【摘要】：股利政策作為上市公司的一項(xiàng)重要財(cái)務(wù)政策，一直以來(lái)受到人們的關(guān)注。當(dāng)前我國(guó)上市公司的股利政策仍存在很多問(wèn)題，部分公司的股利政策仍處在無(wú)序狀態(tài)。雖然證券監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)已經(jīng)出臺(tái)了許多政策法規(guī)，但股利政策的亂象仍然沒(méi)有從根本上得到遏制。探究股利政策的影響因素，對(duì)規(guī)范我國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)、完善上市公司的公司治理具有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文主要從兩個(gè)方面來(lái)研究股利政策的影響因素：首先是管理層權(quán)力對(duì)股利政策的影響，因?yàn)楣衫叩膶?shí)施會(huì)影響到管理層所能控制的現(xiàn)金總量，所以管理層完全有動(dòng)機(jī)也有能力來(lái)影響股利政策；其次是股本擴(kuò)張對(duì)股利政策的影響，因?yàn)榇嬖诠杀緮U(kuò)張動(dòng)機(jī)的上市公司可能會(huì)更傾向于股票股利的發(fā)放。本文選取了2010—2012年三年在滬深證券交易所上市并發(fā)行A股的制造業(yè)上市公司為樣本，通過(guò)總經(jīng)理是否兼任董事長(zhǎng)、董事會(huì)規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事人數(shù)和管理層持股比例來(lái)衡量管理層權(quán)力的大小，以公司規(guī)模、公司上市年限、每股未分配利潤(rùn)和每股資本公積作為股本擴(kuò)張?zhí)娲兞浚M(jìn)而提出自己的研究假設(shè)，并通過(guò)描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、相關(guān)性分析和回歸分析檢驗(yàn)了本文的研究假設(shè)，從而得出研究結(jié)論，并提出改進(jìn)上市公司股利政策監(jiān)管的政策建議。 通過(guò)實(shí)證分析，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)：管理層權(quán)力的大小直接影響著上市公司股利政策的選擇，上市公司股本擴(kuò)張的各個(gè)衡量指標(biāo)對(duì)股利政策的選擇也有顯著的影響。為了限制管理層滿足自身利益而濫用其權(quán)力影響上市公司股利政策，有必要對(duì)管理層權(quán)力的某些方面進(jìn)行限制。而對(duì)于那些股本擴(kuò)張需求比較小的上市公司，有必要強(qiáng)化強(qiáng)制分紅機(jī)制。只有加強(qiáng)對(duì)上市公司分紅的要求，，才能建立良好的投資者回報(bào)機(jī)制，推動(dòng)我國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)健康有序的發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Dividend policy as an important financial policy of listed companies, has been paid attention to. At present, there are still many problems in the dividend policy of listed companies in China, some of which are still in disorder. Although securities regulators have issued many policies and regulations, the chaos of dividend policy has not been fundamentally contained. Exploring the influencing factors of dividend policy is of practical significance to standardize the stock market and improve the corporate governance of listed companies. This paper mainly studies the influence factors of dividend policy from two aspects: firstly, the influence of management power on dividend policy, because the implementation of dividend policy will affect the total amount of cash that management can control. Therefore, the management is fully motivated and able to influence dividend policy, followed by the impact of equity expansion on dividend policy, because the listed companies with equity expansion motivation may be more inclined to pay dividends. This paper selects the manufacturing listed companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for three years from 2010 to 2012, and the size of the board of directors through whether the general manager is also the chairman or not. The number of independent directors and the proportion of management shares to measure the size of the management power, the size of the company, the company listed years, undistributed profits per share and capital reserves per share as a substitute for equity expansion variables, and then put forward their own research assumptions. Through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis, the research hypotheses are tested, and the conclusions are drawn, and some policy suggestions to improve the regulation of dividend policy of listed companies are put forward. Through empirical analysis, this paper finds that: the size of management power directly affects the choice of dividend policy of listed companies, and each measure of equity expansion of listed companies also has a significant impact on the choice of dividend policy. In order to limit the management to satisfy their own interests and abuse their power to influence the dividend policy of listed companies, it is necessary to restrict some aspects of management power. For those listed companies with relatively small demand for equity expansion, it is necessary to strengthen the compulsory dividend mechanism. Only by strengthening the requirement of dividends of listed companies can we establish a good investor return mechanism and promote the healthy and orderly development of our stock market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275;F272.91;F271

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