本文選題：董事的報(bào)酬 + 經(jīng)理的報(bào)酬　； 參考：《當(dāng)代法學(xué)》2013年02期

【摘要】：對(duì)有功于提升股東價(jià)值的經(jīng)理,對(duì)其報(bào)酬沒有進(jìn)行限制的必要。在美國(guó),引發(fā)經(jīng)理報(bào)酬問(wèn)題的也僅限于受公共資金支援的金融機(jī)構(gòu),而非全體公司。特別是在韓國(guó),經(jīng)理和職員之間的報(bào)酬差距并不十分顯著。我們可將報(bào)酬的上漲視為與現(xiàn)代企業(yè)在全球化經(jīng)營(yíng)過(guò)程中的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相應(yīng)的預(yù)期收益的提高,在這一觀點(diǎn)下,對(duì)經(jīng)理的報(bào)酬進(jìn)行規(guī)制的主張即有悖于資本主義精神。
[Abstract]:There is no need to limit the remuneration of managers who have contributed to the promotion of shareholder value. In the United States, managers' compensation issues are also limited to publicly funded financial institutions, not companies as a whole. Especially in Korea, the pay gap between managers and staff is not very significant. We can regard the increase of remuneration as the increase of expected income corresponding to the high risk of modern enterprises in the process of globalization. In this view, the idea of regulating the remuneration of managers runs counter to the spirit of capitalism.
【作者單位】： 韓國(guó)成均館大學(xué)法學(xué)院;長(zhǎng)春理工大學(xué)法學(xué)院;吉林省高級(jí)人民法院;
【分類號(hào)】：F03;F276.6
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本文編號(hào)：1922391