【摘要】：在當(dāng)代的公司管理政策之中，所有者將企業(yè)的全部資產(chǎn)交與經(jīng)營(yíng)者來(lái)管理，從而產(chǎn)生了代理成本。由于所有者和經(jīng)營(yíng)者之間存在著嚴(yán)重的信息不對(duì)稱，經(jīng)營(yíng)者很可能在利益的驅(qū)使之下，夸大資產(chǎn)，虛報(bào)利潤(rùn)，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)自己的目的。這種目的的實(shí)現(xiàn)是通過(guò)損害穩(wěn)健性準(zhǔn)則來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)的。經(jīng)營(yíng)者這種進(jìn)行盈余管理，對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性視而不見(jiàn)的行為，會(huì)使外部投資者對(duì)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)管理現(xiàn)狀產(chǎn)生很大的誤解，會(huì)嚴(yán)重的損害外部投資者的利益。所以為了保護(hù)企業(yè)的利益免受傷害，減少訴訟成本、代理成本等，股東及利益相關(guān)者一致要求在對(duì)外報(bào)告的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表中應(yīng)用會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性原則。 本文分為六個(gè)部分，第一部分緒論，介紹本文的研究背景和研究意義,國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀、研究?jī)?nèi)容、研究方法與創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。第二部分從不同的角度論述關(guān)于高管薪酬的相關(guān)理論，并對(duì)高管薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān)性進(jìn)行了初步的討論。第三部分闡述了會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性產(chǎn)生的動(dòng)因及經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，產(chǎn)生的動(dòng)因包括有效契約、法律訴訟、稅收政策、政府管制等動(dòng)因，經(jīng)濟(jì)后果包括盈余管理、債務(wù)契約、信息不對(duì)稱、投資效率等后果。第四部分由淺入深、逐步遞進(jìn)的分析了上市公司高管薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān)性對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的影響，從理論上得出上市公司高管薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)的相關(guān)程度越大，會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性越差的結(jié)論。第五部分對(duì)上市公司高管薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān)性對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性影響進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析，通過(guò)選取上市公司滬市連續(xù)三年的樣本，采用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析和線性回歸分析兩種方法進(jìn)行研究，定量的得出了上市公司高管薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān)性越大，會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性越差的結(jié)論。第六部分結(jié)論。通過(guò)本文的分析得出在我國(guó)上市公司中，行業(yè)不同，規(guī)模不同，盈利能力不同，對(duì)于穩(wěn)健性準(zhǔn)則應(yīng)用的程度也有著很大的差別的結(jié)論。 本文在高管激勵(lì)和約束的角度出發(fā)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性進(jìn)行研究，可以在理論上為制定高管薪酬契約提供指導(dǎo)。通過(guò)討論高管薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān)的程度對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的影響，，提出了了高管薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān)的程度越大會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性越差的結(jié)論，為企業(yè)提高會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性提供依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:In the contemporary corporate management policy, the owner handed over all the assets of the enterprise to the operator to manage, thus resulting in agency cost. Due to the serious information asymmetry between the owner and the operator, the operator is likely to exaggerate the assets and report the profit under the driving of the profit, so as to realize his goal. This goal is achieved by damaging the robustness criterion. The managers' behavior of turning a blind eye to accounting conservatism will make external investors misunderstand the current situation of enterprise management and seriously damage the interests of external investors. Therefore, in order to protect the interests of enterprises from harm, reduce litigation costs, agency costs and so on, shareholders and stakeholders unanimously request the application of accounting conservatism principle in the financial statements of external reports. This paper is divided into six parts. The first part is introduction, which introduces the research background and significance, domestic and foreign research status, research content, research methods and innovation points. The second part discusses the related theories of executive compensation from different angles and discusses the correlation between executive compensation and performance. The third part expounds the causes and economic consequences of accounting conservatism, including valid contract, legal action, tax policy, government regulation and so on. The economic consequences include earnings management, debt contract, information asymmetry, etc. Investment efficiency and other consequences. The fourth part analyzes the influence of executive compensation and performance correlation on accounting conservatism step by step, and draws the conclusion that the greater the correlation degree between executive compensation and performance, the worse accounting conservatism. The fifth part has carried on the empirical analysis to the listed company executive compensation and the performance correlation to the accounting conservatism influence, through the selection listed company Shanghai stock market three consecutive years sample, By using two methods of descriptive statistical analysis and linear regression analysis, the conclusion that the higher the correlation between executive compensation and performance of listed companies is, the worse the accounting conservatism is. The sixth part concludes. Through the analysis of this paper, we can draw a conclusion that the degree of application of the robustness criterion is also very different in the listed companies of our country, the industry is different, the scale is different, the profit ability is different. This paper studies the accounting conservatism from the perspective of executive incentive and restraint, which can provide guidance for the formulation of executive compensation contract. By discussing the influence of executive compensation and performance related degree on accounting conservatism, this paper puts forward the conclusion that the greater the degree of executive compensation is related to performance, the worse accounting conservatism is, which provides a basis for enterprises to improve accounting conservatism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽(yáng)理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275.2;F272.92

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