我國(guó)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)法律制度研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-12-12 16:24
【摘要】:股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度作為一項(xiàng)長(zhǎng)效激勵(lì)機(jī)制,自其產(chǎn)生以來便對(duì)企業(yè)激勵(lì)制度的構(gòu)建和完善奠定了堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)。經(jīng)過半個(gè)多世紀(jì)的不斷變革和發(fā)展,股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度已經(jīng)在全球范圍內(nèi)得到廣泛推廣,并且越來越多的被運(yùn)用在企業(yè)管理當(dāng)中,成為企業(yè)最有效的一種激勵(lì)機(jī)制。但是,該項(xiàng)制度也不可避免地具有兩面性,即在這柄“雙刃劍”為公司發(fā)展不斷提供助力的同時(shí),潛伏于其中的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也日漸顯示出其驚人的破壞力。2001年底,曾經(jīng)盛極一時(shí)的美國(guó)安然公司迅速破產(chǎn),股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度下的公司欺詐問題成為人們熱議的話題,也正是從這時(shí)開始,如何在促進(jìn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度正面效應(yīng)的同時(shí)約束其負(fù)面效應(yīng)成為學(xué)界研究的重點(diǎn)所在。在我國(guó),股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的發(fā)展僅僅二十余載,在理論和實(shí)踐方面與國(guó)外先進(jìn)國(guó)家還存在很大差距:在理論上,研究的廣度與深度都還有待加強(qiáng),尤其是需要進(jìn)一步增強(qiáng)核心制度與配套制度的契合性研究;在實(shí)踐上,尚不健全的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)無法為股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度提供發(fā)展平臺(tái),而處在發(fā)展初期的資本市場(chǎng)更是為其激勵(lì)效果的實(shí)現(xiàn)設(shè)置了巨大障礙。以此為背景,本文選擇以美國(guó)作為對(duì)比研究的范例,旨在期望通過對(duì)比美國(guó)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度為完善我國(guó)相關(guān)制度提出有益探索。 本文共包含六個(gè)部分,除了引言和結(jié)語外,其余四部分的主要內(nèi)容如下: 第一部分,“股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度概述”。該部分首先明確了股權(quán)期權(quán)的定義、特性與法律屬性,并特別對(duì)比辨析了股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)與其它相關(guān)股權(quán)激勵(lì);其次,分別從委托代理理論、人力資本理論、利益相關(guān)者理論和公司治理理論四個(gè)維度剖析了股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的理論基礎(chǔ);最后著眼于該制度的兩面性,在深入研究其正面效應(yīng)的同時(shí)也積極總結(jié)其負(fù)面效應(yīng),,力求全面揭示取票期權(quán)制度的綜合效應(yīng)。 第二部分,“我國(guó)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的本土化實(shí)踐及評(píng)析”。該部分以梳理我國(guó)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的發(fā)展歷程為基礎(chǔ),從授予主體、授予對(duì)象、股票來源等七個(gè)角度闡釋我國(guó)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的基本框架,重點(diǎn)提出法律規(guī)范體系不健全、 核心制度設(shè)計(jì)不完善與配套機(jī)制不充分三方面的不足,并結(jié)合具體制度進(jìn)行了深入剖析。 第三部分,“美國(guó)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度評(píng)介及對(duì)我國(guó)的啟示”。該部分以美國(guó)為研究樣本,在簡(jiǎn)單介紹美國(guó)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的產(chǎn)生與發(fā)展脈絡(luò)后,系統(tǒng)研究了現(xiàn)有制度的法律體系、核心制度與配套制度三方面內(nèi)容,并就其中值得借鑒吸收的部分進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)闡述。 第四部分,“完善我國(guó)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的法律建議”。作為整篇論文的重點(diǎn),該部分以第二部分提出的制度不足為目標(biāo),結(jié)合第三部分介紹的美國(guó)經(jīng)驗(yàn)為參照,從健全股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的法律規(guī)范體系、完善股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的核心制度、充實(shí)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的配套制度三個(gè)角度出發(fā),詳細(xì)闡述了完善我國(guó)股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的路徑與對(duì)策。
[Abstract]:The stock option incentive system, as a long-term incentive mechanism, has laid a solid foundation for the construction and improvement of the enterprise incentive system since its production. After more than half a century of continuous change and development, the stock option incentive system has been widely promoted in the world, and more and more is applied in the enterprise management, and becomes the most effective incentive mechanism of the enterprise. However, the system inevitably has two sides, that is, when the double-edged sword provides power for the development of the company, the moral hazard lurks in it is also showing its devastating destructive power. At the end of 2001, the United States Enron Company, which used to be a very short time, went bankrupt. The issue of corporate fraud under the system of equity incentive has become a hot topic, and it is from this time that how to restrain the negative effect of the positive effect of the equity incentive system becomes the focus of the research of the academic circle. In our country, the development of the equity incentive system is only twenty-one, and there is a great gap in the theory and practice with the advanced countries in the world: in theory, the scope and depth of the research are still to be strengthened, in particular, it is necessary to further enhance the fit of the core system and the supporting system. On the other hand, the unsound corporate governance structure cannot provide the development platform for the equity incentive system, and the capital market in the early stage of development has set a great obstacle to the realization of the incentive effect. Based on this background, this paper chooses the United States as an example of the comparative study, and it is to look forward to the beneficial exploration of the improvement of the relevant system in China by comparing the American equity incentive system. In addition to the introduction and the conclusion, the main contents of the four parts are as follows: 涓嬶細(xì) 絎竴閮ㄥ垎,鈥淎n Overview of the Stock Option Incentive System鈥
本文編號(hào):2374903
[Abstract]:The stock option incentive system, as a long-term incentive mechanism, has laid a solid foundation for the construction and improvement of the enterprise incentive system since its production. After more than half a century of continuous change and development, the stock option incentive system has been widely promoted in the world, and more and more is applied in the enterprise management, and becomes the most effective incentive mechanism of the enterprise. However, the system inevitably has two sides, that is, when the double-edged sword provides power for the development of the company, the moral hazard lurks in it is also showing its devastating destructive power. At the end of 2001, the United States Enron Company, which used to be a very short time, went bankrupt. The issue of corporate fraud under the system of equity incentive has become a hot topic, and it is from this time that how to restrain the negative effect of the positive effect of the equity incentive system becomes the focus of the research of the academic circle. In our country, the development of the equity incentive system is only twenty-one, and there is a great gap in the theory and practice with the advanced countries in the world: in theory, the scope and depth of the research are still to be strengthened, in particular, it is necessary to further enhance the fit of the core system and the supporting system. On the other hand, the unsound corporate governance structure cannot provide the development platform for the equity incentive system, and the capital market in the early stage of development has set a great obstacle to the realization of the incentive effect. Based on this background, this paper chooses the United States as an example of the comparative study, and it is to look forward to the beneficial exploration of the improvement of the relevant system in China by comparing the American equity incentive system. In addition to the introduction and the conclusion, the main contents of the four parts are as follows: 涓嬶細(xì) 絎竴閮ㄥ垎,
本文編號(hào):2374903
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