本文選題：商業(yè)銀行 + 內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量��； 參考：《廣西師范大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：自上個世紀到現(xiàn)在,世界各地上市企業(yè)財務舞弊、會計信息失真情況多有出現(xiàn),奧林巴斯案例、綠大地案例、萬福生科案例更是不斷刺激我們的神經(jīng),監(jiān)管機構(gòu)更是不斷更新內(nèi)部監(jiān)控法規(guī)以強化各行各業(yè)公司的內(nèi)部控制機制,學者們對內(nèi)部控制的研究層出不窮。有些悲劇事件的發(fā)生是因為違反相關法規(guī)造成的,有些則不然,而是公司高管為了內(nèi)部利益過度的盈余管理行為導致的。盈余管理行為一直是財務管理理論和實務的熱門話題,有些學者認為盈余管理合法合規(guī),在國家允許范圍之內(nèi)無可厚非；而有些學者則認為過度的盈余管理行為勢必導致財務信息質(zhì)量的下降,誤導財務報表使用者,影響投資者合理決策,久而久之將企業(yè)引入歧途而不知返。因此企業(yè)應該建立一種能夠規(guī)范企業(yè)行為、引導員工合規(guī)操作、監(jiān)督交易業(yè)務的制度,即內(nèi)部控制制度,有效防止企業(yè)不合理行為。上個世紀,國內(nèi)外學者紛紛通過理論和實證研究來驗證內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量和盈余管理是否存在相關性的問題,一些學者如Doyle (2007)通過搜集數(shù)據(jù)進行研究驗證,推出內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量越低將導致會計信息質(zhì)量越差的結(jié)論。 不過大量的數(shù)據(jù)分析和實證研究都局限于非銀行機構(gòu),可能由于上市商業(yè)銀行在證監(jiān)會和相關監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的監(jiān)管之下能夠具有較高的內(nèi)控質(zhì)量,因而使得銀行業(yè)內(nèi)控質(zhì)量不具有研究性。但是我們看到商業(yè)銀行在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中發(fā)揮著不可限量的作用,是經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的紐帶�！吨袊鹑诜�(wěn)定報告2013》的頒布實施標志著我國“存款保險制度”和“銀行破產(chǎn)法”的即將出臺,這無疑是對我國銀行業(yè)一次巨大挑戰(zhàn)和更高希望。同時商業(yè)銀行由于其特殊性,具有超出一般工商企業(yè)的風險,受經(jīng)濟環(huán)境影響較大,屬于高風險行業(yè)。而且外部投資者或者社會大眾由于自身的能力局限和信息的不對稱對商業(yè)銀行的考量都是“霧里看花”,并不能深入銀行進行相關了解；外部審計機構(gòu)只有在受委托情況下才會對商業(yè)銀行進行審查,而委托-代理的關系勢必給審計的獨立性蒙上一層紗。在人們都“仰望”商業(yè)銀行的時候,英國巴林銀行因為內(nèi)部控制缺陷帶來的倒閉轟動了世界,也打破了銀行不倒的神話,引起各界對銀行內(nèi)部控制的思考。而銀行盈余管理的行為也始見報端,需要強有力的內(nèi)部控制制度進行約束,防止悲劇的再次發(fā)生。不過商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部控制能否抑制其盈余管理行為還是一個亟待考證的問題,本文正是通過搜集相關數(shù)據(jù)進行實證分析,對這一假設進行驗證。 本論文劃分為五部分內(nèi)容,第一部分內(nèi)容對選題意義和相關文獻進行描述；第二部分分別從商業(yè)銀行盈余管理、內(nèi)部控制和二者相關性三個角度分析了理論基礎；第三部分研究假設與設計,提出假設并對數(shù)據(jù)和模型的選��；第四部分進行實證分析；最后一個部分針對實證結(jié)論給出相關建議。 本文在衡量商業(yè)銀行盈余管理程度時候借鑒各界學者模型,針對商業(yè)銀行盈余管理的特殊性,選擇了在陸建橋的擴展Jones模型基礎上進行適當改進,將應收賬款的增加額改成應收利息來度量盈余管理程度。內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的度量按照信號傳遞理論選擇ICQ作為為指標。本文搜集了2007-2012年我國16家上市商業(yè)銀行的相關數(shù)據(jù)進行整理,通過加入總資產(chǎn)凈利率、資產(chǎn)負債率等數(shù)據(jù)進行回歸分析,從而揭示上市商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)控質(zhì)量與盈余管理行為是否具有關系。研究結(jié)果證明：第一,上市商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的高低會影響其盈余管理水平；第二,上市商業(yè)銀行盈余管理程度的高低受公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)合理與否的影響。
[Abstract]:From the last century to the present, the financial fraud of the listed companies in the world and the distortion of accounting information have appeared. The OLYMPUS case, the green land case, and the case of the Wanfu department are constantly stimulating our nerves, and the regulators are constantly updating the internal control laws and regulations to strengthen the internal control mechanism of all walks of life. Some of the tragic events are caused by the violation of relevant laws and regulations, and some are not the result of the excessive earnings management behavior of the company's executives for internal interests. The earnings management behavior has always been a hot topic in the theory and practice of financial management, and some scholars believe that the earnings management is legal compliance, Some scholars believe that excessive earnings management will lead to the decline in the quality of financial information, mislead the users of financial statements, affect the rational decision of the investors, and lead the enterprise into the wrong way for a long time, so the enterprise should establish a kind of ability to standardize the behavior of the enterprise and guide the staff. In the last century, scholars at home and abroad have verified the problem of whether the quality of internal control and the management of earnings are relevant. Some scholars, such as Doyle (2007), have done research and verification through collecting data. The lower the quality of internal control, the worse the quality of accounting information will be.
However, a large number of data analysis and empirical research are limited to non bank institutions, which may cause the quality of internal control of the listed commercial banks under the supervision of the Securities Regulatory Commission and the relevant regulatory agencies. Therefore, the quality of the internal control of the banking industry is not of research. But we see that the commercial banks are playing an important role in the economic development. The effect of limited quantity is the bond of economic development. The promulgation and implementation of China's financial stability report 2013> marks the upcoming introduction of the "deposit insurance system" and "Bank Bankruptcy Law" in China. This is undoubtedly a great challenge and higher hope for our banking industry. At the same time, the commercial bank is more special than the general business enterprise. Risk is highly affected by the economic environment, and it belongs to high risk industry. Besides, the external investors or the social masses are "looking at the flowers" for commercial banks because of their own limitations and information asymmetry, which can not be deeply understood by the banks; the external audit institutions will only have commercial Silver under the circumstances of entrustment. When people are looking up to the commercial banks, the Bank of Bahrain, when people are all "looking up" to commercial banks, caused the collapse of the world because of the failure of the internal control defects. It also breaks the myth of the bank's failure and causes the thinking of the internal control of the banks in all circles. And the bank surplus management. A strong internal control system needs a strong internal control system to prevent the tragedy from happening again. However, whether the internal control of commercial banks can restrain its earnings management is still an urgent problem. This paper is to verify the hypothesis through the collection of relevant data.
This paper is divided into five parts. The first part describes the significance of the topic and the related literature; the second part analyses the theoretical basis from three angles: the earnings management of commercial banks, the internal control and the correlation of the two parties; the third part studies the hypothesis and design, and the selection of the data and the model, and the fourth part. Empirical analysis is carried out; the last part gives relevant recommendations for empirical conclusions.
In this paper, when measuring the degree of earnings management of commercial banks, we use the model of scholars from all walks of life. In view of the particularity of the earnings management of commercial banks, we choose the appropriate improvement on the basis of the extended Jones model of Lu Jian bridge to measure the increase of accounts receivable to the interest rate to measure earnings management. The measurement of the quality of internal control is based on the letter. The number transfer theory selects ICQ as the index. This paper collects the relevant data of 16 listed commercial banks in China for 2007-2012 years. The data of total assets net interest rate and asset liability ratio are analyzed by regression analysis to reveal whether the internal control quality of the listed commercial banks is related to the earnings management behavior. First, the quality of the internal control of the listed commercial banks will affect the level of earnings management; second, the degree of earnings management of the listed commercial banks is affected by the reasonable or not the corporate governance structure.

【學位授予單位】：廣西師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F830.42;F832.33

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