本文關(guān)鍵詞：審計(jì)專(zhuān)用性投資不足問(wèn)題研究　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 不完全契約 審計(jì)專(zhuān)用性投資 敲竹杠 投資成本 聲譽(yù)

【摘要】：會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所在接受客戶(hù)委托時(shí)要深入了解客戶(hù)及其環(huán)境，積累相關(guān)行業(yè)和客戶(hù)專(zhuān)門(mén)知識(shí)，這可以視為一種專(zhuān)用性投資，并且其投資水平的高低會(huì)影響審計(jì)服務(wù)的質(zhì)量。由于我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)屬于典型的壟斷競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)，會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所對(duì)客戶(hù)存在一定程度上的經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴(lài)，議價(jià)能力較弱�；诔杀�-收益的考量，事務(wù)所缺乏進(jìn)行高水平審計(jì)專(zhuān)用性投資的動(dòng)力，成為我國(guó)實(shí)現(xiàn)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的現(xiàn)實(shí)障礙。 本文以不完全契約理論為基礎(chǔ)，，以審計(jì)專(zhuān)用性投資不足問(wèn)題作為主要研究對(duì)象，為使模型更加接近真實(shí)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)，本文在傳統(tǒng)GHM模型上，修正了信息對(duì)稱(chēng)這一假設(shè)，構(gòu)建了一個(gè)信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)下的審計(jì)敲竹杠模型，分析了審計(jì)專(zhuān)用性投資不足的現(xiàn)狀；鑒于已有研究的局限性，分別構(gòu)建了專(zhuān)用性投資成本和審計(jì)聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)相關(guān)的審計(jì)敲竹杠模型，從靜動(dòng)態(tài)角度探討了這兩個(gè)因素引入對(duì)審計(jì)專(zhuān)用性投資不足的改進(jìn)作用。模型結(jié)論表明：信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)引起的“隱藏信息”會(huì)降低高能型事務(wù)所而提高低能型事務(wù)所的專(zhuān)用性投資水平；專(zhuān)用性投資成本影響雙方談判力的情況下，會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所專(zhuān)用性投資激勵(lì)更強(qiáng)；審計(jì)聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)也會(huì)對(duì)專(zhuān)用性投資水平產(chǎn)生影響；敲竹杠行為是否影響投資水平主要取決于初始談判力的大小和審計(jì)聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)的好壞，并且一定條件下，會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所有可能做出社會(huì)最優(yōu)甚至過(guò)度的審計(jì)專(zhuān)用性投資。 最后，根據(jù)模型的分析結(jié)果，主張通過(guò)建立審計(jì)雙方信任機(jī)制、加強(qiáng)事務(wù)所執(zhí)業(yè)能力以及培育寡占型市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)來(lái)增強(qiáng)專(zhuān)用性投資水平以提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量，這也是本文的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義所在。
[Abstract]:Accounting firms should deeply understand customers and their environment, accumulate relevant industry and customer expertise, which can be regarded as a kind of special investment. And the level of investment will affect the quality of audit services. Because our audit market is a typical monopoly competition market, accounting firms have a certain degree of economic dependence on customers. The bargaining power is weak. Based on the cost-benefit consideration, the firm lacks the motive power to carry out the high-level audit special investment, which becomes the realistic obstacle to the realization of the high quality audit in our country. Based on the theory of incomplete contract, this paper focuses on the problem of insufficient investment in audit specificity. In order to make the model more close to the real audit market, this paper is based on the traditional GHM model. This paper corrects the hypothesis of information symmetry, constructs a model of audit rip-off under asymmetric information, and analyzes the current situation of insufficient investment in audit specificity. In view of the limitations of existing research, the audit rigging models related to the specific investment cost and audit reputation effect are constructed respectively. From the static and dynamic point of view, this paper discusses the improvement effect of these two factors on the insufficient investment in audit specificity. The conclusion of the model shows that the "hidden information" caused by information asymmetry is "hidden information". It will reduce the high-energy firms and improve the investment level of the low-energy firms. When the cost of special investment affects the negotiating power of both sides, the incentive of specific investment of accounting firm is stronger; Audit reputation effect will also have an impact on the level of dedicated investment; Whether the behavior of racketeering affects the level of investment mainly depends on the size of the initial bargaining power and audit reputation effect, and under certain conditions. Accounting firms are likely to make socially optimal or even excessive audit specific investments. Finally, according to the analysis results of the model, it is proposed that the audit quality should be improved by establishing the mutual trust mechanism, strengthening the practice ability of the firm and cultivating the oligopolistic market structure to enhance the level of dedicated investment. This is also the practical significance of this article.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F233;F239.22

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 王嵐;;獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊(學(xué)術(shù)版);2007年06期

2 朱峰;;獨(dú)立審計(jì)激勵(lì)機(jī)制模式及外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2010年27期

3 杜紅梅;;注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)履約問(wèn)題研究[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì);2008年02期

4 劉燁;對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司獨(dú)立審計(jì)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)思考[J];當(dāng)代財(cái)經(jīng);2000年09期

5 謝軍,李明輝;論會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所選擇的信號(hào)傳遞功能[J];當(dāng)代財(cái)經(jīng);2003年02期

6 江偉;李斌;;審計(jì)任期與審計(jì)質(zhì)量——基于簽字注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師任期的經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究[J];當(dāng)代財(cái)經(jīng);2008年01期

7 劉桂良;李潔;;審計(jì)師信譽(yù)資本、物質(zhì)資本與履約機(jī)制分析[J];管理世界;2007年05期

8 李曉穎;張鳳林;;基于公平心理偏好的投資博弈——敲竹杠問(wèn)題的一個(gè)行為解決[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)評(píng)論;2012年01期

9 楊瑞龍,楊其靜;專(zhuān)用性、專(zhuān)有性與企業(yè)制度[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2001年03期

10 楊瑞龍;聶輝華;;不完全契約理論:一個(gè)綜述[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2006年02期

本文編號(hào)：1428000