【摘要】：隨著農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)改革的步伐加快,農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社在組織形態(tài)上突破了由農(nóng)戶單一群體組織成立的模式,趨向于多主體聯(lián)合發(fā)展模式;這一改變實(shí)現(xiàn)了不同主體間的要素整合,有利于提升合作社運(yùn)營(yíng)效率,對(duì)我國(guó)農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生了深遠(yuǎn)的影響。但是,在新的組織形態(tài)下如何處理合作社在利益分配上的矛盾,仍然是制約合作社進(jìn)一步發(fā)展的難題,也是實(shí)現(xiàn)我國(guó)農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)改革目標(biāo)必須妥善處理的問(wèn)題。正是基于上述變化,優(yōu)化合作社利益分配,以平衡不同主體之間的利益沖突,穩(wěn)定相互合作的關(guān)系,成為合作社發(fā)展的重中之重。本文以演化博弈理論、合作及經(jīng)濟(jì)理論為基礎(chǔ),綜合國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究成果;在考慮組織形態(tài)演化的前提下,針對(duì)我國(guó)合作社利益分配現(xiàn)狀,提出文章的研究問(wèn)題。主要而言,研究了以下三個(gè)方面的問(wèn)題:第一,對(duì)我國(guó)合作社當(dāng)前所處的階段及其組織模式進(jìn)行研究判斷,總結(jié)了我國(guó)合作社在利益分配中的現(xiàn)實(shí)困境,即合作社過(guò)度重視貨幣性投資等稀缺性要素,弱化了普通農(nóng)戶投入要素的合理收益,并對(duì)造成這一現(xiàn)實(shí)困境的原因進(jìn)行簡(jiǎn)單分析。第二,針對(duì)合作社利益分配博弈關(guān)系的核心群體,即普通農(nóng)戶與合作社,本文建立雙種群演化博弈模型,分析影響雙方博弈向“帕累托”最優(yōu)狀態(tài)演化的影響因素,最后通過(guò)數(shù)值仿真展示相關(guān)參數(shù)的變化對(duì)合作社利益均衡的影響。研究結(jié)果表明較高的規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)、市場(chǎng)交易分險(xiǎn)、農(nóng)產(chǎn)品收購(gòu)價(jià)值,有利于博弈向最優(yōu)狀態(tài)演化;而政府財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移支付、合作社業(yè)務(wù)活動(dòng)收益、普通農(nóng)戶盈余分配系數(shù)變動(dòng)會(huì)影響合作社讓利大小,進(jìn)而對(duì)博弈演化的方向產(chǎn)生作用。第三,在分析相關(guān)參數(shù)對(duì)合作社利益分配博弈的影響基礎(chǔ)上,文章從合作社、普通農(nóng)戶、政府三個(gè)角度,提出合作社利益分配優(yōu)化建議。最后結(jié)合金寨縣農(nóng)民專業(yè)合作社的調(diào)研,分析當(dāng)?shù)睾献魃缋娣峙涞默F(xiàn)狀及優(yōu)缺點(diǎn),提出當(dāng)?shù)睾献魃缋娣峙浞矫娴母倪M(jìn)對(duì)策,包括加強(qiáng)合作社盈余分配的管理,政府繼續(xù)加強(qiáng)合作社利益分配引導(dǎo)工作,合作社在緊密連接成員基礎(chǔ)上不斷拓展自身業(yè)務(wù)等。
[Abstract]:With the quickening pace of rural economic reform, farmers'professional cooperatives have broken through the mode of single group organization of farmers and tended to the mode of multi-subject joint development; this change has realized the integration of factors among different subjects, is conducive to improving the operational efficiency of cooperatives, and has produced a far-reaching impact on rural economic development in China. However, under the new organizational form, how to deal with the contradictions in the distribution of interests of cooperatives is still a difficult problem that restricts the further development of cooperatives, and also a problem that must be properly handled in order to achieve the goal of rural economic reform in China. Conflict and stability of the relationship between cooperation have become the top priority in the development of cooperatives.Based on evolutionary game theory, cooperation and economic theory, this paper synthesizes the relevant research results at home and abroad.On the premise of considering the evolution of organizational form, this paper puts forward the research issues of the article in view of the current situation of the distribution of interests of cooperatives in China. The following three aspects are discussed: Firstly, the current stage and organizational model of Chinese cooperatives are studied and judged, and the realistic dilemma of Chinese cooperatives in the distribution of interests is summarized, that is, cooperatives pay too much attention to scarce elements such as monetary investment, which weakens the reasonable income of the input factors of ordinary farmers and causes this reality. Secondly, aiming at the core group of cooperatives'benefit distribution game, i.e. ordinary farmers and cooperatives, this paper establishes a dual-population evolutionary game model to analyze the influencing factors of the evolution from the game to the Pareto optimal state. Finally, numerical simulation is carried out to show the change and combination of relevant parameters. The results show that the higher scale economy, market transaction risk sharing, agricultural product acquisition value are conducive to the evolution of the game to the optimal state; while the government financial transfer payment, cooperative business activities income, the change of the surplus distribution coefficient of ordinary farmers will affect the size of cooperative yields, and then the evolution direction of the game. Thirdly, on the basis of analyzing the influence of relevant parameters on the game of benefit distribution of cooperatives, the paper puts forward suggestions on the optimization of benefit distribution of cooperatives from the three angles of cooperatives, ordinary farmers and the government. Finally, combining with the investigation of farmers'professional cooperatives in Jinzhai County, the paper analyzes the present situation, advantages and disadvantages of benefit distribution of local cooperatives, and puts forward the suggestions. The measures to improve the benefit distribution of local cooperatives include strengthening the management of the surplus distribution of local cooperatives, continuing to strengthen the guiding work of the benefit distribution of local cooperatives, and expanding the business of local cooperatives on the basis of close links with their members.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F321.42

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