發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-03 16:00

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效相關(guān)性研究　出處：《華北電力大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 創(chuàng)業(yè)板 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效 主成分分析 回歸分析

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的兩權(quán)分離使得企業(yè)的所有者與企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)者之間對(duì)自身利益的不同訴求成了潛在矛盾。股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的運(yùn)用將二者的利益綁定在一起,所有者通過(guò)授予經(jīng)營(yíng)者一定的股權(quán),使得經(jīng)營(yíng)者以股東身份參與企業(yè)的管理決策、利益分配、承擔(dān)經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。深交所創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)自2009年10月30日開(kāi)板以來(lái),一直作為我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的有效補(bǔ)充,自2010年起,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司不斷進(jìn)行著股權(quán)激勵(lì)的嘗試。本文選取125家創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司作為樣本,運(yùn)用回歸分析法對(duì)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究。文章以“財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效綜合值”作為回歸模型的被解釋變量,以“股權(quán)激勵(lì)額度”作為解釋變量,以“公司規(guī)模”、“股權(quán)集中度”和“首次信息發(fā)布年份”作為控制變量。在財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效綜合值的確定中,結(jié)合創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的特點(diǎn),依據(jù)我國(guó)企業(yè)績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)體系選取12個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo),再采用主成分分析法提取出4個(gè)主成分從而確定財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效綜合值。全樣本回歸分析結(jié)果顯示,我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)額度與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效綜合值在10%的水平上正相關(guān),假設(shè)一得到驗(yàn)證;按照激勵(lì)模式及股權(quán)激勵(lì)有效期分組樣本回歸分析結(jié)果顯示,相比于股票期權(quán)模式,限制性股票模式下股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的相關(guān)性更高,假設(shè)二得到驗(yàn)證;相比于有效期偏短的激勵(lì)計(jì)劃,有效期更長(zhǎng)時(shí),股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效的相關(guān)性沒(méi)有更高,假設(shè)三被拒絕。進(jìn)一步分析影響股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果的因素,有資本市場(chǎng)的有效性、股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式的設(shè)計(jì)、行權(quán)條件的設(shè)計(jì)、會(huì)計(jì)信息的可靠性這四個(gè)主要因素。最后,對(duì)實(shí)證研究結(jié)論進(jìn)行總結(jié),并從外部環(huán)境、上市公司及股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃設(shè)計(jì)三方面對(duì)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度提出建議。
[Abstract]:The separation of the two rights of the modern enterprise system makes the different demands for their own interests between the owner of the enterprise and the operator of the enterprise become a potential contradiction. The application of the equity incentive system binds the two interests together. By granting certain shares to the operator, the owner makes the operator participate in the management decision and benefit distribution of the enterprise as a shareholder. Since October 30th 2009, the growth Enterprise Market of Shenzhen Stock Exchange has been an effective supplement to our capital market since 2010. Gem listed companies continue to try to encourage equity. This paper selects 125 gem listed companies as the sample. This paper makes an empirical study on the correlation between equity incentive and financial performance of listed companies in gem by using regression analysis method. The article takes "financial performance comprehensive value" as the explanatory variable of regression model. Taking "equity incentive quota" as explanatory variable, "company size", "ownership concentration" and "first information release year" as control variables. According to the characteristics of gem listed companies, 12 financial performance evaluation indicators are selected according to the performance evaluation system of Chinese enterprises. Then four principal components were extracted by principal component analysis to determine the comprehensive value of financial performance. The results of full sample regression analysis showed that. There is a positive correlation between the amount of equity incentive and the comprehensive value of financial performance of gem listed companies in China at the level of 10%. According to the results of sample regression analysis of incentive model and validity period of equity incentive, compared with the stock option model, the correlation between equity incentive and corporate financial performance is higher under restrictive stock model. Hypothesis two is verified; Compared with the incentive plan with short validity period, when the validity period is longer, the correlation between equity incentive and corporate financial performance is not higher, and hypothesis three is rejected. Further analysis of the factors that affect the effect of equity incentive. There are four main factors: the validity of capital market, the design of equity incentive mode, the design of exercise conditions, the reliability of accounting information. Finally, the conclusion of empirical research is summarized, and the external environment. Three aspects of listed companies and equity incentive plan design to China's gem listed companies equity incentive system suggestions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F275;F276.6

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