我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司大股東掏空研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-05 21:02
【摘要】：在我國(guó)上市公司中,制造業(yè)上市公司占有十分重要的地位。制造業(yè)上市公司的發(fā)展對(duì)我國(guó)整體經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展具有關(guān)鍵性的作用。然而，制造業(yè)上市公司中大股東掏空行為不僅影響著公司自身的發(fā)展，同時(shí)對(duì)整個(gè)行業(yè)乃至整個(gè)國(guó)家的發(fā)展都有消極的影響。我國(guó)的上市公司中普遍存在著一股獨(dú)大的現(xiàn)象，制造業(yè)上市公司大股東掏空現(xiàn)象較其他類(lèi)型的公司相比較為嚴(yán)重。研究我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司掏空，發(fā)掘掏空行為的表現(xiàn)形式以及探討其影響因素，對(duì)于完善中小投資者的利益保護(hù)機(jī)制有很重要的指導(dǎo)意義。便于我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司有關(guān)決策層，制定相應(yīng)的決策以更好的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)，實(shí)現(xiàn)公司價(jià)值最大化的目標(biāo)，也有利于促進(jìn)我國(guó)制造業(yè)行業(yè)和整個(gè)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。從理論上，研究我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司大股東掏空進(jìn)一步豐富了上市公司代理理論，對(duì)相關(guān)理論研究具有補(bǔ)充和細(xì)化作用。 本文首先對(duì)中外學(xué)者的研究進(jìn)行詳細(xì)闡述，對(duì)大股東掏空的研究成果進(jìn)行總結(jié)，其次從理論的角度敘述有關(guān)大股東掏空行為的相關(guān)理論，并且具體分析我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司大股東掏空行為的表現(xiàn)形式以及大股東掏空對(duì)公司的影響，為進(jìn)一步研究制造業(yè)上市公司大股東掏空打下基礎(chǔ)。再次，本文利用理論和實(shí)際相結(jié)合的方式，分析我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司大股東掏空行為的影響因素，并提出相應(yīng)的假設(shè)。第四，選取滬深上市的制造業(yè)公司的數(shù)據(jù),進(jìn)行統(tǒng)計(jì)性描述和回歸分析，探尋影響制造業(yè)上市公司大股東掏空行為的因素。最后根據(jù)實(shí)證分析得出的結(jié)論，經(jīng)分析提出針對(duì)性的對(duì)策建議。 本文主要研究結(jié)論如下：一股獨(dú)大現(xiàn)象加強(qiáng)了制造業(yè)上市公司大股東掏空行為動(dòng)機(jī)；獨(dú)立董事數(shù)量與大股東掏空行為成反比例關(guān)系；控制人性質(zhì)對(duì)大股東的影響不是很顯著；兩職設(shè)置情況對(duì)我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司大股東掏空行為有一定的影響；我國(guó)監(jiān)事會(huì)還沒(méi)有發(fā)揮應(yīng)有的監(jiān)督權(quán)力；外部審計(jì)意見(jiàn)對(duì)我國(guó)制造業(yè)上市公司大股東掏空行為有一定的抑制作用。 本文的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新之處有以下幾點(diǎn)：第一，，應(yīng)用上的創(chuàng)新。本文采用的數(shù)據(jù)是最近五年的數(shù)據(jù)，能夠反映近幾年制造業(yè)上市公司的情況應(yīng)用上有創(chuàng)新。第二，研究角度和思路的創(chuàng)新。在作出假設(shè)時(shí)，通過(guò)總結(jié)以前學(xué)者的研究結(jié)果和相關(guān)理論分析，結(jié)合上市公司的實(shí)際情況作出假設(shè)，并且較全面將內(nèi)部治理因素和外部審計(jì)因素引入模型。第三，提出的對(duì)策全面有新意。根據(jù)實(shí)證部分得出的結(jié)論，從內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)和外部環(huán)境兩個(gè)方面提出相應(yīng)的對(duì)策，并且結(jié)合我國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的具體情況和制造業(yè)上市公司的實(shí)際情況提出建議。
[Abstract]:In our country listed companies, manufacturing listed companies play a very important role. The development of listed manufacturing companies plays a key role in the overall economic development of our country. However, the tunneling behavior of large shareholders in listed manufacturing companies not only affects the development of the company itself, but also has a negative impact on the development of the whole industry and even the whole country. There is a dominant phenomenon in Chinese listed companies, and the phenomenon of large shareholder tunneling in manufacturing listed companies is more serious than that of other types of companies. It is of great significance to study the tunneling of manufacturing listed companies in our country, to explore the manifestation of tunneling behavior and to explore its influencing factors, which is of great significance to improve the mechanism of protecting the interests of small and medium-sized investors. It is convenient for the relevant decision makers of the listed manufacturing companies in our country to make corresponding decisions in order to achieve the goal of maximizing the value of the company and to promote the development of the manufacturing industry and the whole national economy of our country. Theoretically, the research on the large shareholder tunneling of manufacturing listed companies in China further enriches the agency theory of listed companies, which is complementary and detailed to the relevant theoretical research. Firstly, this paper expatiates the research of Chinese and foreign scholars in detail, summarizes the research results of large shareholder tunneling, and then from the theoretical point of view, describes the relevant theories about the behavior of large shareholders tunneling. The paper also analyzes the manifestation of large shareholder tunneling in manufacturing listed companies and the influence of large shareholder tunneling on the company, which lays a foundation for further study of large shareholder tunneling in manufacturing listed companies. Thirdly, by combining theory with practice, this paper analyzes the factors influencing the tunneling behavior of large shareholders of listed manufacturing companies in China, and puts forward the corresponding assumptions. Fourthly, the data of manufacturing companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen are selected, and the statistical description and regression analysis are carried out to find out the factors that affect the tunneling behavior of major shareholders of listed manufacturing companies. Finally, according to the conclusion of empirical analysis, the paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: a dominant phenomenon strengthens the motivation of large shareholders' tunneling behavior in manufacturing listed companies; the number of independent directors is inversely proportional to the tunneling behavior of large shareholders; the influence of the nature of controller on large shareholders is not very significant; The establishment of the two positions has a certain influence on the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders of the manufacturing listed companies in our country, and the supervisory board of our country has not yet brought into play its proper supervisory power. The external audit opinion can restrain the large shareholders'tunneling behavior of the manufacturing listed companies in China. The main innovations of this paper are as follows: first, the innovation in application. The data used in this paper are the data of the last five years, which can reflect the innovation in the application of manufacturing listed companies in recent years. Second, research angle and train of thought innovation. In the process of making assumptions, by summarizing the previous research results and relevant theoretical analysis, combining with the actual situation of listed companies, we make assumptions, and introduce the internal governance factors and external audit factors into the model. Third, the proposed countermeasures are full of new ideas. According to the conclusions of the empirical part, this paper puts forward the corresponding countermeasures from two aspects of internal governance structure and external environment, and puts forward some suggestions based on the specific situation of our country and the actual situation of listed manufacturing companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F425;F406.7
本文編號(hào)：2225450
[Abstract]:In our country listed companies, manufacturing listed companies play a very important role. The development of listed manufacturing companies plays a key role in the overall economic development of our country. However, the tunneling behavior of large shareholders in listed manufacturing companies not only affects the development of the company itself, but also has a negative impact on the development of the whole industry and even the whole country. There is a dominant phenomenon in Chinese listed companies, and the phenomenon of large shareholder tunneling in manufacturing listed companies is more serious than that of other types of companies. It is of great significance to study the tunneling of manufacturing listed companies in our country, to explore the manifestation of tunneling behavior and to explore its influencing factors, which is of great significance to improve the mechanism of protecting the interests of small and medium-sized investors. It is convenient for the relevant decision makers of the listed manufacturing companies in our country to make corresponding decisions in order to achieve the goal of maximizing the value of the company and to promote the development of the manufacturing industry and the whole national economy of our country. Theoretically, the research on the large shareholder tunneling of manufacturing listed companies in China further enriches the agency theory of listed companies, which is complementary and detailed to the relevant theoretical research. Firstly, this paper expatiates the research of Chinese and foreign scholars in detail, summarizes the research results of large shareholder tunneling, and then from the theoretical point of view, describes the relevant theories about the behavior of large shareholders tunneling. The paper also analyzes the manifestation of large shareholder tunneling in manufacturing listed companies and the influence of large shareholder tunneling on the company, which lays a foundation for further study of large shareholder tunneling in manufacturing listed companies. Thirdly, by combining theory with practice, this paper analyzes the factors influencing the tunneling behavior of large shareholders of listed manufacturing companies in China, and puts forward the corresponding assumptions. Fourthly, the data of manufacturing companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen are selected, and the statistical description and regression analysis are carried out to find out the factors that affect the tunneling behavior of major shareholders of listed manufacturing companies. Finally, according to the conclusion of empirical analysis, the paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: a dominant phenomenon strengthens the motivation of large shareholders' tunneling behavior in manufacturing listed companies; the number of independent directors is inversely proportional to the tunneling behavior of large shareholders; the influence of the nature of controller on large shareholders is not very significant; The establishment of the two positions has a certain influence on the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders of the manufacturing listed companies in our country, and the supervisory board of our country has not yet brought into play its proper supervisory power. The external audit opinion can restrain the large shareholders'tunneling behavior of the manufacturing listed companies in China. The main innovations of this paper are as follows: first, the innovation in application. The data used in this paper are the data of the last five years, which can reflect the innovation in the application of manufacturing listed companies in recent years. Second, research angle and train of thought innovation. In the process of making assumptions, by summarizing the previous research results and relevant theoretical analysis, combining with the actual situation of listed companies, we make assumptions, and introduce the internal governance factors and external audit factors into the model. Third, the proposed countermeasures are full of new ideas. According to the conclusions of the empirical part, this paper puts forward the corresponding countermeasures from two aspects of internal governance structure and external environment, and puts forward some suggestions based on the specific situation of our country and the actual situation of listed manufacturing companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F425;F406.7
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