異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者對內(nèi)部控制審計的影響
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者 上市公司 內(nèi)部控制審計 出處:《重慶理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:審計的價值在于實現(xiàn)會計信息的價值增值。審計所發(fā)揮的治理作用在內(nèi)部控制進入審計視野后發(fā)生了新的變化。內(nèi)部控制審計作為優(yōu)化內(nèi)部控制監(jiān)督機制的一項重要制度安排,是內(nèi)部控制在企業(yè)中有效實施的重要保障。隨著一系列由于內(nèi)部控制失效引發(fā)的財務(wù)舞弊事件的發(fā)生,內(nèi)部控制審計成為了社會各界關(guān)注的重要領(lǐng)域。目前,在機構(gòu)投資者迅速發(fā)展的帶動下,理論界和實務(wù)界越來越關(guān)注機構(gòu)投資者對公司治理的積極影響。本文以內(nèi)部控制審計為研究對象,從異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者的角度,采用實證分析為主的研究方法,結(jié)合我國上市公司2012年內(nèi)部控制審計披露情況來分析異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者對內(nèi)部控制審計的影響。 首先,本文回顧和評價了國內(nèi)外關(guān)于內(nèi)部控制審計以及異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者的研究文獻。通過分析評價國內(nèi)外專家學(xué)者們關(guān)于機構(gòu)投資者與內(nèi)部控制審計方面的研究成果,為本文的理論分析和實證檢驗部分奠定基礎(chǔ)。 其次,本文從經(jīng)濟學(xué)角度來分析異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者對內(nèi)部控制審計的影響,主要運用了委托代理理論、信號傳遞理論和信息不對稱理論。理論分析表明:壓力抵制型機構(gòu)投資者會對內(nèi)部控制審計產(chǎn)生積極影響。 再次,用樣本數(shù)據(jù)實證檢驗了異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者對內(nèi)部控制審計的影響。經(jīng)過理論分析,本文提出關(guān)于異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者對內(nèi)部控制審計影響的三個假設(shè),并通過收集整理2012年上市公司的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),主要采用描述性統(tǒng)計、相關(guān)性分析和邏輯回歸的方法對假設(shè)進行實證檢驗。本文檢驗發(fā)現(xiàn)異質(zhì)機構(gòu)投資者持股會對內(nèi)部控制審計產(chǎn)生影響,其中:壓力敏感型機構(gòu)投資者持股比例的變化,對上市公司自愿披露內(nèi)部控制審計報告的影響不明顯;壓力抵制型機構(gòu)投資者持股比例越高,上市公司自愿披露內(nèi)部控制審計報告的程度越高。 最后,在理論分析與實證研究的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了相關(guān)政策建議:大力發(fā)展機構(gòu)投資者,,實現(xiàn)機構(gòu)投資者的規(guī);投嘣环e極引導(dǎo)機構(gòu)投資者發(fā)揮治理效應(yīng),實現(xiàn)積極股東主義投資;培育優(yōu)秀的機構(gòu)投資者隊伍。
[Abstract]:The value of audit lies in realizing the value increment of accounting information. The governance function of audit has changed after the internal control has entered the audit field of vision. Internal control audit is an important institutional arrangement to optimize the internal control supervision mechanism. Internal control is an important guarantee for the effective implementation of internal control in enterprises. With the occurrence of a series of financial fraud events caused by the failure of internal control, internal control audit has become an important area of concern to all sectors of society. At present, Driven by the rapid development of institutional investors, the theorists and practitioners are paying more and more attention to the positive impact of institutional investors on corporate governance. This paper adopts the empirical analysis method to analyze the influence of heterogeneous institutional investors on internal control audit combined with the disclosure of internal control audit of listed companies in China in 2012. First of all, this paper reviews and evaluates the domestic and foreign literature on internal control audit and heterogeneous institutional investors. Through the analysis and evaluation of domestic and foreign experts and scholars on institutional investors and internal control audit research results, It lays a foundation for the theoretical analysis and empirical test of this paper. Secondly, this paper analyzes the influence of heterogeneous institutional investors on internal control audit from the perspective of economics, mainly using the principal-agent theory. Signal transmission theory and information asymmetry theory. Theoretical analysis shows that pressure-resistant institutional investors will have a positive impact on internal control audit. Thirdly, the paper empirically tests the influence of heterogeneous institutional investors on internal control audit with sample data. Through theoretical analysis, this paper puts forward three hypotheses about the influence of heterogeneous institutional investors on internal control audit. And through collecting and collating the relevant data of listed companies in 2012, mainly using descriptive statistics, Correlation analysis and logical regression are used to test the hypothesis. This paper finds that heterogeneous institutional investors' shareholding will have an impact on internal control audit, including: the change of the proportion of pressure sensitive institutional investors' shareholding. The impact on the voluntary disclosure of internal control audit report of listed companies is not obvious; the higher the proportion of pressure and resistance institutional investors hold, the higher the degree of voluntary disclosure of internal control audit reports of listed companies. Finally, on the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical research, the paper puts forward some relevant policy suggestions: vigorously developing institutional investors, realizing the scale and diversification of institutional investors, actively guiding institutional investors to exert the governance effect, To realize active shareholder investment and cultivate excellent institutional investors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:重慶理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F239.45;F275;F276.6
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