本文選題：負債融資 + 治理績效　； 參考：《山東財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：目前我國資本市場發(fā)展尚不成熟，上市公司經(jīng)營所需資本偏好于股票融資，除此之外主要資金來源為銀行貸款。從樣本數(shù)據(jù)資料來看無論國有控股上市公司還是非國有控股上市公司資產(chǎn)負債率都在50%左右，事實上負債融資已經(jīng)成為上市公司重要的資金來源。從研究情況來看，我國學(xué)者主要研究股權(quán)融資治理效應(yīng)，對于負債融資治理效應(yīng)的研究處于起步階段，并且沒有達成一致研究結(jié)論。隨著學(xué)者們對公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)和公司治理研究的逐漸深入，開始有學(xué)者關(guān)注負債融資在公司治理中的作用。負債融資作為公司的重要資金來源，債權(quán)人承擔(dān)著公司很大一部分經(jīng)營風(fēng)險，并且還面臨著被股東和管理層侵害利益的重大風(fēng)險，因此，為了提高公司的治理水平，保護債權(quán)人的合法利益，應(yīng)當(dāng)重視負債融資在公司治理中的作用。 本文運用公司治理理論、資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論等微觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)理論，結(jié)合規(guī)范分析、實證分析和比較分析等研究方法，對我國上市公司負債融資治理效應(yīng)進行深入研究和分析。本文前三章為理論分析，主要介紹了文章的選題背景、研究意義，通過文獻梳理總結(jié)國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的研究結(jié)論，運用相關(guān)理論進行推導(dǎo)分析。第四章與第五章為實證分析，在前三章理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上，結(jié)合我國上市公司獨特的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，選取滬深A(yù)股制造業(yè)上市公司為研究樣本，通過建立多元回歸模型實證分析負債融資的治理效應(yīng)。第六章在實證研究結(jié)果的基礎(chǔ)上總結(jié)研究結(jié)論，并針對研究結(jié)果提出政策建議。 本文通過理論分析和實證研究，對國有控股上市公司和非國有控股上市公司從股東結(jié)構(gòu)角度，進一步檢驗了負債融資的治理效應(yīng)，研究結(jié)果表明：（1）負債融資通過對管理層激勵與約束和破產(chǎn)機制等方面對公司治理具有積極效應(yīng)。（2）非國有控股公司負債融資的治理效應(yīng)要優(yōu)于國有控股公司的負債融資治理效應(yīng)。（3）無論國有控股公司還是非國有控股公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)集中度越高，負債融資治理效應(yīng)越弱。 本文的創(chuàng)新點有以下兩個方面：（1）從研究角度上，選取股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)角度分析負債融資公司治理效應(yīng)被弱化的原因。本文選取股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)視角進行研究，從股權(quán)集中度和股東性質(zhì)兩方面分別構(gòu)建模型，探究股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對負債融資績效的影響。（2）從研究對象上，原先學(xué)著研究大多是以全部上市公司為研究樣本，干擾因素太多。本文以制造業(yè)上市公司為樣本，，并進一步細分為國有控股上市公司和非國有控股上市公司兩個樣本組對比研究，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)負債融資具有積極地公司治理效應(yīng)，股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)會影響其治理作用的發(fā)揮，與大多數(shù)文獻負債融資與公司績效負相關(guān)的結(jié)論不同。
[Abstract]:At present, the capital market of our country is not mature, the capital that listed companies need to operate prefers to stock financing, in addition, the main source of capital is bank loan. According to the sample data, both state-owned holding listed companies and non-state-owned holding listed companies have an asset-liability ratio of about 50%. In fact, debt financing has become an important source of funds for listed companies. From the point of view of the research situation, Chinese scholars mainly study the governance effect of equity financing, and the research on the governance effect of debt financing is still in its infancy, and there is no consensus conclusion. With the deepening of scholars' research on corporate capital structure and corporate governance, some scholars began to pay attention to the role of debt financing in corporate governance. Debt financing is an important source of funds for the company, creditors bear a large part of the company's operating risks, and also face the significant risk of being infringed by shareholders and management. Therefore, in order to improve the corporate governance level, To protect the legitimate interests of creditors, we should attach importance to the role of debt financing in corporate governance. Based on the microeconomic theories such as corporate governance theory, capital structure theory, normative analysis, empirical analysis and comparative analysis, this paper makes an in-depth study and analysis on the governance effect of debt financing of listed companies in China. The first three chapters of this paper are theoretical analysis, mainly introduced the background of the article, the significance of the research, through literature review of domestic and foreign scholars' research conclusions, using the relevant theory to deduce and analyze. The fourth and fifth chapters are empirical analysis. On the basis of the theoretical analysis of the first three chapters, combined with the unique equity structure of listed companies in China, the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing listed companies are selected as the research samples. The governance effect of debt financing is analyzed empirically by establishing multiple regression model. Chapter six summarizes the conclusions based on the empirical results and puts forward some policy recommendations. Through theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper further examines the governance effect of debt financing on state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies from the perspective of shareholder structure. The results show that: (1) debt financing has a positive effect on corporate governance through incentive and constraint of management and bankruptcy mechanism. (2) the governance effect of debt financing of non-state-owned holding companies is better than that of state-owned holding companies. Governance effect of debt financing. (3) the higher the concentration of ownership structure of state-owned or non-state-owned holding companies, Debt financing governance effect is weaker. The innovation of this paper has the following two aspects: (1) from the perspective of research, select the equity structure to analyze the reasons for the weakening of corporate governance effect of debt financing. This article selects the equity structure angle of view to carry on the research, separately constructs the model from the equity concentration degree and the shareholder nature, explores the equity structure to the debt financing performance influence. (2) from the research object, The original study is mostly based on all listed companies as a sample, interference factors are too much. This article takes the manufacturing listed company as the sample, and further divides into the state-owned holding listed company and the non-state-owned holding listed company two sample groups contrast research, the research discovers that the debt financing has the positive corporate governance effect. The equity structure will affect its governance function, which is different from the conclusion that most literature debt financing has negative correlation with corporate performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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