本文關鍵詞： 審計合謀治理 審計關系人 審計合謀利益關系主體 利益均衡　出處：《湖南大學》2008年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】： 現實審計環(huán)境的復雜性,導致了審計關系人的現實角色與理想角色的錯位和扭曲,審計關系人的正當利益失去應有的保護,進而導致了審計合謀的產生,而審計合謀又進一步加劇了審計關系失衡。審計合謀之所以一直未能得到有效的治理,究其原因關鍵還是在于審計關系人利益分割不公平或不合法及其權責利不明晰。審計合謀治理是一個世界性的難題。因此,研究審計合謀治理在理論上和實務上都具有重要意義。 本文以信息不對稱理論、有限政府理論、審計合謀共生理論和投資者保護的法律論等作為研究的理論基礎。本文首先對審計關系人的范疇予以重新界定,將預期審計報告使用者納入審計關系人范疇以取代傳統(tǒng)審計關系下的委托者。并且將作為監(jiān)管者的政府與新審計關系人一同納入審計合謀利益關系主體的范疇。認為當審計合謀泛濫時,作為監(jiān)管者的政府應當承擔政策失誤和監(jiān)管無效的社會責任和行政責任。然后,結合我國的國情分析了審計關系人利益失衡的原因和審計合謀機理,認為審計關系人的經濟人特性和審計環(huán)境的復雜性決定了審計合謀是各方利益主體之間的一個長期共存和博弈的過程,并對此進行博弈分析和案例分析。提出被審計者的信息權優(yōu)勢決定了其相對于審計者而言應當為審計合謀的后果承擔更大的責任,同時認為預期審計報告使用者擁有獲取真實而完整的審計信息的權力和投資損失的有限求償權。本文通過利益均衡分析,最后立足于國情提出審計合謀治理應當遵循的思路是:被審計者和審計者有效自我約束、委托者有效監(jiān)督、政府有效監(jiān)管和投資者有效信賴。并提出審計合謀的“三維治理觀”,即動機誘正、過程控制以及結果的監(jiān)督和懲戒。
[Abstract]:The complexity of the reality of audit environment, leads to the reality of the role of the auditors and the ideal role of dislocation and distortion of the legitimate interests of the auditors lose their protection, which led to the audit collusion, and audit collusion and further aggravate the imbalance of audit relationship. The audit collusion has not been effective governance, the key the reason is that the audit stakeholder segmentation of unfair or unlawful power and responsibility are not clear. Audit collusion is a worldwide problem. Therefore, research on the governance of audit collusion in theory and practice are of great significance.
Based on the information asymmetry theory, the theory of limited government, audit collusion symbiosis theory and investor protection law theory as the theoretical basis for research. This paper first category to redefine the relationship between the audit, the audit report users into the expected auditrelationshipparties category to replace the traditional auditing relationship under the client and will serve as the people. The relationship between the government and the new audit regulators into the audit subject interests collusion category. It is thought that when the audit collusion flood, the government as the regulator should undertake policy mistakes and non effective supervision of social responsibility and administrative responsibility. Then, combined with China's national conditions and analyzes the causes and mechanism of audit collusion audit stakeholder imbalance. That the complexity of the economic characteristics of people and the relationship between the audit environment audit determines the audit collusion is a long-term between the main interests of all parties The process of coexistence and game theory, and analyzes this game analysis and case. Put forward the audit information advantage of the right to determine its relative to the auditors should take greater responsibility for audit collusion, at the same time that the expected audit report users have access to real and complete the limited audit information of power and investment losses right. Through the interest equilibrium analysis, finally put forward based on the audit collusion governance should follow the ideas on the situation is: the audit and audit effective self-discipline, entrust the effective supervision, government supervision and effective investors trust. And put forward the "three audit collusion governance view, namely incentive, supervision and process control and the results and punishment.

【學位授予單位】：湖南大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：F239.0;F224

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本文編號：1551029