本文選題：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 + 高管薪酬��； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的崛起是全球金融體系近30年來最重大的變化之一,隨著其規(guī)模的不斷擴(kuò)大,逐漸成為資本市場上的主導(dǎo)力量。相比于中小投資者,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者擁有資金、專業(yè)、信息、有限理性等優(yōu)勢,可以在制衡大股東、監(jiān)督管理層方面發(fā)揮更好的治理效果。20世紀(jì)80年代以來,以養(yǎng)老基金為代表的美國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者“股東積極主義”逐漸興起,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者不再采用傳統(tǒng)的拋售股票的“華爾街規(guī)則(The Wall Street Rule)"來保護(hù)其資本的價(jià)值,而是以積極的姿態(tài)“用手投票”,主動(dòng)參與和改善公司治理狀況。 近十年來,我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在國家一系列政策的大力推動(dòng)下得到了快速發(fā)展。從招商銀行的“可轉(zhuǎn)債風(fēng)波”、中興通訊增發(fā)H股等事件可以看出,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者開始嘗試在公司治理中扮演積極監(jiān)督者的角色。然而在我國法律制度背景、市場環(huán)境、上市公司質(zhì)量、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)展水平等內(nèi)外部因素的阻礙下,經(jīng)過成本收益分析,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者也會(huì)選擇在公司治理中扮演“消極監(jiān)督者”甚至“合謀者”的角色。 所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離,使管理層成為公司事實(shí)上的“內(nèi)部控制人”,其可能會(huì)為了私人利益損害外部股東利益,產(chǎn)生所有者與經(jīng)營者之間的代理問題。高管薪酬制度作為緩解此類代理問題的一種方式,也是機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理,監(jiān)督管理層的一個(gè)重要方面。 然而,2008年金融危機(jī)后集中爆發(fā)的高管超額薪酬現(xiàn)象使得高管薪酬制度本身已成為公司治理中新的代理問題。本文通過選擇高管超額薪酬這一視角,從持股集中度、持股期限兩個(gè)維度將機(jī)構(gòu)投資者進(jìn)行劃分,通過研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與高管超額薪酬、高管-薪酬業(yè)績敏感性、高管總薪酬的相關(guān)性,試圖檢驗(yàn)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者能否在監(jiān)督管理層,參與公司治理中扮演更加積極的角色。雖然實(shí)證結(jié)果表面上與假設(shè)不一致,但通過回歸分析并結(jié)合之前學(xué)者的研究,本文認(rèn)為高管超額薪酬包括兩部分,一部分是管理層權(quán)利尋租獲取的私有收益,一部分是公司對管理層經(jīng)營才能和經(jīng)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的補(bǔ)償。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股期限越長、持股集中度越高時(shí),越傾向于積極參與公司治理、監(jiān)督管理層。當(dāng)公司治理環(huán)境得到改善時(shí),業(yè)績相應(yīng)上升,高管與業(yè)績相聯(lián)系的薪酬提高。同時(shí),體現(xiàn)高管經(jīng)營能力的超額薪酬的增長幅度將大大超過高管減少權(quán)力尋租獲取超額薪酬的下降幅度,最終使總薪酬增加�？傊�,通過機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與高管超額薪酬相關(guān)性的研究,驗(yàn)證了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者一定程度上能在公司治理中扮演積極監(jiān)督者的角色。 本文分為六個(gè)章節(jié),以委托代理理論、最優(yōu)契約理論、管理層權(quán)利理論、組織合謀理論為背景,聚焦于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股對高管超額薪酬的影響進(jìn)行研究,并運(yùn)用多元線性模型進(jìn)行回歸分析,對我國資本市場上影響上市公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)問題的因素加以解釋,以期對完善當(dāng)前的高管薪酬激勵(lì)方案提供借鑒和參考。并驗(yàn)證了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者隨著持股規(guī)模的增大確實(shí)能在公司治理領(lǐng)域產(chǎn)生積極的效果。 第一章為導(dǎo)論。主要對論文進(jìn)行了簡要概述。其中包括研究背景及意義、研究思路與框架、研究方法、研究貢獻(xiàn)及相關(guān)名詞解釋。 第二章為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與高管超額薪酬相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)綜述。本章從與機(jī)構(gòu)投資者相關(guān)的研究、與高管超額薪酬相關(guān)的研究、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與高管薪酬的關(guān)系三大方面對國內(nèi)外相關(guān)領(lǐng)域文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行梳理歸納。 第三章為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者影響高管超額薪酬的機(jī)理分析。本章分為理論基礎(chǔ)和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的影響因素兩部分。首先,對與本文有關(guān)的委托代理理論、管理層權(quán)利理論、最優(yōu)契約理論和組織合謀理論做出詳細(xì)介紹。其次,從機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的內(nèi)外部條件、動(dòng)因與障礙幾方面分析影響其積極參與公司治理的各種因素。 第四章為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對高管超額薪酬影響的實(shí)證研究。根據(jù)對相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的梳理歸納和理論分析,本章提出了與本文相關(guān)的六個(gè)假設(shè)。根據(jù)研究假設(shè)建立起回歸模型,并對各變量進(jìn)行解釋、給出變量選擇理由、樣本篩選標(biāo)準(zhǔn)及數(shù)據(jù)來源。本文以2006年至2012年我國只發(fā)行A股的上市公司為樣本,選用上市公司各年的高管實(shí)際薪酬與由回歸模型計(jì)算出的高管預(yù)期正常薪酬的差額及調(diào)整后的上市公司高管薪酬總額與行業(yè)職工平均工資的差額兩種方式衡量高管超額薪酬。另外分別以公司期末資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率、第一大股東持股集中度、總資產(chǎn)、總資產(chǎn)利潤率、管理層持股比例、兩職合一等作為控制變量,衡量公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司規(guī)模、資產(chǎn)收益和董事會(huì)特征。 第五章為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者影響高管超額薪酬的實(shí)證結(jié)果與分析。本章主要對變量進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、相關(guān)性分析、多元回歸分析及穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比與高管超額薪酬負(fù)相關(guān)、與高管薪酬-業(yè)績敏感性相關(guān)性不顯著、與高管總薪酬水平正相關(guān)。通過進(jìn)一步分析,本文認(rèn)為模型計(jì)算出的高管超額薪酬不僅包括高管利用權(quán)力尋租獲得的超額薪酬,還包括公司對高管經(jīng)管才能和經(jīng)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的補(bǔ)償,隨著機(jī)構(gòu)投資者積極參與公司治理,抑制了高管利用權(quán)利尋租獲取超額報(bào)酬。而公司業(yè)績的增加,使股東又逐漸加大對高管經(jīng)管才能和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的補(bǔ)償,導(dǎo)致高管超額薪酬不降反升,高管總薪酬水平上升、薪酬與業(yè)績的敏感性不顯著。 第六章為研究結(jié)論與啟示。本文的研究結(jié)論是：通過回歸模型計(jì)算的高管超額薪酬包括兩部分,高管利用權(quán)力尋租獲得的超額薪酬和公司對高管經(jīng)管才能和經(jīng)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的補(bǔ)償。當(dāng)公司治理環(huán)境得到改善時(shí),公司業(yè)績增加,高管與業(yè)績相聯(lián)系的薪酬提高。同時(shí),體現(xiàn)高管經(jīng)營能力的超額薪酬的增長幅度將大大超過高管減少權(quán)力尋租獲取的超額薪酬的下降幅度,最終導(dǎo)致總薪酬水平上升。鑒于高管超額薪酬的存在,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對高管薪酬-業(yè)績敏感性未有明顯影響。說明隨著我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大、持股比例的提高一定程度上能夠在改善公司內(nèi)部治理環(huán)境、監(jiān)督管理層方面產(chǎn)生積極的作用。 結(jié)合我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀本文提出以下建議：(1)增強(qiáng)股票市場的進(jìn)化機(jī)制；(2)完善資本市場法制環(huán)境,減少機(jī)構(gòu)投資者主動(dòng)參與公司治理的法律障礙；(3)放寬機(jī)構(gòu)投資者設(shè)立和入市的限制,培育多元市場投資主體；(4)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者要重視對管理層的薪酬激勵(lì),全面參與公司治理。 本文的學(xué)術(shù)貢獻(xiàn)主要有以下三點(diǎn)： (1)拓展了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對高管薪酬影響的研究視角。本文立足我國機(jī)構(gòu).投資者發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,從高管超額薪酬這一角度進(jìn)行深入分析,對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與高管薪酬的研究角度進(jìn)行了一定的補(bǔ)充。 (2)本文從高管薪酬的內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行分析,認(rèn)為高管超額薪酬包括高管利用權(quán)力尋租獲得的薪酬、高管基于自身經(jīng)管才能和經(jīng)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)獲得的薪酬。將由回歸模型計(jì)算出的高管超額薪酬的構(gòu)成因素考慮在內(nèi),可以對之前學(xué)者研究結(jié)論的差異進(jìn)行一個(gè)合理的解釋。 (3)本文分別研究了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者整體、長期機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與高管超額薪酬的關(guān)系,證明了隨著機(jī)構(gòu)投資者規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大,持股比例的提高,確實(shí)能夠在公司治理中積極扮演監(jiān)督者的角色。 本文的不足之處主要有以下幾點(diǎn)： (1)數(shù)據(jù)的獲取方面存在局限性。本文只是對高管經(jīng)濟(jì)性報(bào)酬中的貨幣薪酬進(jìn)行了相關(guān)研究。沒有涉及股權(quán)、期權(quán)等非貨幣經(jīng)濟(jì)性報(bào)酬,也沒有涉及高管薪酬中的福利、在職消費(fèi)等非經(jīng)濟(jì)性報(bào)酬。 (2)所選擇指標(biāo)的準(zhǔn)確性存在局限。由于對高管超額薪酬的定義不統(tǒng)一,并且在本文的研究中對衡量高管超額薪酬模型的選取和指標(biāo)的采用,主要是借鑒了學(xué)者以往的研究經(jīng)驗(yàn),但是對于哪種指標(biāo)更具有衡量意義還有待于進(jìn)一步研究。 (3)沒有對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的持股情況進(jìn)行對比分析。本文只是對上市公司中有機(jī)構(gòu)投資者、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股期限超過一年的情況進(jìn)行了分析,沒有與無機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股或者其持股期限短于一年的上市公司高管薪酬?duì)顩r進(jìn)行對比分析,得出的結(jié)論還有待進(jìn)一步驗(yàn)證。
[Abstract]:The rise of institutional investors is one of the most important changes in the global financial system in the past 30 years. As its scale continues to expand, it has gradually become the dominant force in the capital market. Compared with small and medium-sized investors, institutional investors have the advantages of capital, specialty, information and limited rationality, and can play a more important role in balancing large shareholders and supervising management. Good governance effect in the 80s.20, the American institutional investor "Shareholder Activism", represented by pension fund, has been rising gradually. Institutional investors no longer adopt the traditional "The Wall Street Rule" to protect the value of their capital, but take a positive attitude to "vote by hand", and take the active reference. And improve the state of corporate governance.
In the last ten years, China's institutional investors have developed rapidly under the strong impetus of a series of national policies. From the "convertible bonds" of China Merchants Bank and the addition of H-shares by ZTE communications, institutional investors have begun to try the role of active supervisors in corporate governance. However, the market is in the background of China's legal system and the market. Under the hindrance of the internal and external factors such as the environment, the quality of the listed companies and the development level of institutional investors, the institutional investors will also choose to play the role of "the negative supervisor" or even the conspirators in the corporate governance through the analysis of the cost and income.
The separation of ownership and right of management makes the management a "internal controller" in fact. It may damage the interests of the external shareholders for the private interests and produce the agency problem between the owner and the operator. The executive compensation system is a way to alleviate the problem of such agency, and also the institutional investors participate in corporate governance. An important aspect of monitoring management.
However, the overpay phenomenon of top executives in 2008 after the financial crisis has made the executive pay system a new agency problem in corporate governance. This paper divides the institutional investors from the two dimensions of the ownership concentration and the duration of the stock, through the study of the institutional investors and the high level. Overpay, executive pay performance sensitivity, and the relevance of executive compensation try to test whether institutional investors can play a more active role in supervising management and participating in corporate governance. Although the empirical results are not consistent with assumptions, this paper believes that the top salary is overpaid by regression analysis and previous scholars' research. There are two parts, one part is the private income obtained by management rights rent-seeking, part of which is the company's compensation for management and management risks. The longer the time limit is, the higher the ownership concentration is, the more inclined to actively participate in corporate governance and supervise the management. When the corporate governance environment is improved, the performance phase is improved. At the same time, the increase in the amount of excess pay that embody the executive ability will greatly exceed the decrease in the overpay of the executive's power seeking and rent-seeking, which will eventually increase the total salary. Investors can play an active role in corporate governance to some extent.
This paper is divided into six chapters. Based on the principal-agent theory, the optimal contract theory, the management right theory and the organizational collusion theory, this paper focuses on the research on the influence of institutional investors' Shareholding on senior executives' excess pay, and uses a multiple linear model to carry out regression analysis, which affects the executive compensation incentive of the listed companies in China's capital market. The factors of the problem are explained in order to provide reference and reference for improving the current executive compensation incentive scheme, and verify that institutional investors can produce positive effects in the field of corporate governance with the increase of the size of the stock.
The first chapter is an introduction. This paper gives a brief overview of the paper, including the research background and significance, research ideas and frameworks, research methods, research contributions and related nouns interpretation.
The second chapter is the literature review of institutional investors and senior executives' excess pay. This chapter reviews the related research related to institutional investors, the research related to senior executive pay and the relationship between institutional investors and executive compensation in three aspects.
The third chapter is the mechanism analysis of institutional investors affecting executive excess compensation. This chapter is divided into theoretical basis and the two part of the influence factors of institutional investors participating in corporate governance. First, this chapter gives a detailed introduction to the principal-agent theory, management rights theory, optimal contract theory and organizational collusion theory. Secondly, from institutional investment. The internal and external conditions, motivations and obstacles of corporate governance are factors that affect their active participation in corporate governance.
The fourth chapter is an empirical study on the impact of institutional investors on top executives' excess pay. According to the related literature and theoretical analysis, this chapter puts forward six hypotheses related to this article. Based on the hypothesis, a regression model is set up, and the variables are explained, the reasons for the selection of variables, the standard of sample screening and the source of data are given. In this paper, the listed companies that only issued A shares from 2006 to 2012 were used as samples, and the top executive compensation was measured in two ways, which were the difference between the actual salary of senior executives and the average salary calculated by the regression model and the difference between the total salary of the senior executives and the average wages of the employees. The company's final asset liability ratio, the concentration degree of the first large shareholders, the total assets, the total asset profit rate, the proportion of managerial ownership and the two position as control variables are used to measure the company's capital structure, the ownership structure, the company size, the asset income and the characteristics of the board of directors.
The fifth chapter is the empirical results and Analysis on the effect of institutional investors on executive excess compensation. This chapter mainly describes the variables as descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and robustness test. The empirical results show that institutional investors' shareholding ratio is negatively related to executive excess compensation, and has no significant correlation with executive compensation performance sensitivity. The total salary level of senior executives is positively related. Through further analysis, this paper thinks that the excess compensation of top executives calculated by the model not only includes the excess compensation obtained by the executive use of power rent-seeking, but also the compensation for the management and management risks of the executives. With the active participation of institutional investors in corporate governance, the executives have suppressed the rent-seeking of the executive's rights. The increase of the company's performance makes the shareholders gradually increase the compensation for the management ability and risk of senior executives, which leads to the rise of top executives' excess pay, the rising level of executive pay and the insignificant sensitivity of salary and performance.
The sixth chapter is the conclusion and inspiration. The conclusion of this paper is that the excess compensation of senior executives calculated by the regression model includes two parts, the senior executives use the power to rent the excess compensation and the company's compensation for the management and management of the executives. At the same time, the increase in the excess pay, which embodies the executive ability, will greatly exceed the decrease in the excess compensation obtained by the executive to reduce the power rent-seeking, and eventually lead to the increase in the total salary level. With the expansion of China's institutional investors' shareholding scale, the increase in the shareholding ratio can make a positive effect on improving the corporate governance environment and supervising the management level.
Combined with the development status of institutional investors in China, the following suggestions are put forward: (1) strengthen the evolution mechanism of the stock market; (2) improve the legal environment of the capital market, reduce the legal barriers to the initiative of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance; (3) relax the restrictions on the establishment and entry of institutional investors, and cultivate multiple market investment bodies; (4) institutional investment. Investors should pay attention to management incentive compensation and fully participate in corporate governance.
The academic contribution of this article is mainly the following three points:
(1) the research perspective on the impact of institutional investors on executive compensation is expanded. Based on the current situation of China's institutions and the development of investors, this paper makes a thorough analysis from the perspective of executive excess pay, and makes a certain supplement to the research angle of institutional investors and executive compensation.
(2) from the analysis of the internal structure of executive compensation, this paper holds that top executives' excess pay includes the salary obtained by executive use of power rent-seeking, and the salary of executives based on their own management ability and management risk. A reasonable explanation is made.
(3) this paper studies the relationship between institutional investors as a whole, long-term institutional investors and senior executive pay, which proves that with the expansion of institutional investors and the increase of the share proportion, it is true that the role of supervisors can be actively played in corporate governance.
The inadequacies of this paper are as follows:
(1) there are limitations in the acquisition of data. This paper only studies the monetary remuneration in the economic reward of senior executives. It does not involve non monetary remuneration such as equity, option and other non monetary remuneration, nor does it involve non economic rewards such as executive compensation and on-the-job consumption.
(2) the accuracy of the selected indicators is limited. Because the definition of top executive excess pay is not uniform, and the selection of the excess compensation model and the use of indicators in this study are mainly used for reference to the previous research experience of the scholars, but the more measurable significance of which kind of reference remains to be further studied.
(3) there is no comparative analysis on the stock ownership of institutional investors. This paper analyses the situation of institutional investors with institutional investors for more than one year. The conclusion remains to be further verified.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F272.92

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前9條

1 羅宏;黃文華;;國企分紅、在職消費(fèi)與公司業(yè)績[J];管理世界;2008年09期

2 呂長江;趙宇恒;;國有企業(yè)管理者激勵(lì)效應(yīng)研究——基于管理者權(quán)力的解釋[J];管理世界;2008年11期

3 辛清泉;林斌;王彥超;;政府控制、經(jīng)理薪酬與資本投資[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2007年08期

4 辛清泉;譚偉強(qiáng);;市場化改革、企業(yè)業(yè)績與國有企業(yè)經(jīng)理薪酬[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2009年11期

5 權(quán)小鋒;吳世農(nóng);文芳;;管理層權(quán)力、私有收益與薪酬操縱[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2010年11期

6 鄭志剛;;經(jīng)理人超額薪酬和公司治理——一個(gè)文獻(xiàn)綜述[J];金融評論;2012年01期

7 王曦;齊歡;;論機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理[J];科技進(jìn)步與對策;2003年07期

8 伊志宏;李艷麗;高偉;;異質(zhì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的治理效應(yīng):基于高管薪酬視角[J];統(tǒng)計(jì)與決策;2010年05期

9 吳曉暉;姜彥福;;機(jī)構(gòu)投資者治理效率研究[J];統(tǒng)計(jì)研究;2006年09期

，

本文編號：1956704