【摘要】：投資決策行為對企業(yè)的發(fā)展至關(guān)重要,正確的投資決策會為企業(yè)帶來更多正的現(xiàn)金流量和良好的發(fā)展空間,然而長期以來我國上市公司或多或少都面臨著投資效率低下的問題,使得企業(yè)盈利能力和國民經(jīng)濟的健康快速發(fā)展受到嚴重的制約。與此同時,投資者保護立法和執(zhí)法水平的高低不僅對我國資本市場的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生深刻影響,同時,作為一種外部治理機制,也會對企業(yè)的投資決策產(chǎn)生不可忽視的影響。因此,本文以公司內(nèi)部控制權(quán)配置模式為切入點,研究、考察造成上市公司非效率投資行為背后的作用機制和利益動機,并將投資者保護這一外部治理機制結(jié)合起來考察三者之間的動態(tài)關(guān)系,以便為我國上市公司優(yōu)化其所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),維護各利益相關(guān)者的利益從而規(guī)范投資決策行為、提高企業(yè)投資效率提供一些參考,也為健全我國當前投資者保護體制的重要性和必要性提供一些理論啟示。為了研究控制權(quán)配置、投資者保護與投資效率的關(guān)系,本文首先采用文獻綜述法對已有研究成果進行系統(tǒng)地梳理,從而找到本文研究的重點,然后通過理論上的推理提出相應假設(shè),并通過構(gòu)建模型和對上市公司數(shù)據(jù)的實證分析對相關(guān)假設(shè)進行檢驗,最后對檢驗結(jié)果進行總結(jié)分析并提出政策建議。本文的實證檢驗表明:(1)股權(quán)分散制衡模式下,控制權(quán)比例的提高可以減少企業(yè)過度投資與投資不足問題;(2)相對控股模式下,控制權(quán)比例的提高使企業(yè)過度投資問題增加;(3)絕對控股模式下,控制權(quán)比例的提高會加重過度投資與投資不足;(4)投資者保護的提高可以直接減少控股股東造成的非效率投資;(5)企業(yè)處于絕對控股模式時,投資者保護的提高還可以削弱控制權(quán)比例過高引發(fā)的非效率投資。本文理論分析表明:當控制權(quán)配置模式處于股權(quán)分散制衡狀態(tài)時,企業(yè)的非效率投資行為將會隨控制權(quán)比例的提高而大大減少。而當企業(yè)存在控股股東時,控制權(quán)比例的提高會加重企業(yè)的非效率投資,而此時投資者保護水平的提高不僅有助于降低企業(yè)與外界的信息不對稱,從而減少企業(yè)由于融資約束帶來的投資不足問題;還可以減少大、小股東的代理問題,從而削弱控股股東過度投資的動機和能力。
[Abstract]:The behavior of investment decision is very important to the development of the enterprise. The correct investment decision will bring more positive cash flow and good development space for the enterprise. However, for a long time, the listed companies in our country have been faced with the problem of low investment efficiency more or less. The profitability of enterprises and the healthy and rapid development of the national economy are severely restricted. At the same time, the level of legislation and enforcement of investor protection not only has a profound impact on the development of China's capital market, but also, as an external governance mechanism, will have an unnegligible impact on the investment decisions of enterprises. Therefore, this paper takes the internal control allocation mode as the starting point, studies the mechanism and interest motive behind the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies. In order to optimize the ownership structure of the listed companies in our country and safeguard the interests of the stakeholders, the dynamic relationship between them is investigated by combining the external governance mechanism of investor protection, so as to standardize the investment decision-making behavior. Improving the investment efficiency of enterprises provides some references, and also provides some theoretical enlightenment for the importance and necessity of perfecting the current investor protection system in China. In order to study the relationship between the allocation of control rights, investor protection and investment efficiency, this paper systematically combs the existing research results by literature review method, and finds out the focus of this study. Then the hypothesis is put forward through theoretical reasoning, and the relevant hypotheses are tested by constructing models and empirical analysis of listed company data. Finally, the test results are summarized and analyzed and policy recommendations are put forward. The empirical test of this paper shows that: (1) under the mode of decentralized equity balance, the increase of control ratio can reduce the problem of overinvestment and underinvestment of enterprises; (2) under the mode of relative holding, The increase of the proportion of control rights increases the problem of overinvestment. (3) under the absolute holding mode, The increase of control ratio will aggravate the overinvestment and underinvestment; (4) the improvement of investor protection can directly reduce the inefficient investment caused by controlling shareholders; (5) when the enterprise is in absolute holding mode, Increased investor protection can also weaken inefficient investments caused by an excessive proportion of control rights. The theoretical analysis of this paper shows that when the allocation mode of control rights is in the state of decentralized equity balance, the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises will be greatly reduced with the increase of the proportion of control rights. When there are controlling shareholders in the enterprise, the increase of the proportion of control rights will aggravate the inefficient investment of the enterprise, and the improvement of the level of investor protection will not only help to reduce the information asymmetry between the enterprise and the outside world. It can also reduce the agency problem of large and small shareholders and weaken the motivation and ability of controlling shareholders to overinvest.
【學位授予單位】：西南交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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