本文選題：上市企業(yè)　切入點(diǎn)：股權(quán)激勵(lì)　出處：《長(zhǎng)安大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：企業(yè)績(jī)效的提升是企業(yè)健康與發(fā)展的體現(xiàn),是企業(yè)所追求的目標(biāo)。隨著企業(yè)規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大,由出資者一人掌管企業(yè)的傳統(tǒng)管理模式逐漸演變?yōu)樗袡?quán)和管理權(quán)相互獨(dú)立的新型管理模式。這種新型管理模式在提高管理效率的同時(shí)也帶來(lái)了經(jīng)營(yíng)者與管理者利益不統(tǒng)一、管理者為了自身短期利益無(wú)視甚至損害企業(yè)長(zhǎng)期績(jī)效等問(wèn)題。針對(duì)這種現(xiàn)象,股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度作為解決措施之一,在降低企業(yè)委托代理成本、吸引并留住高端人才、約束管理者兼顧企業(yè)短期發(fā)展和長(zhǎng)期績(jī)效的提升方面發(fā)揮著重要的作用,但同時(shí)也存在著股權(quán)激勵(lì)額度設(shè)置不合理,高管人員進(jìn)行投機(jī)套現(xiàn)、操縱股價(jià)等損害企業(yè)績(jī)效行為的問(wèn)題。因此研究股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系,明確怎樣的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度能避免負(fù)面效應(yīng)、更好的提高企業(yè)績(jī)效,具有重要的意義。本論文選取實(shí)施股權(quán)分置改革后的2006年至2013年上市企業(yè)的數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本,從橫向和縱向兩個(gè)角度對(duì)各類企業(yè)間的績(jī)效進(jìn)行比較,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)于上市企業(yè)績(jī)效的提升效果已及股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施額度、激勵(lì)模式與企業(yè)績(jī)效之間的具體關(guān)系,得出以下結(jié)論:①限制性股票激勵(lì)模式下的企業(yè)績(jī)效提升效果會(huì)優(yōu)于股票期權(quán)下的;②企業(yè)績(jī)效會(huì)隨著股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例的增加而得到相應(yīng)的提高,當(dāng)激勵(lì)比例達(dá)到3%時(shí),企業(yè)績(jī)效會(huì)隨著激勵(lì)的增加而減小,因此股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例與企業(yè)績(jī)效間呈非線性相關(guān)關(guān)系,最佳股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例應(yīng)控制在0%至3%之間;③在幾種股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式中,企業(yè)采用股票期權(quán)和限制性股票兩種模式分別占有51%和47%,股票增值權(quán)等其他激勵(lì)方式采用相對(duì)較少甚至沒(méi)有。在這兩種主流模式中,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)限制性股票激勵(lì)模式下的企業(yè)績(jī)效提升效果會(huì)優(yōu)于股票期權(quán)下的。針對(duì)以上結(jié)果,本論文從完善信息披露機(jī)制,促進(jìn)經(jīng)理人市場(chǎng)的成熟,加強(qiáng)業(yè)績(jī)考核制度建設(shè),擴(kuò)寬企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的授予范圍等方面提出對(duì)策建議。目的在于通過(guò)了解股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度和企業(yè)績(jī)效之間的具體關(guān)系,明確如何設(shè)置股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度及如何改善企業(yè)內(nèi)外環(huán)境以避免股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度實(shí)施不當(dāng)對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效帶來(lái)的不良影響,從而更加有效的提高企業(yè)績(jī)效,促使企業(yè)健康可持續(xù)發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:The improvement of enterprise performance is the embodiment of the health and development of the enterprise and the goal pursued by the enterprise. The traditional management mode, which is managed by one investor, has gradually evolved into a new management model, which is independent of ownership and management power. This new management mode not only improves the management efficiency, but also brings about the disunity of the interests of managers and managers. For the sake of their own short-term interests, managers ignore or even damage the long-term performance of enterprises. In view of this phenomenon, equity incentive system, as one of the solutions, can reduce the cost of agency, attract and retain high-end talents. Constraining managers to take into account the short-term development and long-term performance of enterprises plays an important role, but at the same time there is unreasonable setting of equity incentive quota, and executives speculate to cash out. Therefore, to study the relationship between equity incentive and enterprise performance, to make clear what kind of equity incentive system can avoid negative effects, and to improve enterprise performance better. This paper selects the data of listed enterprises from 2006 to 2013 after the implementation of the split share structure reform as the research sample, and compares the performance of all kinds of enterprises from the horizontal and vertical angles. The paper tests the effect of equity incentive on the performance of listed enterprises and the implementation quota of equity incentive, and the specific relationship between incentive mode and enterprise performance. The following conclusions can be drawn that the performance enhancement effect under the restricted stock incentive mode of 1: 1 will be better than that under the stock option with the increase of equity incentive ratio, and when the incentive ratio reaches 3, the performance will be improved with the increase of equity incentive ratio. The enterprise performance will decrease with the increase of incentive, so the proportion of equity incentive is nonlinear correlation with enterprise performance. The optimal proportion of equity incentive should be controlled between 0% and 3% in several kinds of equity incentive modes. Enterprises use stock options and restrictive stock models to occupy 51% and 47 respectively, and other incentive modes such as stock appreciation right are relatively few or even absent. The empirical test shows that the effect of performance improvement under restrictive stock incentive mode will be better than that under stock option. In view of the above results, this paper improves the mechanism of information disclosure, promotes the maturity of manager market, and strengthens the construction of performance appraisal system. The purpose of this paper is to understand the relationship between equity incentive system and enterprise performance. It is clear how to set up the equity incentive system and how to improve the internal and external environment of the enterprise to avoid the negative impact of the improper implementation of the equity incentive system on the enterprise performance so as to improve the enterprise performance more effectively and promote the healthy and sustainable development of the enterprise.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長(zhǎng)安大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F272.92

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本文編號(hào)：1562319