【摘要】：對(duì)獨(dú)立董事的認(rèn)識(shí)不能局限于貨幣收益和家族關(guān)系,影響其行為的兩個(gè)主要因素是:聲譽(yù)和社會(huì)關(guān)系。通過(guò)我國(guó)中小板2007-2010年面板數(shù)據(jù)實(shí)證發(fā)現(xiàn):1)獨(dú)立董事與大股東的社會(huì)關(guān)系會(huì)促使獨(dú)立董事被俘獲;2)聲譽(yù)會(huì)促進(jìn)獨(dú)立董事的忠誠(chéng)化;3)聲譽(yù)會(huì)降低社會(huì)關(guān)系對(duì)獨(dú)立董事的俘獲程度,聲譽(yù)足夠高時(shí)甚至?xí)霈F(xiàn)獨(dú)立董事反向俘獲大股東的現(xiàn)象。因此,獨(dú)立董事的制度構(gòu)建和選聘,要充分考慮其社會(huì)因素,減少關(guān)系董事,增加高聲譽(yù)董事。
[Abstract]:The understanding of independent directors cannot be limited to monetary returns and family relations. The two main factors influencing their behavior are reputation and social relations. Through the panel data from 2007 to 2010, we find that: 1) the social relationship between independent directors and major shareholders will promote the capture of independent directors. 2) reputation will promote the loyalty of independent directors. 3) reputation will reduce the degree of capture of independent directors by social relations. When reputations are high enough, independent directors even reverse capture large shareholders. Therefore, the system construction and appointment of independent directors should take full account of its social factors, reduce the relationship of directors, and increase the high reputation of directors.
【作者單位】： 中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)院財(cái)經(jīng)戰(zhàn)略研究院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金重大項(xiàng)目“外部沖擊和結(jié)構(gòu)性轉(zhuǎn)換下的中高速增長(zhǎng)和中高端發(fā)展研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):15ZDC010);國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目“行政審批改革與產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩的制度成因研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):16CJY036) 教育部2011中國(guó)特色社會(huì)主義經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中心項(xiàng)目“認(rèn)識(shí)、適應(yīng)和引領(lǐng)經(jīng)濟(jì)新常態(tài)研究”的階段性成果
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F271;F832.51

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