本文選題：操縱交易 + 信息創(chuàng)造　； 參考：《中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)分置改革之后,定向增發(fā)作為一種新的股權(quán)融資方式,一推出就受到了市場(chǎng)上的關(guān)注和青睞,逐步成為了中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)上股權(quán)融資的主流方式。那么在定向增發(fā)中,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者充當(dāng)了什么的角色?他們是否有私人信息?如果有,能不能夠利用私人信息獲得更多更好的股票?定向增發(fā)中,是否存在利益輸送行為? 文章重點(diǎn)回顧了定向增發(fā)和利益輸送有關(guān)的研究,并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了我們的設(shè)想。文章選擇了2008-2011年間的401個(gè)定向增發(fā)樣本,并將機(jī)構(gòu)投資者按照鎖定期長(zhǎng)短,將36月鎖定期的劃分為大股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方,將12個(gè)月鎖定期的劃分為金融機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和非金融機(jī)構(gòu)投資者,并分別進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析。 研究結(jié)果顯示,在定向增發(fā)中,12月鎖定期的非金融和金融機(jī)構(gòu)投資者配股比例越高,增發(fā)公司未來(lái)的收益就越低,增發(fā)的折扣也越低；而股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方配股比例越高,增發(fā)公司的未來(lái)收益就越高,增發(fā)的折扣也越高。 文章的結(jié)論是,第一,相比大股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方,無(wú)論是非金融類(lèi)還是金融類(lèi)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在定向增發(fā)中都沒(méi)有信息優(yōu)勢(shì),不能在收益更好的公司的定向增發(fā)中獲得更多的配股,而大股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方擁有信息優(yōu)勢(shì),并且他們利用了這種優(yōu)勢(shì)來(lái)獲得收益；第二,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者沒(méi)有利用定向增發(fā)的信息操縱股價(jià),機(jī)構(gòu)投資者獲得配股越多,增發(fā)的折扣會(huì)越小,增發(fā)的價(jià)格越高。第三,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持有公司的股份越多,其增發(fā)的價(jià)格越高,這對(duì)中小股東是有利的。所以定向增發(fā)中,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的參與對(duì)于全體投資者來(lái)說(shuō)都是有利的,而大股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方在定向增發(fā)中則完全充當(dāng)了操縱交易的一種角色。第四,大股東及其關(guān)聯(lián)方通過(guò)定向增發(fā)輸送利益。
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure, as a new way of equity financing, directional additional issuance has attracted the attention and favor of the market, and has gradually become the mainstream way of equity financing in China's capital market. So what is the role of institutional investors in targeted placement? Do they have personal information? If so, can we use private information to get more and better stock? Is there a behavior of interest transmission in directional additional issuance? In this paper, we review the research of directional additional issuance and benefit transmission, and put forward our ideas. In this paper, 401 additional directional issuance samples were selected from 2008-2011, and institutional investors were divided into major shareholders and their related parties according to the length of lock period. The 12-month locking period is divided into financial institutional investors and non-financial institutional investors. The research results show that the higher the proportion of non-financial and financial institutional investors who issue additional shares in December, the lower the future earnings and the lower the discount of additional issuance, and the higher the proportion of shareholders and their related parties. The higher the company's future earnings, the higher the discount. The conclusions are as follows: first, compared with large shareholders and their related parties, both non-financial and financial institutional investors have no information advantage in private placement, and can not obtain more rights issues in the private placement of companies with better returns. Large shareholders and their affiliates have an information advantage, and they take advantage of this advantage to make a profit. Second, institutional investors do not manipulate stock prices by using the information of targeted placement, and the more institutional investors get a rights issue, the more they get a rights issue. The smaller the discount, the higher the price. Third, the more institutional investors hold shares in the company, the higher the issue price, which is beneficial to minority shareholders. Therefore, the participation of institutional investors is beneficial to all investors, while the majority shareholders and their related parties play a role in the manipulation of the transaction. Fourth, the major shareholders and their related parties through the directional distribution of additional transmission of benefits.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F832.39

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