本文關鍵詞： 股權(quán)激勵 非上市公司 法律問題　出處：《華中科技大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：理性人作為西方經(jīng)濟學的一個基本假設，即假定人都是利己的，在面臨決策時都會選擇最大限度地滿足自己的利益，因此，這就帶來了另一個經(jīng)濟學原理：人們會對激勵做出反應。激勵是引起一個人做出某種行為的某種東西，諸如懲罰或獎勵的預期。由于理性人通過比較成本與利益作出決策，所以，他們會對激勵做出反應。①因此，我們在進行制度設計時，絕對不能忘記激勵。激勵機制設計的出發(fā)點是為了滿足客體的需要，其直接目的是為了調(diào)動激勵客體的積極性，最終實現(xiàn)激勵客體的個人目標和激勵主體目標的一致性。②在現(xiàn)代公司的治理理論中，激勵功能是指力求公司經(jīng)營者在追求個人利益的同時，使其行為的客觀效果更好地實現(xiàn)股東所要達到的目的。激勵的方式有很多種，從時間的長短來分，有長期激勵和短期激勵；從內(nèi)容來看，有貨幣激勵和非貨幣激勵。其中，貨幣激勵主要有基本工資、獎金、津貼和福利、期權(quán)、社會保險等；而非貨幣激勵則主要指名譽激勵和職位消費等。③而法律無疑是這些激勵得以實現(xiàn)的最重要的保障，，這是因為法律不僅給這些激勵機制提供制度保障，也給行為人一個明確的預期。在這樣的背景下，股權(quán)激勵作為一種長期的激勵機制，能夠合理、有效地將經(jīng)營者個人利益同公司價值增值及股東利益結(jié)合在一起，這樣公司在運作過程中所產(chǎn)生的代理成本問題就能夠得到很好的解決，同時股權(quán)激勵機制也是公司治理過程中重要組成部分。 本文正是以非上市公司作為研究對象,遵循理論結(jié)合實踐的原則，從非上市公司與上市公司的不同點出發(fā)，分析非上市公司股權(quán)激勵計劃的相關法律問題,總結(jié)我國現(xiàn)有實踐和制度中所存在的問題，提出完善建議。
[Abstract]:Rational people, as a basic hypothesis of western economics, assume that people are self-interested and will choose to satisfy their own interests to the maximum extent in the face of decision-making. This leads to another economic principle: people react to incentives, something that causes a person to behave. Such as the expectation of punishment or reward. Since rational people make decisions by comparing costs and benefits, they will react to incentives. The starting point of incentive mechanism design is to meet the needs of the object, and its direct purpose is to mobilize the enthusiasm of the incentive object. In the modern corporate governance theory, the incentive function is to strive for the company managers to pursue personal interests at the same time. To make the objective effect of its behavior better to achieve the purpose of shareholders. There are many ways of incentive, according to the length of time, there are long-term incentive and short-term incentive; From the content point of view, there are monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives. Among them, monetary incentives mainly include basic wages, bonuses, allowances and benefits, options, social insurance and so on. The non-monetary incentive mainly refers to reputation incentive and position consumption, and the law is undoubtedly the most important guarantee to realize these incentives, which is because the law not only provides institutional protection for these incentive mechanisms. In this context, equity incentive, as a long-term incentive mechanism, can be reasonable. Effectively combine the personal interests of the operator with the value added and the interests of the shareholders, so that the company in the operation process of the agency cost problem can be well resolved. At the same time, the equity incentive mechanism is also an important part of the corporate governance process. This article takes the non-listed company as the research object, following the principle of combining theory with practice, starting from the difference between the non-listed company and the listed company, analyzes the related legal problems of the non-listed company's equity incentive plan. This paper summarizes the existing problems in the practice and system of our country, and puts forward some suggestions for perfection.
【學位授予單位】：華中科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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