本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板 + 信號傳遞理論��； 參考：《河北工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：股利分配是上市公司進行融資、投資后對股東進行的投資回報分配，是現(xiàn)代公司理財活動的三大核心內(nèi)容之一，處于企業(yè)財務(wù)決策的重要地位。由于企業(yè)的所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)相互分離，導(dǎo)致了投資者與經(jīng)營者之間存在著信息不對稱。上市公司的經(jīng)營者擁有更多關(guān)于公司未來盈利能力、營運能力、成長能力等各方面的私有信息。而股利的信號傳遞理論認(rèn)為，在信息不對稱以及市場的不完全有效下，上市公司經(jīng)營者可以將股利分配行為作為一種有效信號向投資者傳遞關(guān)于企業(yè)未來經(jīng)營前景的信息。對于我國在2009年為高新技術(shù)企業(yè)融資剛剛推出的創(chuàng)業(yè)板，其呈現(xiàn)出了與主板市場大相徑庭的股利分配特點，即高分紅、高轉(zhuǎn)增的股利分配政策，引起了市場投資者的廣泛關(guān)注。本文旨在探究處于成長初期的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高分紅、高送轉(zhuǎn)的股利政策是否具有信號效應(yīng)，是否向投資者傳遞出關(guān)于企業(yè)未來經(jīng)營前景的信號，并以此來引導(dǎo)投資者進行投資。 本文以創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司2009年上市之初至2012年的股利分配事件為研究樣本，，應(yīng)用股利的信號傳遞理論，采用規(guī)范研究和實證研究相結(jié)合的方法，分析了我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司股利政策的信號傳遞效應(yīng)。研究結(jié)果表明，創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的股利政策確實具有信號傳遞效應(yīng)，并且對于不同的股利政策會引起不同的市場反應(yīng)。同時就股利信號的強度來說，股利公告的市場反應(yīng)隨著未預(yù)期股利的大小而變化。然而通過進一步的回歸分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，作為信號的股利政策傳遞出的并不是企業(yè)未來的經(jīng)營前景，而是當(dāng)前的經(jīng)營業(yè)績。由此也為規(guī)范創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的股利分配行為和投資者的投資行為提供了一些合理建議。
[Abstract]:Dividend distribution, which is one of the three core contents of financial management activities of modern companies, is one of the three core contents of the financial activities of modern companies, and it is an important position in the financial decision-making of enterprises. Due to the separation of ownership and management right, there is information asymmetry between investors and managers. Managers of listed companies have more private information about the company's future profitability, operating capacity, growth capacity and so on. In the theory of signal transmission of dividend, under the condition of asymmetric information and incomplete market, managers of listed companies can take dividend distribution behavior as an effective signal to transmit information about the future business prospects of enterprises to investors. For the gem, which has just been launched for high-tech enterprises in 2009, it presents the characteristics of dividend distribution which is different from the main board market, that is, the dividend distribution policy with high dividend and high conversion, which has aroused the widespread concern of market investors. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the high dividend policy of gem listed companies, which is in the early stage of growth, has signalling effect and whether it conveys a signal about the future business prospects of enterprises to investors. And to guide investors to invest. This paper takes the dividend distribution events of gem listed companies from the beginning of 2009 to 2012 as the research sample, applies the signal transmission theory of dividend, and adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research. This paper analyzes the signal transmission effect of dividend policy of gem listed companies in China. The results show that the dividend policy of gem companies does have signaling effect, and different dividend policies will cause different market reactions. In terms of the intensity of dividend signal, the market reaction of dividend announcement varies with the size of unanticipated dividend. However, through further regression analysis, it is found that the dividend policy as a signal conveys not the future business prospects, but the current operating performance. It also provides some reasonable suggestions for regulating the dividend distribution behavior of gem market and investors' investment behavior.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前4條

1 喻國平;事件研究:經(jīng)濟和金融研究的重要方法[J];金融與經(jīng)濟;1998年10期

2 王素娟;;兩種股利理論的比較——追隨者效應(yīng)理論與迎合理論[J];科技與管理;2008年01期

3 梁萊歆;王文芝;;上市公司超能力派現(xiàn)信號效應(yīng)實證研究[J];上海立信會計學(xué)院學(xué)報;2007年06期

4 孟焰;王偉;;非經(jīng)常性損益信息市場反應(yīng)的事件研究[J];中國會計評論;2010年01期

本文編號：1908839