰公告中處罰類型不同,是否會影響會計師事務(wù)所的審計質(zhì)量。最后,針對披露會計師事務(wù)所違規(guī)信息這一行政處罰方式對審計質(zhì)量的影響結(jié)果,提出建議,加強政府行政監(jiān)管強度,完善行政處罰機制,更好的規(guī)范審計市場秩序,為資本市場發(fā)展提供良好的審計環(huán)境。以操縱性應(yīng)計作為替代變量,分析會計師事務(wù)所違規(guī)對審計質(zhì)量的影響。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),被披露違規(guī)信息的會計師事務(wù)所在違規(guī)后審計質(zhì)量顯著好于違規(guī)前;對于被披露違規(guī)信息的事務(wù)所來說,被披露違規(guī)處罰程度越嚴重,違規(guī)以后審計質(zhì)量改善越明顯。由此可以推斷,證監(jiān)會行政處罰手段具有提高審計質(zhì)量,維護審計市場秩序,促進社會經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的作用。
[Abstract]:As an important information carrier in the stock exchange market, the audit report is of great significance to government supervision, investor investment and the development of listed companies. Accounting firms play the role of "verifier" in the process of issuing audit reports. To analyze the relationship between the disclosure of illegal information and the audit quality of accounting firms, and to develop the audit market in an orderly manner, The smooth operation of the financial industry is of great significance. In this paper, the administrative penalty announcement of accounting firms published by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) from 2007-2014 is taken as the research object, and the manipulative accrual is taken as the substitute variable. This paper studies the relationship between the disclosure of irregularities in accounting firms and the audit quality. This paper reviews the influencing factors of administrative supervision and audit behavior, taking the accounting firms which were disclosed from 2007 to 2014 as the research objects. The related literature on the impact of information disclosure on audit quality, comprehensive principal-agent theory, public product theory, reputation transmission mechanism, legal mechanism and other basic theories, analyzes the relationship between information disclosure and audit quality; And using descriptive analysis to test the same method and the least square regression method. First, according to the administrative announcement of the CSRC, the accounting firm information that was disclosed in the period 2007-2014 was manually collected. The accounting firms that have not been disclosed as control samples are selected by pairing method. Secondly, the firms that have not been disclosed by the CSRC are used as the control samples. To study the changes in audit quality of accounting firms that were disclosed by the CSRC before and after the disclosure of illegal information; third, to study the different types of penalties in the punishment notices issued by the CSRC. Whether it will affect the audit quality of accounting firms. Finally, in view of the results of the administrative punishment of disclosing information about irregularities in accounting firms on the audit quality, some suggestions are put forward to strengthen the intensity of administrative supervision by the government. Perfecting the administrative punishment mechanism, standardizing the audit market order better, providing a good audit environment for the development of the capital market, taking the manipulative accrual as the substitute variable, analyzing the influence of accounting firms' violation on the audit quality. The audit quality of the accounting firm that has been disclosed to violate the rules is significantly better than that before the violation. For the firm that has been disclosed, the more serious the penalty for the disclosure of the violation is, The more obvious the improvement of audit quality is after the violation of rules, the more obvious it is that the administrative punishment means of CSRC can improve the audit quality, maintain the order of audit market and promote the development of social economy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F239.4;F233;F832.51

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