本文選題：管理者過度自信 + 非條件會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性　； 參考：《浙江大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：管理者過度自信指的是管理者高估自身的決策能力從而高估公司未來業(yè)績(jī)而低估未來風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。公司管理層對(duì)于公司未來前景的估計(jì)對(duì)于公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)決策制定十分重要。過度自信的管理者由于自身的心理偏差會(huì)影響到公司的許多方面,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性便是其一。會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性包括非條件會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性和條件會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性兩種。處于不同公司治理環(huán)境的公司,過度自信的管理者對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的影響程度是不同的。因此,研究該領(lǐng)域中三者之間的作用機(jī)制能夠幫助我們更好地制定相關(guān)政策,更好地服務(wù)利益相關(guān)者。 本文通過理論方法和實(shí)證方法考察管理者過度自信對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的影響,以及不同公司治理水平對(duì)于二者的影響關(guān)系。 首先,本文在回顧國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究的基礎(chǔ)上,介紹了管理者過度自信的定義、成因,以及對(duì)于公司各種政策的影響。還介紹了會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的定義、分類及產(chǎn)生原因。其次,基于理論分析,本文提出了緊密圍繞主旨的五大假設(shè),并選取我國(guó)滬深兩市2009-2012年的上市公司作為樣本,進(jìn)行線性回歸檢驗(yàn)。最后結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)管理者過度自信非條件會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性不存在顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；與條件會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；(2)股權(quán)集中度高的公司,即控股大股東持股比例越高的公司,管理者過度自信與條件會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系越強(qiáng),然而與非條件會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性卻不存在這種顯著的結(jié)論；(3)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例高的公司,管理者過度自信與兩種會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性之間的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系會(huì)有所抑制,但效果均不明顯；(4)國(guó)有控股的公司,管理者過度自信對(duì)于條件會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的損害程度也會(huì)加強(qiáng),而非條件會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的結(jié)果并不顯著；(5)管理者過度自信對(duì)于條件會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的負(fù)面影響并沒有因內(nèi)部獨(dú)立董事比例的增加而有所改善。
[Abstract]:Manager overconfidence refers to managers overestimating their ability to make decisions, thus overestimating their future performance and underestimating future risks. The estimation of the company's future prospects by the management is very important to the company's business decision making. Overconfident managers can affect many aspects of the company because of their own psychological bias, accounting conservatism is one of them. Accounting conservatism includes non-conditional accounting conservatism and conditional accounting conservatism. In different corporate governance environments, overconfident managers have different impacts on accounting conservatism. Therefore, the study of the mechanism between the three in this field can help us to better formulate relevant policies and better serve stakeholders. This paper investigates the influence of manager overconfidence on accounting conservatism and the relationship between different levels of corporate governance and accounting conservatism through theoretical and empirical methods. First of all, this paper introduces the definition of manager overconfidence, its causes, and the influence on various policies of the company on the basis of reviewing relevant studies at home and abroad. It also introduces the definition, classification and causes of accounting conservatism. Secondly, based on the theoretical analysis, this paper puts forward five hypotheses closely surrounding the theme, and selects the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2009 to 2012 as samples to carry out the linear regression test. The results show that: (1) there is no significant negative correlation between managers' overconfidence and non-conditional accounting conservatism; there is a significant negative correlation with conditional accounting conservatism; (2) companies with high equity concentration, That is, the higher the proportion of controlling shareholders, the stronger the negative correlation between manager overconfidence and conditional accounting conservatism, but there is no such significant conclusion with non-conditional accounting conservatism. (3) the negative correlation between the overconfidence of managers and the two kinds of accounting conservatism will be restrained, but the effect is not obvious. Managers' overconfidence will also strengthen the degree of damage to conditional accounting conservatism, but the results of non-conditional accounting conservatism are not significant; (5) the negative effect of manager overconfidence on conditional accounting conservatism has not been improved by the increase of the proportion of internal independent directors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F272.9;F233

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前8條

1 江偉;;管理者過度自信,融資偏好與公司投資[J];財(cái)貿(mào)研究;2010年01期

2 王毅春;孫林巖;;銀企關(guān)系、股權(quán)特征與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性——來自中國(guó)上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];財(cái)政研究;2006年07期

3 黃蓮琴;傅元略;;管理者過度自信與公司融資策略的選擇[J];福州大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2010年04期

4 余明桂;夏新平;鄒振松;;管理者過度自信與企業(yè)激進(jìn)負(fù)債行為[J];管理世界;2006年08期

5 吳超鵬;吳世農(nóng);鄭方鑣;;管理者行為與連續(xù)并購(gòu)績(jī)效的理論與實(shí)證研究[J];管理世界;2008年07期

6 郝穎,劉星,林朝南;我國(guó)上市公司高管人員過度自信與投資決策的實(shí)證研究[J];中國(guó)管理科學(xué);2005年05期

7 修宗峰;;股權(quán)集中、股權(quán)制衡與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性[J];證券市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)報(bào);2008年03期

8 陳勝藍(lán);魏明海;;董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性、盈余穩(wěn)健性與投資者保護(hù)[J];中山大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2007年02期

，

本文編號(hào)：2094236