本文選題：盈余穩(wěn)健性　切入點：控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離　出處：《湖南大學》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：2008年美國次貸危機爆發(fā)，進而引發(fā)全球性的金融危機。公允價值計量屬性受到質疑，穩(wěn)健性原則在會計學界引起廣泛的關注。在我國，穩(wěn)健性原則經(jīng)歷了從無到有，由弱到強的過程，但是我國上市公司采用激進的會計政策來粉飾利潤的現(xiàn)象仍然比較常見。盡管國外就穩(wěn)健性原則展開了深入廣泛的研究，并取得了一系列研究成果，但我國經(jīng)濟體制和制度環(huán)境與國外存在較大的不同，我國資本市場上各方面的制度設計還很不完善，，比如投資者法律保護程度偏低，企業(yè)內部治理結構不合理等等。在我國特殊的制度背景下，探討集中股權結構下兩權分離——控制權和現(xiàn)金流權分離對盈余穩(wěn)健性的影響，可以進一步深化盈余穩(wěn)健性的動因解說，為集中股權結構下控股股東侵占中小股東利益，并可能進一步損害會計信息質量提供實證依據(jù)，也有利于我們正確認識我國新企業(yè)會計準則適度引入公允價值的前提下，進一步強化穩(wěn)健性原則應用的原因，為評價我國會計制度變遷提供客觀依據(jù)。 本文首先介紹了不完全契約理論、委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論和公司治理理論等理論基礎和金字塔集中股權結構、股權分置改革、新企業(yè)會計準則發(fā)布等制度背景。其次，從理論角度深入探討了兩權分離對盈余穩(wěn)健性的影響、現(xiàn)金流權的激勵作用以及控股股東性質不同對盈余穩(wěn)健性的不同影響，并根據(jù)理論分析提出研究假設。再次，采用盈余/股價反向回歸模型，以2007~2011年我國滬深A股主板上市公司為樣本，實證檢驗了兩權分離、現(xiàn)金流權和控股股東性質對盈余穩(wěn)健性的影響。實證研究結果表明：控股股東的兩權分離顯著地降低了盈余穩(wěn)健性，而現(xiàn)金流權具有激勵效應，能夠顯著增強企業(yè)的盈余穩(wěn)健性；從控股股東性質來看，較之非國有控股上市公司而言，國有控股上市公司的盈余穩(wěn)健性更弱；進一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，國有控股上市公司的兩權分離對盈余穩(wěn)健性的損害作用更強，現(xiàn)金流權的激勵作用也更強。最后，根據(jù)實證結果，本文從優(yōu)化上市公司股權結構、加強債務治理功能和完善會計盈余為基礎的監(jiān)管和評價制度三個方面提出相應的政策建議，以期促進上市公司提供更穩(wěn)健的會計信息。
[Abstract]:In 2008, the subprime mortgage crisis broke out in the United States, which led to the global financial crisis. The fair value measurement property was questioned, and the conservatism principle aroused widespread concern in the accounting field. In China, the conservatism principle has experienced from scratch to existence. The process from weak to strong, but the phenomenon that listed companies in our country use radical accounting policies to whitewash profits is still quite common. Although abroad has carried out in-depth and extensive research on the principle of conservatism, and has made a series of research results. However, the economic system and institutional environment of our country are quite different from those of foreign countries. The institutional design in various aspects of our capital market is not perfect, for example, the degree of legal protection of investors is on the low side. Under the special system background of our country, this paper discusses the influence of the separation of two rights on the stability of earnings under the structure of concentrated ownership, that is, the separation of control rights and cash flow rights, and so on. It can further deepen the explanation of the motivation of earnings conservatism, and provide an empirical basis for controlling shareholders to encroach on the interests of minority shareholders under the structure of concentrated equity, and may further damage the quality of accounting information. It is also helpful for us to correctly understand the reasonable introduction of fair value to the accounting standards of new enterprises in our country, further strengthen the reasons for the application of conservatism, and provide an objective basis for evaluating the changes of accounting system in our country. This paper first introduces the theories of incomplete contract theory, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and corporate governance theory, as well as pyramid centralized ownership structure, split share structure reform, etc. Secondly, it discusses the influence of the separation of two rights on earnings conservatism, the incentive function of cash flow right and the different influence of controlling shareholders' nature on earnings conservatism. And put forward the research hypothesis according to the theoretical analysis. Thirdly, using the earnings / stock price reverse regression model, taking China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares main board listed companies as the sample from 2007 to 2011, this paper empirically tests the separation of the two rights. The empirical results show that the separation of the two rights of the controlling shareholder significantly reduces the earnings robustness, while the cash flow right has the incentive effect. From the perspective of the nature of controlling shareholders, the earnings robustness of state-owned holding listed companies is weaker than that of non-state-owned holding listed companies. The separation of the two rights of state-owned holding listed companies has a stronger damage to the robustness of earnings and a stronger incentive to the right of cash flow. Finally, according to the empirical results, this paper tries to optimize the equity structure of listed companies. Strengthening the function of debt management and perfecting the supervision and evaluation system based on accounting earnings, this paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions in order to promote the listed companies to provide more stable accounting information.
【學位授予單位】：湖南大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F233

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 李偉;周林潔;吳聯(lián)生;;高管持股與盈余穩(wěn)健性:協(xié)同效應與塹壕效應[J];財經(jīng)論叢;2011年06期

2 鐘宜彬;;會計穩(wěn)健性與公司治理的關系:替代或補充[J];財會月刊;2011年24期

3 王宇峰;蘇逶妍;;會計穩(wěn)健性與投資效率——來自中國證券市場的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];財經(jīng)理論與實踐;2008年05期

4 王毅春;孫林巖;;銀企關系、股權特征與會計穩(wěn)健性——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];財政研究;2006年07期

5 劉舒文;汪壽陽;;上市公司盈余穩(wěn)健和資產(chǎn)負債表穩(wěn)健的相關性[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2006年10期

6 裴麗娜;;高管持股對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響[J];合作經(jīng)濟與科技;2011年02期

7 曹宇;李琳;孫錚;;公司控制權對會計盈余穩(wěn)健性影響的實證研究[J];經(jīng)濟管理;2005年14期

8 溫章林;;管理層持股影響會計穩(wěn)健性的實證研究——來自2005～2008年中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];經(jīng)濟論壇;2010年02期

9 郝東洋;張?zhí)煳?;股利政策沖突、穩(wěn)健會計選擇與公司債務成本[J];經(jīng)濟與管理研究;2011年02期

10 江偉;;會計穩(wěn)健性與管理層薪酬對會計業(yè)績的敏感度[J];暨南學報(哲學社會科學版);2007年05期

本文編號：1573935