本文選題：研發(fā)投入　切入點(diǎn)：業(yè)績評(píng)價(jià)　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：以往學(xué)者們主要從內(nèi)部和外部兩個(gè)角度對(duì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投入的驅(qū)動(dòng)或影響因素進(jìn)行研究,內(nèi)部因素包括企業(yè)經(jīng)營狀況、董事會(huì)治理、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)等方面;外部因素包括行業(yè)特征、市場結(jié)構(gòu)和政府政策等方面。企業(yè)經(jīng)營業(yè)績被視為研發(fā)的驅(qū)動(dòng)因素是基于企業(yè)行為理論的觀點(diǎn),它反映了企業(yè)是否具備進(jìn)行研發(fā)創(chuàng)新的動(dòng)機(jī)和條件;公司治理機(jī)制成為研發(fā)的驅(qū)動(dòng)因素之一則是以委托代理理論為依據(jù)的,即通過緩解或者消除股東和管理層之間的代理沖突,為管理層進(jìn)行有利于創(chuàng)造股東價(jià)值的研發(fā)投入提供長效保障機(jī)制。本文基于已有研究,結(jié)合兩類因素,從管理層個(gè)體的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)決策新視角對(duì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投入的驅(qū)動(dòng)因素給出合理解釋,同時(shí),為我國上市公司的管理層激勵(lì)機(jī)制和監(jiān)督機(jī)制的優(yōu)化設(shè)計(jì)提供參考。本文根據(jù)行為代理模型,將管理層風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好作為研發(fā)驅(qū)動(dòng)因素的行為效應(yīng)來源,在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上提出研究假設(shè),并搜集和整理2007-2013年我國上市公司的研發(fā)等相關(guān)樣本數(shù)據(jù),通過構(gòu)建以研發(fā)強(qiáng)度為因變量的多元回歸模型,對(duì)上市公司業(yè)績評(píng)價(jià)因素和公司治理因素的獨(dú)立效應(yīng)以及交互效應(yīng)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),此外,本文還探討了企業(yè)科技屬性對(duì)兩類效應(yīng)的影響。本文在實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)過程中采用了固定效應(yīng)模型和傾向值得分方法。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)業(yè)績偏差并沒有對(duì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投入產(chǎn)生顯著的誘導(dǎo)效應(yīng),反而導(dǎo)致了管理層的保守行為;(2)管理層激勵(lì)能夠顯著促進(jìn)企業(yè)的研發(fā)投入;(3)業(yè)績偏差與貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)(股權(quán)激勵(lì))對(duì)研發(fā)投入產(chǎn)生了顯著的負(fù)向(正向)交互驅(qū)動(dòng)效應(yīng);(4)兩職狀態(tài)在高科技企業(yè)樣本中具有顯著的負(fù)向驅(qū)動(dòng)效應(yīng),在結(jié)合業(yè)績偏差后呈現(xiàn)出顯著的負(fù)向交互驅(qū)動(dòng)效應(yīng);(5)通過將樣本分為高科技上市企業(yè)和非高科技上市企業(yè)兩類,發(fā)現(xiàn)高科技上市企業(yè)的管理層激勵(lì)對(duì)研發(fā)投入的驅(qū)動(dòng)作用更為明顯。因此,本文認(rèn)為促進(jìn)管理層的企業(yè)研發(fā)投入行為應(yīng)當(dāng)采用多種類型的激勵(lì)模式,如股票期權(quán)、虛擬股權(quán)等,同時(shí)將管理層薪酬制度設(shè)計(jì)與企業(yè)業(yè)績以及企業(yè)價(jià)值、研發(fā)成果等指標(biāo)相掛鉤,并進(jìn)一步完善監(jiān)事會(huì)和外部董事等監(jiān)督機(jī)制,為企業(yè)的研發(fā)創(chuàng)新活動(dòng)提供基礎(chǔ)和保障,以有利于我國上市企業(yè)進(jìn)一步轉(zhuǎn)型升級(jí)和競爭力的提升。
[Abstract]:In the past, scholars mainly studied the driving and influencing factors of enterprise R & D investment from both internal and external perspectives. The internal factors include enterprise management, board of directors governance, equity structure and so on; external factors include industry characteristics. Market structure and government policy. Business performance is regarded as the driving factor of R & D based on the viewpoint of enterprise behavior theory, which reflects whether the enterprise has the motivation and conditions for R & D innovation. One of the driving factors of R & D is the corporate governance mechanism, which is based on the principal-agent theory, that is, by mitigating or eliminating the agency conflict between shareholders and management. This paper provides a long-term guarantee mechanism for the management to carry out R & D investment which is conducive to creating shareholder value. This paper combines two kinds of factors based on the existing research. This paper gives a reasonable explanation of the driving factors of R & D investment from the new perspective of individual risk decision of management, and provides a reference for the optimization design of management incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism of listed companies in China. Taking risk preference of management as the source of behavioral effect of R & D driver, this paper puts forward the research hypothesis on the basis of theoretical analysis, and collects and collates the relevant sample data of R & D of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2013. By constructing a multivariate regression model with R & D intensity as dependent variable, this paper empirically tests the independent and interactive effects of performance evaluation factors and corporate governance factors of listed companies. This paper also discusses the influence of enterprise science and technology attributes on two kinds of effects. In the process of empirical testing, this paper adopts a fixed effect model and a tendency to be subdivided. It is found that the performance deviation does not produce a firm R & D investment. Significant inductive effects, On the contrary, it leads to the conservative behavior of management. (2) Management incentives can significantly promote R & D investment of enterprises. (3) performance bias and monetary incentive (equity incentive) have a significant negative (positive) interaction drive on R & D investment. The state of two jobs has a significant negative driving effect in the sample of high-tech enterprises. In combination with the performance deviation, there is a significant negative interactive driving effect. By classifying the sample into high-tech listed enterprises and non-high-tech listed enterprises, It is found that the driving effect of management incentive on R & D investment in high-tech listed enterprises is more obvious. Therefore, this paper argues that the promotion of management's R & D investment behavior should adopt a variety of incentive modes, such as stock option, virtual equity, etc. At the same time, the design of the management compensation system is linked to the performance of the enterprise, the enterprise value, the research and development achievement, and so on, and the supervision mechanism such as the board of supervisors and the outside director is further improved, which provides the foundation and guarantee for the enterprise's R & D innovation activities. In order to help China's listed enterprises to further transformation and upgrading and competitiveness.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F273.1

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 高雷;宋順林;;高管報(bào)酬激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績效——來自中國上市公司的證據(jù)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)科學(xué);2007年04期

2 李丹蒙;夏立軍;;股權(quán)性質(zhì)、制度環(huán)境與上市公司R&D強(qiáng)度[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2008年04期

3 湯業(yè)國;徐向藝;;中小上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)與技術(shù)創(chuàng)新投入的關(guān)聯(lián)性——基于不同終極產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)貿(mào)研究;2012年02期

4 徐向藝;王俊椺;鞏震;;高管人員報(bào)酬激勵(lì)與公司治理績效研究——一項(xiàng)基于深、滬A股上市公司的實(shí)證分析[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2007年02期

5 蒲自立,劉芍佳;公司控制中的董事會(huì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)結(jié)構(gòu)和公司績效[J];管理世界;2004年09期

6 王克敏;王志超;;高管控制權(quán)、報(bào)酬與盈余管理——基于中國上市公司的實(shí)證研究[J];管理世界;2007年07期

7 錢錫紅;楊永福;徐萬里;;企業(yè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)位置、吸收能力與創(chuàng)新績效——一個(gè)交互效應(yīng)模型[J];管理世界;2010年05期

8 饒育蕾;王建新;;CEO過度自信、董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司業(yè)績的實(shí)證研究[J];管理科學(xué);2010年05期

9 唐清泉;甄麗明;;管理層風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏愛、薪酬激勵(lì)與企業(yè)R&D投入——基于我國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2009年05期

10 丁際剛,蘭肇華;前景理論述評(píng)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)動(dòng)態(tài);2002年09期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 王素娟;基于企業(yè)成長的中國上市公司高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)研究[D];山東大學(xué);2014年

，

本文編號(hào)：1661673