本文選題：違規(guī)關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保 + 公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)�。� 參考：《內(nèi)蒙古財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：運(yùn)用擔(dān)保的方式來(lái)融資,是借貸雙方和銀行等金融機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)同的一種高效的輔助融資方式,同時(shí)也是信貸市場(chǎng)上用來(lái)分散風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的一種非常普遍的手段。在我國(guó),由于一些歷史因素,如企業(yè)的集團(tuán)化發(fā)展、國(guó)企改制上市等,導(dǎo)致資本市場(chǎng)上股權(quán)集中程度高的上市公司相當(dāng)普遍。所以,目前我國(guó)市場(chǎng)上有一大部分的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)主體為集團(tuán)化的企業(yè),運(yùn)用擔(dān)保的手段去實(shí)現(xiàn)集團(tuán)的融資目的,具有效率高、成本低等優(yōu)點(diǎn),所以集團(tuán)企業(yè)更愿意通過(guò)這種方式去實(shí)現(xiàn)其籌資目標(biāo),而關(guān)聯(lián)方間的擔(dān)保也就是關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保又是集團(tuán)化上市企業(yè)最常用的擔(dān)保類型,當(dāng)然也有一些企業(yè)會(huì)采用其他的擔(dān)保形式,例如連環(huán)擔(dān)保、互相擔(dān)保等。根據(jù)我國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)每年披露的違規(guī)公告,關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保常常出現(xiàn)問(wèn)題,即違規(guī)關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保時(shí)有發(fā)生。大部分的違規(guī)關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保,關(guān)聯(lián)方之間利用上市公司的身份進(jìn)行擔(dān)保,若到期時(shí)接受擔(dān)保方無(wú)法償還債務(wù),則需由提供擔(dān)保方承擔(dān)連帶責(zé)任,從而也就完成了關(guān)聯(lián)方之間的財(cái)富轉(zhuǎn)移,大股東挖掘“隧道”將中小股東的財(cái)富向自己轉(zhuǎn)移。關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保特別是違規(guī)關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保增大了擔(dān)保提供者的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),容易使其陷入財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī),影響其企業(yè)價(jià)值。同時(shí),由于嚴(yán)重的信息不對(duì)稱,銀行等金融機(jī)構(gòu)面臨著難以收回資金的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),情況嚴(yán)重時(shí)會(huì)影響整個(gè)金融系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定性。本文基于以上背景,將從上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)及其財(cái)務(wù)特征兩個(gè)方面出發(fā),分析哪些內(nèi)部因素影響上市公司違規(guī)關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保的發(fā)生,以及如何影響。本文選取2008-2015年間被中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)披露的存在違規(guī)行為的關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保的滬深兩市的公司為樣本,通過(guò)理論分析及實(shí)證研究。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)方面,當(dāng)公司大股東的持股比例較低時(shí),其可以通過(guò)公司獲得的私人收益是相對(duì)較少的,此時(shí)大股東就更愿意通過(guò)一些手段去侵占與中小股東的共享利益,例如關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保,但是由于其持股比例較低,難以控制企業(yè),限制了其實(shí)施侵占行為;隨著大股東持股比例的提高,增強(qiáng)了其對(duì)企業(yè)的控制能力,方便于其侵占與中小股東的共享利益,關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保作為侵占方式的一種也隨之增多;隨著大股東持股比例的繼續(xù)提高達(dá)到一定程度之后,縱然其幾乎擁有對(duì)企業(yè)的絕對(duì)控制能力,但是此時(shí)大股東的私人利益與公司的利益趨向一致,其若仍然選擇侵占與中小股東的共享利益,為此所付出的私人成本比較高,所以此時(shí)大股東一般會(huì)選擇通過(guò)正常的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)來(lái)獲得更多的私人收益。另一方面,如若大股東實(shí)施侵占行為,持股比例較高的中型股東為了避免其自身利益受到損害,會(huì)聯(lián)合起來(lái)對(duì)大股東的侵占行為進(jìn)行制止。董事會(huì)方面,本文證明了獨(dú)立董事可以對(duì)違規(guī)關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保等違規(guī)行為起到一定的抑制作用;當(dāng)董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理兩職合一時(shí),董事會(huì)常常難以高效的履行其職責(zé),總經(jīng)理邊對(duì)公司的運(yùn)營(yíng)發(fā)展做出決策,邊評(píng)價(jià)和考核這些決策的制定和執(zhí)行,從而也就難以公平公正的處理一些關(guān)于自身利益的問(wèn)題,總經(jīng)理此時(shí)更加偏向于追求私人收益,而非公司的利益,所以也就為違規(guī)的關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保的發(fā)生創(chuàng)造了條件。財(cái)務(wù)特征方面,本文證明如果上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)狀況基本良好,公司大股東完全可以通過(guò)正常的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)獲得想要的回報(bào),或者采用更加直接的手段去侵占公司利益,而不太可能選擇違規(guī)關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保這樣復(fù)雜的方式去獲取其想要的收益,違規(guī)關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保失去了其發(fā)生的動(dòng)機(jī);反之,當(dāng)公司財(cái)務(wù)狀況欠佳時(shí),股東通過(guò)努力經(jīng)營(yíng)難以獲得良好的投資回報(bào),此時(shí)大股東們才會(huì)選擇通過(guò)違規(guī)關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保這樣的行為來(lái)侵占公司的利益。同時(shí)本文還通過(guò)以上影響因素的分析,為違規(guī)關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保的市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管尋找途徑,并提供了一些可行的監(jiān)管建議和關(guān)注要點(diǎn)。
[Abstract]:Financing by means of guarantee is a kind of efficient auxiliary financing method identified by the borrowers and banks and other financial institutions. It is also a very common means used to disperse the risk in the credit market. In our country, some historical factors, such as the group development of enterprises and the reform and listing of state-owned enterprises, have led to the capital market stock. The listed companies with high concentration of rights are quite common. So, at present, a large proportion of the main body of economic activities in our country is a group of enterprises, using the means of guarantee to realize the purpose of the group's financing, which has the advantages of high efficiency and low cost. So the group enterprise is more willing to realize its financing goal through this way, and the association is related. The guarantee between the parties is also the most commonly used guarantee type of the group listed enterprises, and of course some enterprises will adopt other forms of guarantee, such as serial guarantee, mutual guarantee, etc. according to the annual disclosure of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the related guarantee often appears problems, that is, the violation associated guarantee occurs. As a guarantee, the affiliated parties use the identity of the listed company to guarantee. If the guarantor is unable to repay the debt at the time of maturity, the guarantor should be provided with the joint and several liability, thus the wealth transfer between the affiliated parties is completed, and the large shareholders excavate the "tunnel" to transfer the wealth of the small and medium shareholders to themselves. In particular, the violation associated guarantee increases the financial risk of the guarantee provider, which makes it easy to fall into the financial crisis and affect its enterprise value. At the same time, because of the serious information asymmetry, banks and other financial institutions are faced with the risk of difficult to recover funds, which will affect the stability of the entire financial system when the situation is serious. This article is based on the above background, From the two aspects of the listed company's governance structure and its financial characteristics, it will analyze the influence of the internal factors on the occurrence and influence of the listed companies' violation related guarantee. This article selects the companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, which have been disclosed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2008-2015 years, as a sample of the Shanghai Shenzhen two cities, through theoretical analysis and As a result, it is found that, when the shareholding ratio of the company's large shareholders is low, the private income that can be obtained by the company is relatively small. At this time, the large shareholders are more willing to encroach on the shared interests with the small and medium shareholders by means of some means, such as the associated guarantee, but it is difficult because of its low share ratio. The control of the enterprise is limited by the act of encroachment; with the increase of the shareholding ratio of the large shareholders, its control ability to the enterprise is enhanced, and it is convenient for its occupation of the shared interests with the small and medium shareholders. It almost owns the absolute control ability to the enterprise, but at this time the private interests of the large shareholders are consistent with the interests of the company. If they still choose to occupy the shared interests with the small and medium shareholders, the private cost is high, so the large shareholders will generally choose to gain more private income through normal production and operation. On the other hand, if the large shareholders carry out the encroachment behavior, the middle-sized shareholders with higher shareholding proportion will join up to stop the major shareholders' invading behavior in order to avoid their own interests. In the board of directors, this paper proves that the independent director can play a certain inhibitory effect on the violation of the violation related guarantee. The board of directors, in conjunction with the general manager's two job, is often difficult to perform its duties efficiently. The general manager makes decisions on the operation and development of the company, evaluates and examines the formulation and implementation of these decisions, so that it is difficult to deal with some questions about their own interests fairly and impartially, and the general manager is more inclined to pursue private benefits at this time. Rather than the interests of the company, it also creates conditions for the occurrence of an irregularities. In terms of financial characteristics, this article proves that if the financial situation of the listed company is basically good, the large shareholders of the company can get the desired return by the normal production and operation, or use more direct means to invade the company's interests, but not It is likely that it is too likely to choose a complex way to obtain the desired profit in such a way as a violation associated guarantee, which loses its motivation; on the other hand, when the company's financial situation is not good, the shareholders will not be able to get good returns through hard work, and the big shareholders will choose to invade through the behavior of the violation Association guarantee. At the same time, through the analysis of the above factors, this paper seeks to find a way for the market regulation of illegal Association guarantee, and provides some feasible supervision suggestions and main points of concern.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：內(nèi)蒙古財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F275;F832.51

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