【摘要】：合法性鐵籠下的組織制度同型已經(jīng)得到了廣泛的研究，然而，組織內(nèi)部“越來越一致”的同時，組織之間關(guān)系又如何變化這一問題卻一直被制度學(xué)派所忽視。本研究試圖彌補(bǔ)這一缺失。研究選擇的案例是中國上市公司間獨立董事連鎖網(wǎng)絡(luò)，其伴隨獨立董事制度確立而來，并且迅速形成自身的特征。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)伴隨獨董制度的制度化過程形成了兩種異質(zhì)性網(wǎng)絡(luò)關(guān)系：“會計網(wǎng)”和“政治網(wǎng)”，并試圖回答這種差別何以形成以及網(wǎng)絡(luò)背后的意義問題，以嘗試拓展關(guān)于“市場的政治”的一些觀點。 本文的發(fā)現(xiàn)主要有三點：首先，檢驗了從現(xiàn)有研究和理論推論出的“國企優(yōu)勢地位”假設(shè)和“市場化程度”假設(shè)，發(fā)現(xiàn)它們對異質(zhì)性網(wǎng)絡(luò)的差異解釋能力有限；其次，通過分別對政治網(wǎng)和會計網(wǎng)的比較分析，研究說明了網(wǎng)絡(luò)異質(zhì)性的形成原因，并概括為三種對立機(jī)制：（1）政治網(wǎng)的“關(guān)系等級化”和會計網(wǎng)的“關(guān)系扁平化”，（2）政治網(wǎng)的“行業(yè)集聚”和會計網(wǎng)的“行業(yè)分割”；（3）政治網(wǎng)的“轄區(qū)庇護(hù)”和會計網(wǎng)的“腹地聲望”。這三個對立機(jī)制導(dǎo)致了兩個網(wǎng)絡(luò)的巨大差別；最后，就網(wǎng)絡(luò)背后的意義而言，我嘗試在這些機(jī)制的基礎(chǔ)上提出“權(quán)力地位投射”概念，以說明權(quán)力在政治網(wǎng)中通過以上幾種機(jī)制約束了企業(yè)間互動，結(jié)果把自身特征投射入市場領(lǐng)域并形塑了市場結(jié)構(gòu)，，而說明市場結(jié)構(gòu)如何不僅僅是經(jīng)濟(jì)力量的后果，同時也是社會和政治力量的后果，正是經(jīng)濟(jì)社會學(xué)最重要的議題之一。作為對組織同形理論的回應(yīng)，本研究認(rèn)為，在制度確立的過程中，組織間關(guān)系并非僅是固定不變地充當(dāng)制度傳播的“管道”，也并不在合法性的壓力下完全同質(zhì)化，而是存在自身的自主性，形成的組織間網(wǎng)絡(luò)既可能削弱制度本身的作用，也可能加強(qiáng)它的效力。
[Abstract]:The isomorphism of the organizational system under the legitimacy cage has been extensively studied. However, while the organization is "more and more consistent", the problem of how to change the relationship between the organizations has been ignored by the institutional school. This study attempts to remedy this deficiency. The selected case is the chain network of independent directors among listed companies in China, which comes with the establishment of the independent director system and forms its own characteristics. The study found that the institutionalization of the independent director system formed two heterogeneous network relationships: "accounting network" and "political network", and tried to answer the question of why this difference was formed and the significance behind the network. To try to expand some of the views about market politics. The main findings of this paper are as follows: firstly, we test the hypothesis of "superiority of state-owned enterprises" and "degree of marketization" inferred from existing researches and theories, and find that their ability to explain heterogeneity networks is limited; Secondly, through the comparative analysis of the political network and the accounting network, the paper explains the reasons for the heterogeneity of the network, and summarizes the three opposing mechanisms: (1) the "relationship hierarchy" of the political network and the "relationship flattening" of the accounting network. (2) the "industry agglomeration" of the political network and the "industry division" of the accounting network; (3) the "jurisdictional asylum" of the political network and the "hinterland prestige" of the accounting network. These three opposing mechanisms lead to a great difference between the two networks; Finally, as far as the meaning behind the network is concerned, I try to put forward the concept of "power position projection" on the basis of these mechanisms to illustrate that power restricts inter-firm interaction through the above mentioned mechanisms in the political network. The results show that the market structure is not only the consequence of economic power, but also the consequence of social and political power, which is one of the most important issues in economic sociology. In response to the theory of organizational homogeneity, this study holds that in the process of institution establishment, inter-organizational relations not only act as a "conduit" for institutional communication, nor are they completely homogenized under the pressure of legitimacy. It is the existence of its own autonomy, which may weaken the role of the system itself and strengthen its effectiveness.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：清華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F271;F832.51

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