本文選題：真實(shí)盈余管理 + 事務(wù)所行業(yè)專長(zhǎng)��； 參考：《財(cái)會(huì)通訊》2013年24期

【摘要】：真實(shí)盈余管理是一種相對(duì)比較隱蔽的盈余管理方式,本文采用2008年至2011年上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),研究上市公司CEO權(quán)利、CEO非正常變更和會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所行業(yè)專長(zhǎng)對(duì)于上市公司真實(shí)盈余管理的影響。結(jié)果顯示:CEO變更與真實(shí)盈余管理顯著正相關(guān),CEO權(quán)利與上市公司真實(shí)盈余管理顯著正相關(guān),會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所行業(yè)專長(zhǎng)能夠抑制上市公司的管理層的真實(shí)盈余管理行為。
[Abstract]:Real earnings management is a relatively hidden way of earnings management. This paper uses the data of listed companies from 2008 to 2011 to study the influence of CEO rights of listed companies, abnormal changes of CEO and professional expertise of accounting firms on the real earnings management of listed companies. The results show that the changes of CEO and real earnings management are significant positive. The CEO rights are positively related to the real earnings management of the listed companies, and the professional expertise of the accounting firms can inhibit the real earnings management behavior of the listed companies' management.
【作者單位】： 中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：F233
，

本文編號(hào)：2059402