本文選題：公允價(jià)值變動(dòng)　切入點(diǎn)：會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)　出處：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：2007年1月1日我國(guó)財(cái)政部頒布了與國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則(IFRS)實(shí)質(zhì)趨同的《企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則》(2006),其中特別引人關(guān)注的就是積極、謹(jǐn)慎地引入公允價(jià)值計(jì)量屬性,其中17項(xiàng)具體準(zhǔn)則都應(yīng)用到了公允價(jià)值計(jì)量屬性,以提高會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,增強(qiáng)會(huì)計(jì)相關(guān)性。 本文以契約觀為出發(fā)點(diǎn),旨在研究公允價(jià)值變動(dòng)對(duì)高管薪酬的影響。文章的理論部分首先界定了相關(guān)概念,評(píng)述了現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn),接著以委托代理理論、會(huì)計(jì)契約理論以及激勵(lì)理論為基礎(chǔ)構(gòu)建分析框架：公允價(jià)值計(jì)量屬性的應(yīng)用,方面增加了會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)信息的契約有用性,能夠更好地反映出高管能力與努力程度,提高了高管薪酬契約的激勵(lì)作用；另一方面,也可能加劇高管怠惰行為,增加高管薪酬與會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)的不對(duì)稱(chēng)性,降低高管薪酬契約的約束作用。文章的實(shí)證部分選取2009年—2012年受公允價(jià)值計(jì)量屬性影響的A股非金融保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)上市公司為樣本,通過(guò)“薪酬—業(yè)績(jī)”相關(guān)性模型和不對(duì)稱(chēng)性模型,檢驗(yàn)公允價(jià)值變動(dòng)的高管薪酬業(yè)績(jī)相關(guān)性及不對(duì)稱(chēng)性。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明,公允價(jià)值計(jì)量在增量意義上提高了會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)與高管薪酬之間的契約相關(guān)性,對(duì)高管薪酬契約的激勵(lì)效果起到了積極的促進(jìn)作用：在資本市場(chǎng)較為穩(wěn)定的條件下,公司業(yè)績(jī)與高管薪酬的不對(duì)稱(chēng)性在以公允價(jià)值計(jì)量的會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)層面同樣存在。 相比以往研究,本文存在三個(gè)創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)：第一,在研究視角的選取上,本文通過(guò)研究現(xiàn)行準(zhǔn)則中公允價(jià)值的運(yùn)用對(duì)于企業(yè)高管薪酬契約的影響,從契約觀的角度探究公允價(jià)值會(huì)計(jì)的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果；第二,在研究對(duì)象的選取上,本文不但研究“公允價(jià)值變動(dòng)損益”,也將“直接計(jì)入資本公積的公允價(jià)值變動(dòng)”納入研究范圍；第三,在研究樣本的選取上,本文選取2009—2012年四年的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行分析,更準(zhǔn)確全面地評(píng)價(jià)公允價(jià)值引入對(duì)高管薪酬契約的影響。
[Abstract]:On January 1, 2007, the Ministry of Finance of our country promulgated the "Accounting Standards for Enterprises" that converge substantially with the International Accounting Standards (IFRSs). Among them, what attracts special attention is the positive and careful introduction of fair value measurement attributes. 17 of them are applied to fair value measurement to improve the quality of accounting information and enhance accounting relevance. Based on the contract view, this paper aims to study the influence of fair value change on executive compensation. In the theoretical part of the article, we define the relevant concepts, comment on the existing literature, and then use the principal-agent theory. On the basis of accounting contract theory and incentive theory, this paper constructs an analytical framework: the application of fair value measurement attribute increases the contractual usefulness of accounting performance information, and can better reflect the executive ability and effort. On the other hand, it may aggravate executive idleness and increase the asymmetry between executive pay and accounting performance. The empirical part of this paper selects A-share non-financial insurance industry listed companies affected by fair value measurement attribute as samples from 2009 to 2012. The correlation model of compensation and performance and asymmetry model are used to test the correlation and asymmetry of executive compensation performance with fair value change. Fair value measurement improves the contractual correlation between accounting performance and executive compensation in incremental sense, and plays a positive role in promoting the incentive effect of executive compensation contract: under the condition of stable capital market, The asymmetry between corporate performance and executive compensation also exists at the level of accounting performance measured at fair value. Compared with previous studies, there are three innovations in this paper: first, in the perspective of the study, this paper studies the impact of fair value on the executive compensation contract in the current standards. This paper explores the economic consequences of fair value accounting from the point of view of contract. Secondly, in the selection of research objects, this paper not only studies the "gains and losses of changes in fair value", but also brings "the change of fair value directly into the capital reserve" into the scope of the study. Thirdly, in the research sample selection, this paper selects the 2009-2012 four years data to carry on the analysis, more accurately and comprehensively evaluates the fair value introduction to the executive compensation contract influence.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F275;F233

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 姜金香,李增泉,李磊;兩種準(zhǔn)則下會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)的契約有用性評(píng)價(jià)——基于B股公司經(jīng)理人員變更的實(shí)證分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2005年08期

2 葛家澍,杜興強(qiáng);關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)信息的相關(guān)性和可靠性問(wèn)題的思考(上)[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2004年21期

3 葛家澍 ,杜興強(qiáng);關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)信息的相關(guān)性和可靠性問(wèn)題的思考(下)[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2004年23期

4 常勛;公允價(jià)值計(jì)量研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2004年01期

5 王克敏;王志超;;高管控制權(quán)、報(bào)酬與盈余管理——基于中國(guó)上市公司的實(shí)證研究[J];管理世界;2007年07期

6 婁芳;李玉博;原紅旗;;新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則對(duì)現(xiàn)金股利和會(huì)計(jì)盈余關(guān)系影響的研究[J];管理世界;2010年01期

7 鄒海峰;辛清泉;張金若;;公允價(jià)值計(jì)量與高管薪酬契約[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2010年05期

8 方軍雄;;我國(guó)上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性嗎?[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2009年03期

9 盧永華,楊曉軍;公允價(jià)值計(jì)量屬性研究[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2000年04期

10 杜興強(qiáng);王麗華;;高層管理當(dāng)局薪酬與上市公司業(yè)績(jī)的相關(guān)性實(shí)證研究[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2007年01期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 熊運(yùn)蓮;公允價(jià)值會(huì)計(jì)對(duì)企業(yè)投資行為異化和管理報(bào)酬契約設(shè)計(jì)的影響研究[D];重慶大學(xué);2009年

，

本文編號(hào)：1659044