本文選題：內(nèi)幕交易 + 信息披露��； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：內(nèi)幕交易成為我國近年來處罰最多的違規(guī)事件，面對越來越多的內(nèi)幕交易的發(fā)現(xiàn)與查處，證券市場的規(guī)范問題越來越受到關(guān)注。內(nèi)幕交易未能有效防止的原因很大部分歸于信息披露的問題，構(gòu)建一個(gè)專門針對內(nèi)幕交易的信息披露體系，對減少內(nèi)幕交易的發(fā)生，讓公司管理者更好的履行自己作為市場參與者的職責(zé)，為政策制定機(jī)構(gòu)提供建議具有重要意義。 本文從市場公平性角度，對政府監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)、中介機(jī)構(gòu)和上市公司三個(gè)資本市場參與者提出體系構(gòu)建。Kyle模型證明信息披露是有效防止內(nèi)幕交易的措施，筆者針對內(nèi)幕交易構(gòu)建了內(nèi)幕交易信息披露指數(shù)（IDII），從信息的真實(shí)性、及時(shí)性、完整性、準(zhǔn)確性四個(gè)方面對各上市公司進(jìn)行評價(jià)，用于內(nèi)幕交易的預(yù)警，并從證監(jiān)會處罰的案例中對比未處罰的相似公司，得出信息披露指數(shù)的預(yù)警線。財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告也存在一定的局限性，將一次性披露改為持續(xù)性披露，同時(shí)加強(qiáng)預(yù)測性信息的管理，對現(xiàn)有信息披露具有重要作用。 內(nèi)部人采取內(nèi)部人交易披露模式，即內(nèi)部人可以進(jìn)行交易，但必須設(shè)立禁售期和交易的“窗口”期，只有提前報(bào)告了的內(nèi)部人，，才能提交擬進(jìn)行交易的計(jì)劃表，同時(shí)在監(jiān)管部門公布后一段期間后，按計(jì)劃進(jìn)行交易，并對交易后的結(jié)果提交監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)。這樣讓內(nèi)部人所獲得的內(nèi)幕信息喪失信息優(yōu)勢。 讓中介機(jī)構(gòu)在資本市場發(fā)揮重要作用，必須確保獨(dú)立性的問題。筆者認(rèn)為改革中介機(jī)構(gòu)的聘用制度，上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表審計(jì)按被審單位資產(chǎn)總額與銷售收入孰高分檔累進(jìn)計(jì)費(fèi),同時(shí)可以選擇按時(shí)收費(fèi)，二者擇其一。集中建立審計(jì)基金和獨(dú)董基金，由中介機(jī)構(gòu)從基金中支取勞動(dòng)報(bào)酬，業(yè)務(wù)的獲取采用投標(biāo)的形式，由專家進(jìn)行綜合評分后確定服務(wù)機(jī)構(gòu)，徹底斷絕經(jīng)濟(jì)威脅。同時(shí)，為防止道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，加強(qiáng)心理激勵(lì)是必須的。對中介機(jī)構(gòu)、上市公司和執(zhí)業(yè)人員建立相應(yīng)的誠信檔案和信用評級制度，讓三方利益取向相同，維護(hù)資本市場的公平。
[Abstract]:Insider trading has become the most punishable illegal event in China in recent years. In the face of more and more discovery and investigation of insider trading, more and more attention has been paid to the regulation of securities market. Most of the reasons why insider trading has not been effectively prevented are due to the problem of information disclosure. The establishment of a system of information disclosure specifically aimed at insider trading will reduce the occurrence of insider trading. It is important for company managers to better perform their duties as market participants and advise policy-making agencies. From the perspective of market fairness, this paper puts forward a system.Kyle model to the three capital market participants of government regulators, intermediaries and listed companies to prove that information disclosure is an effective measure to prevent insider trading. The author constructs an information disclosure index (IDIIG) for insider trading, and evaluates the listed companies from four aspects of information authenticity, timeliness, completeness and accuracy, which can be used as an early warning for insider trading. The warning line of information disclosure index is obtained by comparing the similar companies with no punishment in the case of CSRC. Financial report also has some limitations. It is important for existing information disclosure to change one-time disclosure to continuous disclosure and to strengthen the management of predictive information at the same time. The insider adopts the insider transaction disclosure model, that is, the insider can conduct a transaction, but must set up a "window" period for the transaction. Only the insiders who have reported in advance can submit the plan for the transaction. At the same time, after the release of the regulatory period, the planned transactions, and the results of the deal submitted to regulators. This makes the insider information gained by the loss of information advantage. For intermediaries to play an important role in capital markets, independence must be ensured. The author thinks that reforming the employment system of intermediary organizations, the audit of financial statements of listed companies is based on the progressive charging of assets and sales income of the units under review, and at the same time, they can choose to charge on time, and choose one of them. The audit fund and the sole Dong fund should be set up in a centralized way, and the intermediary organization would draw the labor reward from the fund, and the business would be obtained in the form of bidding, and the service organization should be determined by the experts after the comprehensive evaluation, and the economic threat would be completely cut off. At the same time, in order to prevent moral hazard, it is necessary to strengthen psychological motivation. To establish the corresponding credit file and credit rating system for intermediary organizations, listed companies and practitioners, so that the interests of the three parties will be the same and the equity of the capital market will be maintained.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F830.42;F832.51

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