本文選題：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資 + 創(chuàng)業(yè)板�。� 參考：《重慶工商大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：作為創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)IPO的主要市場(chǎng),中小板市場(chǎng)和創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)的推出,讓風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的退出渠道得到很大的改善,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資進(jìn)入了高速發(fā)展時(shí)期。本文試圖從理論上分析風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)IPO過(guò)程中承銷商定價(jià)的作用機(jī)理,以及由風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資參與帶來(lái)的二級(jí)市場(chǎng)抑價(jià)率影響。然后通過(guò)對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板數(shù)據(jù)檢驗(yàn),探究風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資給創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO企業(yè)帶來(lái)的市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)。本文通過(guò)構(gòu)建四方主體的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,分析風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)企業(yè)IPO的作用機(jī)理,并分析由此帶來(lái)的IPO抑價(jià)率影響。理論分析的結(jié)論為:(1)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的聲譽(yù)會(huì)影響企業(yè)IPO時(shí)的發(fā)行價(jià)格,相比低聲譽(yù)VC背景企業(yè),高聲譽(yù)VC背景企業(yè)的定價(jià)應(yīng)該更高;(2)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的參與會(huì)影響企業(yè)IPO時(shí)的發(fā)行價(jià)格,相比無(wú)VC背景企業(yè),有VC背景企業(yè)的定價(jià)應(yīng)該更高;(3)由于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的監(jiān)督和認(rèn)證效應(yīng),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的參與可以顯著降低優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)的抑價(jià)率,不會(huì)影響劣質(zhì)企業(yè)的抑價(jià)率。實(shí)證部分選取了2009年10月至2015年12月在創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)上市的491家上市公司作為研究樣本。通過(guò)查看首發(fā)招股說(shuō)明書和投中集團(tuán)的中國(guó)投資年會(huì)的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),確定了291家VC背景企業(yè)和200家無(wú)VC背景企業(yè),通過(guò)差異分析和多元回歸分析,對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的IPO市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證。研究結(jié)果表明,第一,有VC背景的企業(yè)會(huì)吸引更高聲譽(yù)的中介機(jī)構(gòu),驗(yàn)證了認(rèn)證效應(yīng)和市場(chǎng)力量效應(yīng),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的參與對(duì)發(fā)行費(fèi)率的影響并不顯著,可以通過(guò)中介機(jī)構(gòu)聲譽(yù)間接影響發(fā)行費(fèi)率;第二,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的聲譽(yù)能夠顯著影響企業(yè)的發(fā)行市盈率,高聲譽(yù)VC背景企業(yè)可以獲得更高的定價(jià);第三,有VC背景的企業(yè)在IPO前后的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)更好,但是在企業(yè)成功上市后,這種優(yōu)勢(shì)逐漸喪失,差距逐漸縮小。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的監(jiān)督效應(yīng)得到檢驗(yàn),逆向選擇效應(yīng)未得到證實(shí);第四,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的IPO市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)在二級(jí)市場(chǎng)上的表現(xiàn)并不明顯,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的參與對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和成交量換手率的影響都不顯著,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的參與并不能顯著影響企業(yè)的IPO抑價(jià)率,說(shuō)明我國(guó)IPO的高抑價(jià)現(xiàn)象主要是由于二級(jí)市場(chǎng)投資者的投資熱情拉高了首日收盤價(jià)導(dǎo)致的,一級(jí)市場(chǎng)的定價(jià)偏低并不是該現(xiàn)象出現(xiàn)的主要原因。文章的最后在總結(jié)本文研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,分別從促進(jìn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資發(fā)展、投資者理性投資和創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)發(fā)展三個(gè)方面提出發(fā)展建議。
[Abstract]:As the main market of IPO, the introduction of small and medium-sized market and gem market has greatly improved the exit channel of venture capital, and venture capital has entered a period of rapid development. This paper attempts to theoretically analyze the mechanism of underwriter pricing in the process of IPO by venture capital and the influence of secondary market underpricing caused by venture capital participation. Then, through the data test of gem, the paper explores the market effect of venture capital on gem IPO enterprises. This paper analyzes the mechanism of venture capital on enterprise IPO and the influence of IPO underpricing rate by constructing the dynamic game model of quadripartite main body. The conclusion of theoretical analysis is that the reputation of venture capital will affect the issuing price of IPO, and the pricing of high reputation VC background should be higher than that of low reputation VC background.) the participation of venture capital will affect the issuing price of IPO. Compared with enterprises with no VC background, the pricing of enterprises with VC background should be higher than that of enterprises with VC background. Because of the supervision and certification effect of venture capital, the participation of venture capital can significantly reduce the underpricing rate of high-quality enterprises, and will not affect the underpricing rate of inferior enterprises. The empirical part selects 491 listed companies listed in gem from October 2009 to December 2015 as the research sample. By looking at the prospectus of the initial public offering and the relevant data of the China Investment Conference of the China Investment Group, 291 VC background enterprises and 200 non-VC backed enterprises were determined, and the difference analysis and multiple regression analysis were used. The IPO market effect of venture capital is verified. The results show that, first, enterprises with VC background will attract more reputable intermediaries, which verifies the certification effect and market power effect, and the participation of venture capital has no significant impact on the issue rate. It can influence the issuing rate indirectly through the reputation of the intermediary; second, the reputation of venture capital can significantly affect the price-earnings ratio of the enterprise, and the high reputation VC background enterprises can obtain higher pricing; third, The enterprises with VC background have better operating performance before and after IPO, but after the successful listing, this advantage is gradually lost and the gap is gradually narrowed. The supervision effect of venture capital has been tested, and the adverse selection effect has not been proved. Fourthly, the IPO market effect of venture capital is not obvious in the secondary market. The participation of venture capital has no significant influence on institutional investors and turnover, but the participation of venture capital can not significantly affect the IPO underpricing rate of enterprises. It shows that the high underpricing of IPO in China is mainly due to the investors' enthusiasm in the secondary market and the high closing price on the first day. The low pricing in the primary market is not the main reason for this phenomenon. Finally, on the basis of summarizing the research results of this paper, the paper puts forward some suggestions from three aspects: promoting the development of venture capital, investors' rational investment and the development of gem market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 曹婷;馮照楨;溫軍;;我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板異質(zhì)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資及其聯(lián)合持股與IPO抑價(jià)關(guān)系研究[J];上海經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2015年12期

2 劉祥東;范彬;劉澄;;風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)IPO抑價(jià)的影響——來(lái)自創(chuàng)業(yè)板的證據(jù)[J];金融理論與實(shí)踐;2015年09期

3 李曜;王秀軍;;我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)上風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的認(rèn)證效應(yīng)與市場(chǎng)力量[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2015年02期

4 張學(xué)勇;廖理;羅遠(yuǎn)航;;券商背景風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資與公司IPO抑價(jià)——基于信息不對(duì)稱的視角[J];中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2014年11期

5 余琰;羅煒;李怡宗;朱琪;;國(guó)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的投資行為和投資成效[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2014年02期

6 沈維濤;葉小杰;徐偉;;風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在企業(yè)IPO中存在擇時(shí)行為嗎——基于我國(guó)中小板和創(chuàng)業(yè)板的實(shí)證研究[J];南開管理評(píng)論;2013年02期

7 余楠;費(fèi)一文;;私募股權(quán)投資目標(biāo)公司首次上市發(fā)行抑價(jià)分析[J];南方經(jīng)濟(jì);2013年03期

8 張亦春;洪圖;;創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO市盈率與超募率的影響因素研究——基于券商聲譽(yù)及私募股權(quán)投資的實(shí)證分析[J];廈門大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2012年03期

9 張學(xué)勇;廖理;;風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景與公司IPO:市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)與內(nèi)在機(jī)理[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2011年06期

10 陳工孟;俞欣;寇祥河;;風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資參與對(duì)中資企業(yè)首次公開發(fā)行折價(jià)的影響——不同證券市場(chǎng)的比較[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2011年05期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 于博;風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資與企業(yè)價(jià)值創(chuàng)造研究[D];浙江大學(xué);2014年

2 朱暉;基于創(chuàng)業(yè)板的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資IPO市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)研究[D];華南理工大學(xué);2014年

3 袁繼國(guó);風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對(duì)公司治理的作用機(jī)制研究[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2013年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 趙力;風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資及其行為特征對(duì)于創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO抑價(jià)率的影響[D];重慶大學(xué);2016年

，

本文編號(hào)：1945699