本文選題：自愿披露 + 非財(cái)務(wù)信息��； 參考：《南開(kāi)大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：針對(duì)實(shí)踐中公司投資總是偏離最優(yōu)投資水平的現(xiàn)象,大量學(xué)者分別從不同角度進(jìn)行了研究。其中,自Bushman and Smith(2001)以來(lái),財(cái)務(wù)信息能否以及如何影響企業(yè)投資效率成為人們關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)問(wèn)題。理論上講,高質(zhì)量的財(cái)務(wù)信息可以降低道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、緩解逆向選擇以及幫助管理者和投資者甄別更好的投資項(xiàng)目,消除各種“噪音”對(duì)企業(yè)投資效率產(chǎn)生的不利影響,因此能夠抑制公司的非效率投資行為,從而提高企業(yè)投資效率。大量的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)也表明高質(zhì)量的財(cái)務(wù)信息有助于提高企業(yè)投資效率、增加公司價(jià)值。然而,財(cái)務(wù)信息只是對(duì)企業(yè)歷史經(jīng)營(yíng)情況的“圖像反映”,由于受到會(huì)計(jì)確認(rèn)、計(jì)量等因索制約,很多重要信息無(wú)法傳遞給投資者,所以隨著投資者對(duì)企業(yè)信息需求的不斷增長(zhǎng),傳統(tǒng)的財(cái)務(wù)信息越來(lái)越難以滿(mǎn)足其投資決策的需求,因此鼓勵(lì)上市公司自愿披露更多的非財(cái)務(wù)信息尤其是有關(guān)未來(lái)發(fā)展前景的信息以增強(qiáng)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的有用性已經(jīng)得到了理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界地廣泛認(rèn)同,并被各國(guó)政府和相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)所采納。然而,雖然此類(lèi)非財(cái)務(wù)信息在相關(guān)性和及時(shí)性方面優(yōu)于財(cái)務(wù)信息,但很難被立即審計(jì)或證實(shí),可鑒證性較差。那么在這種情況下,其能否影響投資者決策并進(jìn)而對(duì)公司投資效率產(chǎn)生作用呢?本文以非財(cái)務(wù)信息披露動(dòng)機(jī)為切入點(diǎn),結(jié)合我國(guó)新興市場(chǎng)的特殊制度背景,通過(guò)理論分析與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的方法,探討了上市公司自愿披露的有關(guān)未來(lái)發(fā)展前景的非財(cái)務(wù)信息對(duì)企業(yè)投資效率的影響以及作用機(jī)理和發(fā)展趨勢(shì),并進(jìn)一步考察了這種影響是否具有“狀態(tài)依存性”的特點(diǎn)。 本文共分為六章。第一章是緒論,介紹了本文的研究動(dòng)機(jī)、研究意義、研究思路、框架、方法、技術(shù)路線(xiàn)圖以及創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。第二章是文獻(xiàn)綜述,分別從公司投資效率和非財(cái)務(wù)信息披露兩個(gè)方面對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了梳理,并根據(jù)已有研究文獻(xiàn)的不足和我國(guó)新興市場(chǎng)的特殊環(huán)境,闡述了本文進(jìn)一步的研究方向。第三章在上市公司非財(cái)務(wù)信息披露動(dòng)機(jī)的基礎(chǔ)上,研究了非財(cái)務(wù)信息與企業(yè)投資效率二者之間的關(guān)系、內(nèi)在機(jī)理以及發(fā)展,趨勢(shì)。第四章和第五章分別從公司治理和深交所信息披露考評(píng)的視角研究了非財(cái)務(wù)信息、對(duì)企業(yè)投資效率的影響是否具有“狀態(tài)依存性”的特點(diǎn)并提供了相應(yīng)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。第六章總結(jié)了本文的主要發(fā)現(xiàn)并據(jù)此提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議,并指出了論文的研究局限和未來(lái)研究方向。 通過(guò)理論分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),本文主要得到以下結(jié)論： 第一,對(duì)于總樣本,上市公司自愿披露的低質(zhì)量的非財(cái)務(wù)信息也可以獲得投資者的信任,從而扭曲了市場(chǎng)資源配置,使得那些披露了較多數(shù)量但低質(zhì)量的公司獲得了更多資源,在建立“商業(yè)帝國(guó)”等自身利益驅(qū)動(dòng)以及外部政府干預(yù)的壓力下,管理者趨向于擴(kuò)大非效率投資規(guī)模,導(dǎo)致了過(guò)度投資,最終損害了企業(yè)投資效率。本文還發(fā)現(xiàn)也有一部分公司雖然利用獲取的超額市場(chǎng)資源投資了一些高收益項(xiàng)目,緩解了投資不足,但同時(shí)也還會(huì)通過(guò)資金占用的方式轉(zhuǎn)移外部融資以享受控制權(quán)私有收益。通過(guò)進(jìn)一步分年度的子樣本回歸發(fā)現(xiàn),由于近年來(lái)爆發(fā)的一系列虛假陳述案以及隨著投資者能力的不斷增長(zhǎng),低質(zhì)量的非財(cái)務(wù)信息已經(jīng)越來(lái)越難以贏得投資者信任,所以即使公司披露更多的非財(cái)務(wù)信息也不能起到緩解融資約束的作用,因此也就無(wú)法進(jìn)一步影響企業(yè)投資效率。 第二,當(dāng)公司治理比較完善時(shí),管理者披露動(dòng)機(jī)的機(jī)會(huì)主義觀被抑制,而信息觀得到增強(qiáng),所以這類(lèi)公司披露的非財(cái)務(wù)信息質(zhì)量較高。然而,在2004-2008年的子樣本中,本文并未發(fā)現(xiàn)質(zhì)量較高的非財(cái)務(wù)信息可信性也隨之增強(qiáng),所以與其他公司相比,治理更加完善的公司披露的非財(cái)務(wù)信息并沒(méi)有更加顯著地緩解融資約束。而在2009-2010年的子樣本中,治理更加完善的公司披露的非財(cái)務(wù)信息更能獲取投資者信任,所以與其他公司相比,更能顯著地緩解融資約束,從而使得公司可以投資于那些高收益項(xiàng)目,避免了投資不足,提高了企業(yè)投資效率。 第三,對(duì)于信息披露考評(píng)結(jié)果為優(yōu)秀或良好的公司,無(wú)論是總樣本還是各個(gè)時(shí)間段的子樣本,非財(cái)務(wù)信息都與過(guò)度投資顯著負(fù)相關(guān),并且以前年度一直被評(píng)為優(yōu)秀或良好的公司披露的非財(cái)務(wù)信息更能抑制過(guò)度投資,但這種差異并不具有統(tǒng)計(jì)上的顯著性。本文同時(shí)還發(fā)現(xiàn)與信息披露考評(píng)為合格或不合格的公司相比,信息披露考評(píng)為優(yōu)秀或良好的公司披露的非財(cái)務(wù)信息更能夠顯著降低融資約束,有助于公司獲得更多的市場(chǎng)資源,從而可以避免投資不足,并且對(duì)于以前年度一直被評(píng)為優(yōu)秀或良好的公司而言,披露的非財(cái)務(wù)信息相比于僅上一年度被評(píng)為優(yōu)秀或良好的公司,更能贏得投資者信任,并且這種差異通過(guò)了統(tǒng)計(jì)上的顯著性檢驗(yàn)。
[Abstract]:In practice, a large number of scholars have studied the phenomenon that corporate investment always deviates from the optimal investment level, and a large number of scholars have studied from different angles. Among them, since Bushman and Smith (2001), whether financial information can and how to affect the efficiency of enterprise investment has become a hot issue. In theory, high quality financial information can reduce morality. Risk, mitigate adverse selection and help managers and investors identify better investment projects, eliminate the adverse effects of "noise" on the efficiency of enterprise investment, so it can inhibit the inefficiency investment behavior of the company and improve the efficiency of the enterprise investment. The efficiency of high enterprise investment increases the value of the company. However, the financial information is only a "image reflection" of the business history. Because of the accounting confirmation, measurement and other factors, many important information can not be transferred to the investor. Therefore, the traditional financial information is becoming more and more difficult with the increasing demand of the investors for the enterprise information. To meet the needs of its investment decisions, it has been widely accepted by both governments and relevant institutions to encourage listed companies to voluntarily disclose more non-financial information, especially information about future development prospects, to enhance the usefulness of financial reports and to be adopted by governments and related institutions. The relevance and timeliness are superior to financial information, but it is difficult to be audited or confirmed immediately, but the identification is poor. In this case, can it affect the investor's decision-making and then have a effect on the efficiency of the company's investment? This article is based on the motivation of non financial information disclosure and combines the special institutional background of the emerging markets of our country. Through the method of theoretical analysis and empirical test, the influence of non financial information on the future development prospects of listed companies on the enterprise investment efficiency, the mechanism of action and the trend of development are discussed, and the characteristics of "state dependence" are further investigated.
This article is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which introduces the research motivation, research significance, research ideas, framework, methods, technical roadmap and innovation points. The second chapter is literature review, combing the domestic and foreign related literature from two aspects of company investment efficiency and non financial information disclosure, and according to the existing research literature. In the third chapter, the relationship between the non financial information and the investment efficiency of the two parties, the internal mechanism, the development and the trend, the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter respectively from the corporate governance and the depth of the company are discussed. The sixth chapter summarizes the main findings of this paper and puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions, and points out the limitations of the research and the future research direction.
Through theoretical analysis and empirical tests, the following conclusions can be drawn:
First, for the total sample, the low quality non-financial information that the listed companies voluntarily disclosed can also gain the trust of the investors, thus distorting the allocation of market resources, making the companies that disclose a large number of but low quality companies gaining more resources, driving their own interests, such as the "business empire", and the external government intervention. Under the force, managers tend to expand the scale of inefficiency investment, resulting in excessive investment and ultimately damage the efficiency of enterprise investment. Through subsample regression of further sub year, it is found that low quality non-financial information has become more and more difficult to win trust for investors, even if the company discloses more non-financial information, because of a series of false statements in recent years and the increasing capacity of investors. It can play a role in relieving the financing constraints, so it can not further affect the efficiency of enterprise investment.
Second, when corporate governance is more perfect, the opportunism concept of managers' disclosure motivation is suppressed and the information outlook is enhanced, so the quality of non-financial information disclosed by these companies is high. However, in the 2004-2008 year subsample, this article does not find the higher quality of non financial information credibility is also enhanced, so it is with other companies. In comparison, non-financial information disclosed by more perfect companies does not significantly alleviate financing constraints. In the 2009-2010 year subsample, the non financial information disclosed by more perfect companies can be more likely to be trusted by investors, so compared with other companies, the financial constraints can be significantly alleviated, thus making the company available. To invest in those high-yield projects, to avoid investment and improve the efficiency of enterprise investment.
Third, the non financial information is significantly negatively related to overinvestment, whether it is a total sample or a sub sample of each time period, and the non financial information that has been rated as a good or good company for the previous year is more likely to suppress overinvestment, but this difference is not a significant difference. At the same time, this paper also finds that compared with the companies that are qualified or unqualified for the information disclosure, the information disclosure and evaluation for the outstanding or good company disclosure of non-financial information can significantly reduce the financing constraints, help the company to obtain more market resources, and thus avoid the shortage of investment, and for the previous year. The disclosure of non-financial information, which has been rated as a good or good company, is more likely to win trust than a good or good company in the last year, and this difference has passed a statistically significant test.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開(kāi)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F231

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