本文選題：應(yīng)計盈余管理 + 真實盈余管理��； 參考：《江南大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著我國經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展,資本市場的不斷完善,越來越多的上市公司為我國的股市帶來新的動力和活力。公司定期發(fā)布的財務(wù)報告具有向利益相關(guān)者傳遞企業(yè)的經(jīng)營狀況以及財務(wù)成果的功能,但信息不對稱使管理人員能夠公布有利于他們自身的信息,隱藏并修飾其中的不利好信息。盈余管理的存在是普遍而客觀存在的現(xiàn)象,現(xiàn)有相關(guān)研究,主要內(nèi)容包括制度誘因、方式、動機和影響因素,對盈余管理對公司未來業(yè)績的影響的研究還未形成理論體系,尤其是對不同動機下高管進行盈余管理的經(jīng)濟后果研究比較少,且結(jié)論并不一致。因此,本文研究探索了不同動機下,高管實施的不同類型的盈余管理的經(jīng)濟后果。首先本文對盈余管理的概念、影響因素、動機,企業(yè)績效的概念、評價方法進行了梳理,并對國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的相關(guān)研究進行了歸納、整理與總結(jié)。同時也對理論基礎(chǔ)進行了說明,主要從契約理論、信號傳遞理論與委托代理理論三個方面進行了總結(jié)。接著,從三種動機(資本市場動機、契約動機以及政治成本動機)出發(fā),分別對應(yīng)計項目盈余管理以及真實活動管理對企業(yè)未來績效(財務(wù)績效與市場績效)的影響作出了相關(guān)假設(shè),并對研究假設(shè)作出相應(yīng)的研究設(shè)計,建立相應(yīng)的模型,并進行實證分析,并得出以下結(jié)論:資本市場動機下,基于企業(yè)股權(quán)再融資的盈余管理短期內(nèi)與企業(yè)的經(jīng)營績效正相關(guān),但是,在短期內(nèi)會出現(xiàn)比較明顯的反轉(zhuǎn);而基于避免虧損公司的盈余管理行為,有利于公司長期績效的增長,起到了信息傳遞的正向的作用。契約動機下,盈余管理行為對企業(yè)的市場價值的長期影響為負(fù)向。在政治成本動機下,盈余管理行為往往是企業(yè)預(yù)期稅率下降時進行的負(fù)向利潤調(diào)整,其對企業(yè)未來績效的影響并不顯著。最后,從企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理與外部監(jiān)督兩個方面的提出建議,促進企業(yè)以及整個市場更好的發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:With the development of economy and the improvement of capital market, more and more listed companies bring new impetus and vitality to our stock market. The financial reports issued regularly by the company have the function of transmitting the business status and financial results to the stakeholders, but the information asymmetry enables managers to publish information that is beneficial to them. Hide and embellish unfavorable information. The existence of earnings management is a universal and objective phenomenon. The existing relevant studies, including institutional incentives, ways, motives and influencing factors, have not yet formed a theoretical system for the impact of earnings management on the future performance of companies. Especially, there are few studies on the economic consequences of earnings management for executives with different motivations, and the conclusions are not consistent. Therefore, this paper explores the economic consequences of different types of earnings management implemented by executives under different motivations. First of all, the concept of earnings management, influencing factors, motivation, concept of corporate performance, evaluation methods are combed, and domestic and foreign scholars of relevant research are summarized, collated and summarized. At the same time, the theoretical basis is explained, mainly from contract theory, signal transfer theory and principal-agent theory. Then, starting with three motivations (capital market motivation, contractual motivation and political cost motive), Corresponding to the impact of project earnings management and real activity management on the future performance of enterprises (financial performance and market performance), the relevant assumptions are made, and the corresponding research and design of the research hypotheses are made, and the corresponding models are established. And the empirical analysis, and draw the following conclusions: under the motivation of capital market, earnings management based on corporate equity refinancing in the short term is positively related to the business performance, but in the short term, there will be a more obvious reversal; In order to avoid the loss of earnings management behavior, it is conducive to the growth of the company's long-term performance, and plays a positive role in the transmission of information. Under the motivation of contract, the long-term effect of earnings management on the market value of enterprises is negative. Under the motivation of political cost, earnings management behavior is usually the negative profit adjustment when the expected tax rate drops, and the effect on the future performance of the enterprise is not significant. Finally, suggestions are put forward from two aspects of internal governance and external supervision to promote the better development of enterprises and the whole market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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本文編號：2074749