本文選題：控制權 + 股權結構�。� 參考：《東華大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：在我國的資本市場上,一直普遍存在著幾個根深蒂固的問題,股權集中度過高、股權制衡度偏低、大股東控制著公司的所有權、控制權市場的難以形成、小股東地位的缺失、大股東對于中小股東利益的侵害等等,一直以來,上市公司的控制權結構與公司經營績效的關系是學術界研究的熱點問題,關于股權結構對于公司績效的影響關系,則有兩種理論解釋,分別是代理理論和控制權理論,不同學者對于這些理論也有不同的看法。而對于控制權對公司績效的影響,學者們的觀點則有著更大的差異,有人認為因為存在大股東控制權與公司所有權的一致性,所以其對于公司的經營績效有著正面的激勵作用,也有人認為正是因為兩權的一致性存在,大股東在公司治理過程中,對于公司利益更可能出現(xiàn)侵占效應,而正是在在這些研究的過程中,學者們在已有理論的基礎上延伸出了諸如兩權分離理論、代理成本理論在內的諸多新的理論體系,從而吏加豐富了這一熱點問題的研究價值。 本文以我國深圳交易所上市的A股主板和中小板上市公司為研究樣本,在已有的理論基礎上,綜合國內外有關控制權與公司績效內在關系方面的一系列研究成果,深入分析了由上市公司股權結構所形成的控制權對于公司績效的影響問題,從描述性分析到定量實證分析,再到創(chuàng)新性定性分析,從股權集中度、股權制衡度、創(chuàng)新性Banzhaf權力指數(shù)等多角度對于上市公司控制權與經營績效之間的關系進行深度刻畫,回答了諸如大股東手中的控制權對于公司績效是否有影響、其他股東對于大股東的股權制衡程度這一指標對于公司績效是否有影響、有著怎樣的影響等等問題。 全文共分為三大部分,具體結構要點如下： 第一部分：理論研究,該部分共三章,第一章緒論,簡要介紹本文的研究背景、意義、方法、框架及創(chuàng)新點；第二章理論基礎及文獻綜述,主要界定了控制權、股權結構、公司績效等相關概念,并對于國內外一些經典理論作一概述及評述,并對已有的研究結果進行一番總結及評述。 第二部分：實證分析,該部分是全文的核心部分,共兩章,第三章現(xiàn)狀分析,通過對于643個研究樣本近三年的股權結構及績效數(shù)據(jù)進行描述性統(tǒng)計分析,以找出其中一些內在規(guī)律；第四章定量及創(chuàng)新性分析,前半部分主要對于本次研究中選取的控制權及公司績效指標進行實證定量分析,以找出變量間的隱藏規(guī)律；后半部分則創(chuàng)新性地引入了Banzhaf權力指數(shù)這一指標,基于新指標通過對于已有樣本的重新歸類,從中挖掘前述研究中所未能發(fā)現(xiàn)的研究結論。 第三部分：結論建議,該部分共一章,主要是對于本文第二部分兩章內容所得出的研究結論進行總結并加以分析,從中獲得一定的啟示,并同時整理出本文研究中不可避免的局限性問題。政策建議則是通過總結全文的研究,對于我國上市公司控制權現(xiàn)狀及其影響,針對性的提出政策建議。
[Abstract]:In China's capital market, there have always been several deep-rooted problems, such as high concentration of equity, low balance of equity, large shareholders controlling the ownership of the company, the difficulty of forming control market, the lack of the status of small shareholders, the infringement of the interests of the large shareholders by the large shareholders and so on, and the control of the listed companies. The relationship between the structure of the right and the performance of the company is a hot issue in the academic circle. There are two theoretical explanations about the influence of the ownership structure on the performance of the company, namely, the theory of agency and the right of control, and the different scholars have different views on these theories. There are more differences in views. Some people think that because of the existence of the consistency between the control rights of the large shareholders and the ownership of the company, it has a positive effect on the performance of the company's operating performance. Some people think that it is precisely because of the consistency of the two rights that the large shareholders are more likely to have an encroachment effect on the company's interests in the process of corporate governance. And it is in the process of these studies that scholars have extended many new theoretical systems, such as the theory of two rights separation and the theory of agency cost, on the basis of the existing theories, thus enriching the research value of this hot issue.
In this paper, based on a series of research results on the internal and external relations between control rights and company performance on the basis of existing theories, the A shares and small and medium board listed companies listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange in China are studied, and the influence of the control right formed by the ownership structure of the listed companies on the performance of the company is deeply analyzed. From descriptive analysis to quantitative empirical analysis, and then to innovative qualitative analysis, the relationship between control rights and operating performance of listed companies is deeply depicted from the angles of ownership concentration, equity balance, and innovative Banzhaf power index, which answers whether the control rights in the hands of large shareholders have an impact on the performance of the company. Other shareholders' equity checks and balances of large shareholders have an impact on corporate performance and so on.
The full text is divided into three parts. The main points of the structure are as follows:
The first part: a total of three chapters, the first chapter is introduction, which briefly introduces the research background, significance, method, framework and innovation points of this article; the second chapter is the theoretical basis and literature review, which mainly defines the related concepts of control rights, ownership structure, company performance and so on. The results of the research have been summarized and reviewed.
The second part: empirical analysis, this part is the core part of the full text, a total of two chapters and third chapters of the status analysis. Through the descriptive statistical analysis of the stock ownership structure and performance data of the 643 research samples for nearly three years, to find out some of the internal rules; the fourth chapter quantitative and innovative analysis, the first half of this study is mainly for this study. In order to find out the hidden law among the variables, the control right and the company performance index are analyzed by empirical quantitative analysis, and the second half is innovatively introduced the index of Banzhaf power index. Based on the new index, the research conclusions that have not been found in the previous research are excavated.
The third part: the conclusion is that the part of this part is a common chapter, which is mainly a summary and analysis of the conclusions obtained from the content of the second part and the two chapter. The present situation and influence of the control rights of city companies, and put forward policy recommendations accordingly.
【學位授予單位】：東華大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F224

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