本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市公司中小股東權(quán)益審計(jì)保護(hù)問題研究　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 中小股東權(quán)益 審計(jì)保護(hù) 大股東侵占 高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求 高質(zhì)量審計(jì)供給 審計(jì)獨(dú)立性

【摘要】：中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)問題是資本市場(chǎng)尋求利益公平的核心問題，是各國證券監(jiān)管的重點(diǎn)，也是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究熱點(diǎn)。目前，學(xué)術(shù)理論界就如何對(duì)中小股東權(quán)益審計(jì)保護(hù)的系統(tǒng)研究尚屬空白，而且我國的資本市場(chǎng)存在著中小股東權(quán)益訴求的緊迫性，“上市公司中小股東權(quán)益審計(jì)保護(hù)問題研究”順應(yīng)了中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)的實(shí)踐和研究需要，體現(xiàn)了公司制度的公平，對(duì)于促進(jìn)中小股東權(quán)益審計(jì)保護(hù)機(jī)制在我國的形成以及提升我國獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量等具有較重要的理論意義和實(shí)踐價(jià)值。 本文基于委托代理等理論，運(yùn)用規(guī)范研究與實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合的方法，從審計(jì)的需求和供給兩個(gè)維度系統(tǒng)分析了中小股東權(quán)益審計(jì)保護(hù)機(jī)理，提出中小股東權(quán)益審計(jì)保護(hù)的有效性須依賴賦決定權(quán)于審計(jì)委員會(huì)的審計(jì)師選聘機(jī)制、“無過錯(cuò)責(zé)任原則”的歸責(zé)理念及特殊普通合伙制的審計(jì)賠償機(jī)制、社會(huì)責(zé)任審計(jì)的實(shí)施規(guī)范。 首先，本文針對(duì)控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離引起的大股東和中小股東的代理沖突分析發(fā)現(xiàn)中小股東自我保護(hù)形同虛設(shè)、所有權(quán)安排對(duì)中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)的失效、中小股東權(quán)益的法律保護(hù)失衡，而審計(jì)能夠緩解中小股東與大股東之間的代理問題，有效約束大股東的侵占行為，是一種有效的中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)機(jī)制。提出審計(jì)保護(hù)機(jī)制的實(shí)現(xiàn)路徑依賴于中小股東選擇高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)需求和會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所提供高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)供給。提供高質(zhì)量審計(jì)供需應(yīng)解決審計(jì)保護(hù)的關(guān)鍵問題：改進(jìn)審計(jì)師選聘機(jī)制和審計(jì)責(zé)任追究制度、規(guī)范社會(huì)責(zé)任審計(jì)。 其次，運(yùn)用上市公司2008-2010年的樣本數(shù)據(jù)，選擇審計(jì)聲譽(yù)作為審計(jì)質(zhì)量的替代變量，研究了大股東侵占與高質(zhì)量審計(jì)供需的相關(guān)性，，實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)發(fā)現(xiàn)大股東和中小股東代理沖突越嚴(yán)重，上市公司越不愿聘請(qǐng)審計(jì)聲譽(yù)好的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所，審計(jì)師發(fā)表標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見的可能性越大，初步驗(yàn)證了中小股東權(quán)益受損越嚴(yán)重，對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)供給和需求就越低。進(jìn)一步地實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)在不當(dāng)股利支付政策、非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易以及非效率投資這三種常見的大股東侵占方式下，侵占越嚴(yán)重，對(duì)高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)需求越低，而除了非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易外，高質(zhì)量審計(jì)供給也與大股東的侵占程度成反比，與初步檢驗(yàn)基本吻合。主要原因來自于審計(jì)師選聘機(jī)制和審計(jì)責(zé)任追究制度的缺陷、社會(huì)責(zé)任審計(jì)制度的缺失。 最后，針對(duì)中小股東權(quán)益審計(jì)保護(hù)的理論研究和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)得出的結(jié)論分別論述，要提高中小股東選擇高質(zhì)量審計(jì)需求的動(dòng)力和會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所提供高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的主動(dòng)性，強(qiáng)化審計(jì)對(duì)中小股東權(quán)益的保護(hù)作用，提出有關(guān)制度的完善措施與實(shí)務(wù)改進(jìn)對(duì)策：（1）賦予審計(jì)委員會(huì)的審計(jì)師聘用和辭聘的終極決定權(quán)，以改進(jìn)現(xiàn)有的審計(jì)師選聘機(jī)制。為此，應(yīng)通過改革審計(jì)委員會(huì)的選聘機(jī)制、明確審計(jì)委員會(huì)的職責(zé)、完善審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立董事制度和工作制度來提高審計(jì)委員會(huì)的治理效率；（2）審計(jì)法律責(zé)任界定中實(shí)施“無過錯(cuò)責(zé)任原則”，完善“無過錯(cuò)責(zé)任原則”的立法和司法的相關(guān)政策；（3）針對(duì)現(xiàn)有審計(jì)賠償機(jī)制的缺陷，應(yīng)積極采用特殊普通合伙制組織形式，構(gòu)建完備的合伙人個(gè)人信用體系、注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師執(zhí)業(yè)責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度等會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)政策建議來推動(dòng)特殊普通合伙事務(wù)所的健康發(fā)展；（4）構(gòu)建了包括審計(jì)主體、審計(jì)內(nèi)容、審計(jì)評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)、審計(jì)程序和方法的社會(huì)責(zé)任審計(jì)模式。運(yùn)用層次分析法與問卷調(diào)查法，在整合提煉現(xiàn)有的社會(huì)責(zé)任評(píng)價(jià)相關(guān)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)基礎(chǔ)之上，創(chuàng)建了以社會(huì)責(zé)任報(bào)告為核心的社會(huì)責(zé)任管理、社會(huì)責(zé)任認(rèn)知、企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略、企業(yè)聲譽(yù)、商業(yè)伙伴等4個(gè)定性和23個(gè)定量的社會(huì)責(zé)任審計(jì)評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)，提高審計(jì)供需質(zhì)量。
[Abstract]:The protection of medium and small shareholders ' equity is the core issue of seeking benefit equity in the capital market . It is the focus of national security supervision and the research focus of economics . At present , the research on how to protect the minority shareholder ' s rights and interests is still blank , and the research on the protection of minority shareholders ' equity in China is in compliance with the practice and research needs of the protection of minority shareholders ' equity . Based on the theory of principal agent and so on , this paper analyzes the mechanism of audit protection of minority shareholder ' s equity from the demand and supply of audit , and puts forward the audit protection mechanism of minority shareholder ' s equity from the demand and supply of audit . The author puts forward that the validity of the audit protection of minority shareholders ' equity should depend on the audit committee ' s choosing mechanism , the principle of liability without fault liability and the auditing compensation mechanism of special general partnership , and the implementation of social responsibility audit . First of all , the analysis of agency conflict between the large shareholder and the small shareholder , which is caused by the separation of the right of control and cash flow , finds that the minority shareholder ' s self - protection forms the same , and the ownership arrangement is an effective mechanism to protect the minority shareholder ' s rights and interests . The realization path of the audit protection mechanism depends on the selection of high - quality audit demand by the small and medium shareholders and the provision of high - quality audit supply . The key problem of audit protection is to improve the selection mechanism of the auditor and the accountability system of audit responsibility , and regulate the auditing of social responsibility . Secondly , using the sample data of listed companies for 2008 - 2010 , selecting audit reputation as an alternative variable of audit quality , the paper studies the correlation between large shareholder encroachment and high - quality audit supply and demand . The more serious , the more the listed companies do not wish to hire auditors with good audit reputation , the more serious the higher - quality audit demand is , the lower the high - quality audit supply and the encroachment degree of the big shareholders . The main reason is the deficiency of the auditor ' s selection mechanism and the audit responsibility investigation system , and the lack of the audit system of social responsibility . In the end , according to the theory research and empirical test of the protection of minority shareholder ' s equity , the paper discusses that it is necessary to improve the audit committee ' s management efficiency through reform of the audit committee ' s selection mechanism , perfect the independent director system and the working system of the audit committee , and ( 3 ) to establish the audit committee ' s independent director system and the working system to improve the auditing committee ' s health development ; ( 2 ) to build up the audit evaluation index of social responsibility , such as the audit principal , audit content , audit evaluation index , audit procedure and method .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4;F832.51

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